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Preface and Introduction
This is a book of essays about European history. The title and the motto 
are taken from a text by the French philosopher and writer Paul Valéry. 
These few words date from 1919 and can be seen as the shortest summary 
of the new mood that came over Europe in the interbellum years. Until 
1914 nobody had seen Europe as a Cape of Asia. Rather, Asia was seen 
as a backyard of Europe, a region to be conquered, ruled and exploited 
by Europeans as they brought the light of modern, i.e. Western, civiliza-
tion to these backward areas. The same was true, and to an even greater 
extent, for Africa, which had almost entirely been submitted to European 
rule during the last decades of the 19th century. While Asia was consid-
ered a stagnated and backward part of the world, European thinkers also 
realized that once, long ago, the first great civilizations had flourished 
there. Such ideas did not exist about Africa. In the eyes of the Europeans, 
the dark continent had never played a role in world history. Indeed, it did 
not have a history at all, at least not before Europeans arrived there. The 
most famous formulation of this opinion was given by the German phi-
losopher Hegel who wrote: ‘Africa […] is no historical part of the World 
[…]’ (see: ‘Eurocentrism’).
This Eurocentric world view was the result of the dominant position 
Europe had acquired over a great number of years. And that dominant 
position was seen as proof of the superiority of European civilization. 
There are many formulations to be found of this European feeling of 
supremacy but probably none more pertinent and powerful than the 
words that John Henry Newman wrote about this in his The Idea of a 
University. According to Newman, Western civilization ‘has a claim to be 
considered as the representative Society and Civilization of the human 
race, as its perfect result and limit, in fact’. In ‘European Ideas about Edu-
cation, Science and Art’, I discuss these ideas at length.
Newman formulated these ideas extremely forcefully, but they were 
held then by virtually the entire Western intellectual world. Not surpris-
ingly, this resulted in a Eurocentric view of world history, one in which 
non-European nations only entered the stage when they were confront-
ed with and subjected to the Europeans (see: ‘Eurocentrism’). After all, 
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history in its modern, scientific form was a European invention anyway. 
The essay ‘History: Science or Art?’ describes the way modern, scientific 
history was developed in 19th-century Europe.
When Newman gave his lectures on The Idea of a University, European 
supremacy was nearing its zenith. This was the result of a centuries-long 
process. It began in the 1490s with the voyages of Columbus and Vasco 
da Gama and ended in 1945. The first essay of this book, the one on ‘Glo-
balization’, offers an overview of this process and the historical interpre-
tations of it. My argument here is that what we today call globalization 
extends back a long way in history. It is the result of two long-term pro-
cesses, the expansion of Europe and the Industrial Revolution.
The expansion of Europe is a subject that I have studied for well over 
three decades. The first book I published on the subject, Expansion and 
Reaction, dates from 1978. In this book I defined the expansion of Europe 
as ‘the history of the encounters between diverse systems of civilization, 
their influence on one another and the gradual growth toward a global, 
universal system of civilization’. Today I have some doubts about this. I am 
not a believer in Huntington’s theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’, which 
I consider too simplistic, but I also have some doubts about Fukuyama’s 
‘End of history’ because I see the potential for new ideological controver-
sies, for example about ecology and sustainability, in other words about 
the question of how to deal with Planet Earth. However this may be, the 
point is that according to this definition, European expansion includes 
more than colonization and imperialism alone. It also includes informal 
forms of empire, economic interconnections and cultural exchange. One 
could argue that the most important form of European expansion was 
the creation of the New World, a new Europe overseas that, even after it 
acquired political independence, was very strongly connected to the old 
Europe. The languages spoken in the New World are English and French, 
Spanish and Portuguese, the religion is Christianity and the civilization 
European.
The expansion of Europe became ever more powerful after the 
Industrial Revolution. This revolution was rooted in science and tech-
nology and resulted in the division of the world into rich nations and 
poor nations. That division still persists today. The contributions on ‘The 
Expansion of Europe and the Development of Science and Technology’ 
and ‘Rich and Poor: Early and Later’ are about these developments. Euro-
pean expansion culminated in the colonization and imperialism of the 
19th and 20th centuries. Among historians of European expansion, there 
exists a certain division of labor between those specialized in this period 
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of colonization and imperialism and the others, whose main interest is in 
the earlier years. I belong to the first group. My publications in this field 
include The European Empires, 1815–1919, a textbook, and Imperialism and 
Colonialism, a book of essays. The articles ‘Imperialism’ and ‘Changing 
Views on Empire and Imperialism’ offer an overview of the debate on 
the subject of imperialism and some new insights into it, respectively. 
Whereas initially imperialism was considered as having originated in 
response to economic problems in Europe (the need for foreign markets 
for European capital and commodities and for raw materials for Europe’s 
industry), from the 1950s political motives received more attention.
European imperialism was, of course, often connected with warfare. 
Generally speaking, the colonial powers were successful in these con-
flicts. The idea of moral and technical superiority that resulted from this 
series of nearly always successful battles had some influence on the way 
Europeans fought the Great War (see: ‘Imperialism and the Roots of the 
Great War’).
The most spectacular, though not the most important feature of Euro-
pean imperialism was the partition of Africa. In little more than twenty 
years, that entire continent was divided up among European powers and 
submitted to European rule. In 1991 I published a book on this subject 
that was later translated into English and several other languages. The 
essay ‘Some Reflections on the History of the Partition of Africa’ offers 
some afterthoughts on the matter.
The First World War did not bring an end to European colonial rule. 
On the contrary: in 1919 Europe ruled over a larger part of the world 
than it had ever done before. When the remains of the Ottoman Empire 
in the Near East were divided between France and Britain, the domain 
of European rule reached its greatest extent. The self-confidence of the 
colonial powers was still intact. As a matter of fact, it was only then that 
the French became conscious of the fact that they had become a world 
power, and enjoyed it. On the other hand, there were also indications 
that the global power relations were changing. Europe had once been 
‘the world’s banker’ but had now become a debtor, to the United States. 
The American President Woodrow Wilson preached the gospel of self-
determination. The Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in the founding 
of the Soviet Union which, via the Komintern, became a center of anti-
imperialist agitation. Japan emerged as a new power with great ambi-
tions. In parts of Asia, nationalist movements were growing in numbers 
and influence. 
The feeling that things were changing was formulated by philoso-
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phers, writers and historians rather than by businessmen and politicians, 
for whom it was still business as usual. The first indication of this chang-
ing mood was the book Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of 
the West) by the German writer and philosopher Oswald Spengler. This 
thoroughly pessimistic book, published in 1918, was based on a cycli-
cal view of world history. According to this vision, civilizations are 
born, flourish and decline. This cycle had been the fate of the ancient 
civilizations of Asia, and now it was Europe’s turn to enter the path of 
decadence. Another version of this cyclical theory was the ‘heliocentric’ 
concept of world history. According to this interpretation, civilization 
follows the course of the sun, from east to west. From Asia, where it had 
originated, civilization had come to Europe and from there eventually it 
had to cross the Atlantic to America. The article on ‘The American Cen-
tury’ that Henry Luce published in Life in 1941 is a late echo of this vision 
(see: ‘The American Century in Europe’).
Only a year after Spengler’s Untergang had come out, Paul Valéry pub-
lished his Crise de l’esprit  (The Crisis of the Spirit) in which he wrote: 
‘We, civilizations, know now that we are mortal.’ This is a rather strange, 
and some might say a typically French, way of putting things, but what 
he really intended to say was that we Europeans knew by then that our 
civilization would not last forever. Many other European authors wrote 
in the same vein. One of the most famous was the great Dutch scholar 
Johan Huizinga, who published his In de schaduwen van morgen (In the 
Shadows of Tomorrow) in 1935. This book became an overnight best-
seller in the Netherlands as well as, later, elsewhere. The book was trans-
lated into many languages and made him a world-famous writer. The 
article ‘Johan Huizinga and the Spirit of the Nineteen Thirties’ places 
this book in the context of Huizinga’s work and the spirit of the time. 
The concepts of decline and decadence that were so characteristic of the 
1930s were not entirely new of course. In France, after being defeated in 
the war of 1870, the sense of decadence was rather strong, and during the 
fin de siècle it became a general European phenomenon. The essay ‘Two 
fin de siècles’ deals with this subject.
The crisis that Spengler, Valéry, Huizinga and others described was a 
crisis of civilization. But the interbellum years saw other crises as well. 
First, there was the crisis of democracy. It started with the communist 
dictatorship resulting from the Russian Revolution of 1917. The fascist 
dictatorship of Mussolini followed in 1922. In 1928 Salazar became dic-
tator in Portugal, and in 1933 Hitler came to power in Germany. The 
rise of Hitler’s national-socialist movement had much to do with another 
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crisis, the economic crisis, also known as the Great Depression, that fol-
lowed the Wall Street Crash of 1929. And finally there was the diplomatic 
crisis, or The Twenty Years Crisis, to quote the title of E.H. Carr’s classic 
book on the subject. This crisis, spawned by the failure of the peacemak-
ing process of 1919, ended with the beginning of the Second World War 
in the wake of the German invasion of Poland in 1939.
The result of the Second World War was the rise of two new super-
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the end of Europe’s 
world hegemony. The Cold War between the two superpowers origi-
nated from problems in Europe (the Polish question and the division 
of Germany), and Europe was involved in it, but in actual fact NATO 
was run by the Americans, and Eastern Europe was nothing but a satel-
lite of Moscow. At the same time the process of decolonization, which 
started in 1947 in British India and was all but over in 1960, brought an 
end to the European empires. Somewhat paradoxically, this decline of 
Europe’s influence was the beginning of a period of unprecedented peace 
and prosperity. The Marshall Plan laid the foundations for Europe’s eco-
nomic recovery and European cooperation. What British Prime Minister 
Harold MacMillan said about Britain in 1957 was true for the whole of 
Western Europe: ‘You never had it so good.’ Under the pressure of the 
Cold War, and only a few years after the end of World War II, France had 
to accept German rearmament. The European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity was the beginning of a process of cooperation and integration that 
resulted in the European Union of today. The essays ‘What is Europe?,’ 
‘Realism and Utopianism’ and ‘France, Germany and Europe’ deal with 
these developments. 
The Netherlands also flourished after the loss of empire. That was 
quite a surprise. The Dutch had fought many a war to conquer it (see: ‘A 
Peaceful Nation’) and they considered their empire, and particularly the 
Netherlands East Indies, as the basis of the Dutch economy and of the 
well-being of their people. Since the 1930s, ‘The Indies gone, prosper-
ity done’ had been a well-known ditty. The Dutch feared that the loss 
of empire would lead to economic misery and poverty. But it did not. 
Rather, the opposite was the case. A quick and full economic reorienta-
tion followed the loss of the empire, the consequences of which were 
soon forgotten. The only lasting result of colonial times is the presence 
of a number of former colonial subjects (see: ‘Migration and Decoloniza-
tion: the Case of the Netherlands’).
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When looking back at the two centuries discussed in this book, one can 
distinguish three periods. The first was the ‘long 19th century’ which 
lasted until 1914. The 19th century was the century of Europe. Until 
then, Europe had never been more than what it geographically was and 
still is: A Cape of Asia. Even the 18th century did not know a superior 
Western Europe against a stagnated and backwards Asia. Then every-
thing changed. Due to the Industrial Revolution, the productivity of the 
European economies increased dramatically. By 1800, the productivity 
of a British textile worker was about 100 times higher than that of one in 
India. Other sectors of the economy followed. The steam engine, steam 
ships, railways, etc. changed Europe and later the world. By the end of 
the 19th century, Europe dominated virtually the entire world, either by 
informal influence or formal political control. But this supremacy was not 
to last. The century of Europe came to an end with the First World War, 
which led to a diminishing influence of Europe and a growing impact of 
the United States on the world economy. The interbellum years were a 
period in which notions of decline and decadence were becoming fash-
ionable among European intellectuals, and the end of European civiliza-
tion was seriously considered. The Second World War was even more of 
a disaster for Europe and its population, but somewhat surprisingly, this 
did not lead to a revival of the mood of gloom and doom of the 1930s but 
rather to an economic renaissance and a new feeling of self-confidence. 
This period is now coming to an end. The world order is changing again. 
The bonds of friendship between Europe and the United States are loos-
ening, and the European Union is uncertain about what course to follow. 
The question is not if Asia will retake the place in the world economy 
that it had occupied until the 19th century, but when. And whether in 
the long run autocratic China or democratic India will be the leader in 
this vast movement of ‘reorientation’. The title of André Günder Frank’s 
book on this subject, ReOrient, is very well chosen indeed.
The essays collected in this volume deal with many of these topics. 
They are written from a historical perspective. And they are what the 
word ‘essay’ suggests: personal reflections on vast subjects written for 
an intellectual and interested but not necessarily specialized readership. 
They were nearly all written in the last decade of the 20th and the first 
decade of the 21st century. Thus, as the historian knows all too well, they 
reflect the spirit of their time.
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Globalization: A Historical Perspective
‘Globalization’ is neither a very elegant word nor a very clear concept 
but seldom in the history of mankind has a new term been accepted so 
quickly, and on such a global scale. Until the 1990s the word was virtu-
ally unknown, now it is on everybody’s lips. About 700 scholarly publica-
tions appear every year which have the word in its title.1
Because the word is so new, one might believe that the phenomenon 
it refers to is also a new one, but that is not the case. Globalization did 
not begin with the emergence of China and India as the new economic 
powerhouses of the world, nor with the it revolution, or the emergence 
of the multinationals. It did not even begin with the process of Ameri-
canization of the world after World War ii or the age of European impe-
rialism in the late 19th century. Globalization began in 1492 when three 
tiny ships left a small port in southern Spain and set sail for the Ocean. 
Their commander was intent on finding a sea route to the Indies. What 
he actually did was ‘discover’ — as we still say — the Americas. This was 
probably the single most important event in modern history. It led to the 
creation of what is now called ‘the Western world’, that is the continua-
tion of European civilization across the Atlantic, not on the small scale of 
the European subcontinent, but on that of an immense continent.
Five years later another flotilla set sail from the Iberian peninsula. 
In 1497 Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope and arrived in 
Asia. Nobody would say that Vasco da Gama ‘discovered’ Asia as it had of 
course been known to Europeans from ancient times. From a European 
point of view the voyage of Vasco da Gama was less important than that 
of Columbus. It made no ‘discovery’ and it did not lead to the creation 
of a New World. There would not be a new Europe overseas in Asia. But 
that voyage was important all the same both in European and in Asian 
history because it opened up the period of Western dominance over Asia 
or, as the famous Indian historian K.M. Panikkar has put it, the ‘Vasco da 
Gama epoch’ of Asian history.2
These events took place more than five hundred years ago and there 
have been many changes since then. In many respects the world is now 
very different from what it was then. But the most striking difference is 
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no doubt that concerning the ‘wealth and poverty of nations’ to quote the 
title of David Landes’s well-known book (see below ‘Rich and Poor: Early 
and Later’, p. 23).3 This is the result of the two most important develop-
ments of modern history: globalization, which began with the expan-
sion of Europe, and industrialization, which originated in the Industrial 
Revolution of the eighteenth century.
globalization: a very brief history
The Expansion of Europe
For all practical purposes European expansion began in the 1490s with 
the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama. This meant that, in the 
words of Fernand Braudel, Europe faced an ‘extremely grave choice’: 
either to play the American card and develop this immense conti-
nent — that was the difficult and long-term option — or to play the 
Asian card and exploit the riches of Asia, which was the easier, short-
term option.4 Europe decided to practice both forms of expansion but it 
did this with some division of labor. The Spaniards devoted themselves 
to America and created an immense empire. The Portuguese, who were 
weaker in resources, especially demographically speaking — the whole 
country then counted less than a million inhabitants — took the other 
option, not the creation of a new world overseas like a New Spain or 
New England, but the exploitation of existing trade and wealth. Theirs 
was an empire of trade, forts and factories, more oriented towards Asia 
than towards the Americas.
The Iberian hour was brief, however. The great world historical event 
of the ‘long sixteenth century’ (1450–1650) was the transfer of Europe’s 
centre of gravity from the South, the Mediterranean world, to the east-
ern shores of the Atlantic. For a short while the Dutch Republic took 
over the banner of world hegemony. It fought the Spaniards in Europe 
and chased the Portuguese out of most of Asia. The Dutch East India 
Company became the great potentate in Asia. But Holland was essen-
tially as vulnerable as Portugal, as became increasingly clear when it was 
challenged by the British. Towards the end of the seventeenth century 
Britain assumed the mantle of world hegemony, a position it maintained 
until the end of the nineteenth century, when its position was challenged 
by other nations which began claiming parts of the overseas world.
Though the partition of Africa was the most spectacular episode in 
this imperialist race, Asia was the more important one. The British con-
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solidated their Indian Empire, making it the most important of their col-
onies. The French built up their empire in Indochina. The Dutch began 
their expansion from Java into the outer islands of the great Indonesian 
archipelago. Unexpected newcomers like the United States in the Philip-
pines and Japan in Korea and Taiwan also entered the imperialist scene 
in Asia, as did Germany, Italy and Belgium in Africa. Every country great 
or small, new or old, wanted to play a role in the partition of the world. 
This was the new element introduced by imperialism.
However, the era of European expansion was not to last for long. After 
the First World War President Wilson’s concept of self-determination, 
Comrade Lenin’s message of anti-imperialism and the driving forces of 
nationalism in Asia and Africa were indicating that the days of Empire 
would soon be over. Thirty years later Europe had all but withdrawn 
from Asia. Within the space of two decades the European empires had 
dissolved, much faster than they had been created.
The Industrial Revolution
The second great world historical development in modern history was 
the so-called Industrial Revolution that began in Britain at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. There is — as yet — no theory that offers a 
satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon. The most widely accepted 
theory however is one that could be labeled as a convergence theory, that 
is to say an explanation comprising various independent variables which 
came together more or less by accident and that cannot be reduced to 
one prima causa. Historians have mentioned in this respect such features 
as demographic growth, literacy, the scientific and agricultural revolu-
tions, capital formation and low interest rates.
England was the first country to undergo an Industrial Revolution but 
it was not the only one. Western Europe followed suit and in countries 
like Belgium and Germany industrialization in the 1870s was so spec-
tacular that some historians have spoken of a ‘Second Industrial Revolu-
tion’. The same goes for Japan after the Meiji-restoration of 1868 and the 
United States after the Civil War of 1861–1865, both countries which 
went through the same experience. France and Holland, important colo-
nial powers, not to mention Spain and Portugal, had this experience 
much later and to a much lesser degree.
It was the Industrial Revolution that made all the difference for the 
world economy. It divided the world into developed and underdeveloped 
countries, into rich and poor. Until the eighteenth century there was not 
much of an economic difference between the various parts of the world. 
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There was no rich and privileged North as against a poor South. China 
and Latin America probably had the highest level of wealth and develop-
ment. North America was a developing country and Australia was not 
yet even a penal colony. There were differences but they were marginal 
because all societies were living under the ceiling of pre-industrial pro-
ductivity.
Then Prometheus was unbound and the world would never again be 
as it had been before. In the nineteenth century Britain not only took 
over the leading role in European expansion — a traditional periodic 
shift, as leadership had previously moved from Venice to Antwerp and 
then to Amsterdam — but it also began to influence and dominate for-
eign economies. This was something new. Thus the Industrial Revolution 
brought about a qualitative difference. From its beginnings as traditional 
colonialism, comparable to that of the Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, Chi-
nese et cetera, European colonialism moved on and took on a new char-
acter, to become a colonialism sui generis. Globalization, in the form of 
the integration of world markets, had been taking place from about 1500 
on a very limited scale. After the Industrial Revolution, say from about 
1800, global competition for internationally tradeable commodities was 
seen for the first time, and since then it has only increased as it is still 
doing today.
globalization: a brief historiographical overview
The Modern World System
The Industrial Revolution takes an important place in the historiogra-
phy of the development of what Immanuel Wallerstein has called ‘the 
modern world system’.5 Wallerstein however argues that the origins of 
the world economy of today go back much further, viz. to the end of 
the fifteenth century. There he finds the beginnings of a world system 
that developed fully in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and had 
already matured before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The ‘sys-
temic turning point’ he locates in the resolution of the crisis of feudalism 
which occurred approximately between 1450 and 1550. By the period 
1550–1650 all the basic mechanisms of the capitalist world system were 
in place. According to this the Industrial Revolution of about 1760 to 
1830 is no longer considered as a major turning point in the history of 
the capitalist world economy.
The world system, according to Wallerstein, is characterized by an 
international economic order and an international division of labor. 
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It consists of a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery, the location of 
which changes over time (regions can ascend to the core or descend to 
the periphery). Modern history is in fact the history of the continuing 
integration into this world system of ever more parts of the world.
Wallerstein’s work was well received by social scientists but rather 
more critically by historians who in particular criticized the great weight 
given to international trade in the model. Some argued that pre-indus-
trial economies were not able to produce such a significant surplus as to 
make an important international trade possible. Even in trading nations 
par excellence, such as Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, trading 
for export represented a very small percentage of the gnp (and export 
to the periphery only a small percentage of total foreign trade). Gen-
erally speaking, the effects of European expansion on overseas regions 
were not very important. In Asia the impact of overseas trade was only 
regional. Both in India (textile) and Indonesia (cash crops) only some 
regions were affected by the European demand for goods. As far as Africa 
is concerned, the trade in products was very limited. Much more impor-
tant was the Atlantic slave trade. In the Americas and the Caribbean the 
impact of European expansion was most dramatic, not so much because 
of trade but because of the demographic decline of the original popula-
tion.
An interesting point of Wallerstein’s theory is his questioning of the 
very concept of an Industrial Revolution and thus of the distinction 
between pre-industrial and industrial colonialism. This distinction has 
been a central argument in the classical theory of imperialism, a theory 
that has dominated the historiography of late-nineteenth and twentieth 
century European expansion and globalization (see below ‘Imperialism’, 
p. 35).
the end of history (though not of historiography)
European colonialism and global domination reached its zenith between 
the two world wars when most of Asia and virtually all of Africa were 
ruled by European nations. After the end of the second war the world 
changed dramatically. The European era was over. Decolonization 
brought about an end to the European colonial empires. The United 
States became the world’s superpower. ‘The American Century’, to quote 
the title of an article by the editor/publisher Henry Luce, began. Luce 
published his famous article in one of his journals, Life, on 17 February 
1941. He argued that America had to play a major role in the war that 
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was going on and which he considered a war for freedom and democracy. 
America now was a world power and it had to act accordingly, that is to 
say, it had to become a global player (see below, ‘The American Century 
in Europe’, p. 104).
Henry Luce’s prediction that the coming age would fulfill history and 
tensions and wars would become obsolete, was faintly echoed by Francis 
Fukuyama when in 1989 he coined the expression ‘The End of History’.6 
In his famous article with that catching but rather misleading title Fuku-
yama did not argue that after the end of the Cold War nothing of histori-
cal importance would happen anymore. He used the term in a Hegelian 
way to indicate that the struggle of competing ideologies had come to an 
end because a consensus had been reached that the world order should 
be based on capitalist production and democratic political systems.
Maybe this explains how, at the same moment that Fukuyama put 
forward his thesis of the end of history, the word globalization started its 
great advance which has led to the stardom it has today. Politicians and 
businessmen use it as an argument for reforms, revisions and reductions. 
Economists and social scientists have also discovered the subject and so 
did historians as is made clear by the fact that in 2007 a new journal 
was launched with the title of Journal of Global History.7 A lot of work on 
this subject has to be done by historians because the world did not turn 
global overnight. Globalization is the result of a process that has been 
going on for at least five centuries. Therefore it is a historical subject par 
excellence.
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Rich and Poor: Early and Later
Historians are a funny lot. They have strange ways of explaining things. 
They don’t give proofs but only examples. They will argue that phe-
nomenon A was the result of phenomenon B. But they will not predict 
that whenever B will produce itself again, A will follow. Thus they — or 
should I say, we — give strange answers but not, like economists as 
Keynes famously said, to questions that nobody asks. On the contrary, 
we deal with important questions that interest many people, questions 
such as the Causes of the French Revolution or the Origins of the First 
World War. Some historians go even further and ask even more general 
questions, like why and how wars begin or what the social origins of 
dictatorship and democracy are. There are many of such great historical 
questions and it is difficult to tell which is the most important one. Many 
people however will agree that one of the most important questions of 
today is: Why are some nations so rich and some so poor?
Formerly the answer to this question was considered to be easy. That, 
generally speaking, Europe — or ‘the West’ — was rich and others were 
not, was due to the help of God and/or the special virtues of the white 
man. For others with a more rationalist approach to history, salvation 
had not come from the Allmighty but from liberalism and capitalism. 
Even Karl Marx, no friend of capitalism, argued that capitalism liber-
ated great productive forces and was a necessary stage in the inevitable 
and desirable transition from feudalism to socialism. Therefore he also 
welcomed the introduction of capitalism in Asia, by way of colonialism, 
because that would awake Asia from its secular slumber and liberate it 
from the constraints of the ‘Asian mode of production’. Friedrich Engels 
wrote on January 22, 1848 in The Morning Star: ‘the [French, W.] con-
quest of Algeria is an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civ-
ilization’.8 Some truly orthodox Marxists like the Beiing professor Zhang 
Zhi-Lian still hold this position. According to him the causes of China’s 
stagnation (before 1949!) are to be found in Chinese society itself. He 
wrote ‘The roots of China’s stagnation lay more in the economic struc-
ture and mental make-up characteristic of precapitalist modes of life 
than in imperialist encroachments.’ And he concluded: ‘It was basically 
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the refusal to adapt to new conditions and the stubbornness with which 
they clung to the old that incapacitated our forebears to resist effectively 
the aggressions of colonialism and imperialism and to absorb the ‘truly 
progressive’ (my quotation marks, W.) elements of modern capitalism in 
order to make a genuine industrial take off.9
Western neo-Marxists however generally hold rather different views. 
Their arguments are related to the so-called dependencia or develop-
ment of underdevelopment school. This theory which became very pop-
ular in the 1960’s had its origins in the observation of the permanency 
of Latin America’s problems: poverty, inequality, slums, external debts, 
dominance by foreign capital, etcetera. In one word: dependency. The 
theory of dependency argues that this situation is not the result of unde-
velopment but of underdevelopment. The ‘Third World’ is seen as the 
periphery of a world economic system in which the centre, that is to 
say the North, is accumulating the profits and keeping the periphery in 
a situation of permanent dependency. Thus, underdevelopment is not 
a situation but a process. The Third World is not undeveloped, but it is 
being underdeveloped by the West. The dependencia theory was first put 
forward by the Argentinean economist Raoul Prebish in 1947 and then 
further developed by scholars like Furtado, Samir Amin, Galtung and 
others to become a universal theory applicable not only to Latin America 
but to the entire Third World. André Gunder Frank formulated it in a 
catchy phrase: ‘the development of underdevelopment’.
The ‘dependencianists’ form an important school of thought that has 
certainly put its finger on a number of problems that are very relevant 
to our analysis of the relationship between development and underde-
velopment. It should be said, however, that in so far as they consider the 
incorporation of the overseas world in the world economy as the one 
and only cause of underdevelopment, their theory is untenable. When 
we compare for example on the one hand, countries like Egypt, India 
and Nigeria, which were strongly influenced by colonialism, and, on the 
other hand, countries that have never been colonies and where West-
ern influence has been minimal, like Afghanistan, Nepal and Ethiopia, 
which are then the more underdeveloped ones? The answer is not dif-
ficult.
Frank has been one of the most influential thinkers on the problem 
of the relations between the ‘North’ and the ‘South’. These terms came in 
use in the 1960’s to replace the more traditional opposition of ‘East and 
West’. In those days of the Cold War the words ‘East’ and ‘West’ were used 
as terms for the two blocs that stood against each other, and they were 
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thus not available in their traditional sense to indicate Europe and Asia. 
In a way they were similar because the East was considered to be stagnat-
ed — or underdeveloped — while the West was dynamic, or developed. 
But one knew that this had not always been the case. The old words 
‘Ex Oriente lux’ refer to this. The title of Frank’s latest book, ReOrient 
includes a reference to this observation.
Frank takes issue with some theories about the secular superiority 
and predominance of the West over the East, and in many respects he is 
right. Some five hundred years ago the differences in wealth and devel-
opment not only between Europe and Asia but between all parts of the 
world were marginal. It is difficult to find reliable data for that period. 
But this does not really matter. Prima facie evidence demonstrates that 
between economies that were all based on traditional agricultural pro-
duction with very limited division of labor, little production for the mar-
ket and only small scale artisanal production of non-food commodities, 
the differences must have been very small indeed. The ratio being some-
thing in the order of 1 to 2 or even 1 to 1.5. To paraphrase a well-known 
ditty from the 14th century:
‘When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the wealthy man?’
Now, however, the differences between rich and poor countries are 
enormous. The explanation of this development is by no means straight-
forward, but it is clear that this has more to do with the industrial revolu-
tion than with colonial exploitation and the incorporation of peripheral 
countries into the western world economy. There is probably no more 
striking illustration of the relative importance of intercontinental trade 
in the early days of European expansion than these simple data: around 
1600 the combined merchant fleets of the European states only had a 
total tonnage of one or two — around 1800 of seven or eight — of today’s 
supertankers. Intercontinental shipping was spectacular but not impor-
tant. What changed the situation completely was the coming of the 
steamship and the industrial revolution. But for more than three centu-
ries, between 1500 to 1800, the interaction between various parts of the 
world had been marginal. Later on this changed.
Does this mean that colonialism at least then became an important 
factor for the wealth of the West? The answer to that question is not easy 
to give. Britain was the first country to have an Industrial Revolution and 
Britain indeed was a colonial power. But other countries like Belgium 
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and Germany followed suit. These countries however, did not possess 
colonies at that time. The same goes for Japan after the Meiji-restoration 
of 1868 and the United States after the Civil War of 1861–1865, to men-
tion two other countries which went through the same experience. In 
France and Holland, important colonial powers, not to mention Spain 
and Portugal, industrialization came much later and developed to a 
much lesser degree. One might well wonder whether its colonial posses-
sions were not more of an impediment to a country like Holland than an 
asset for modernization and industrialization.
If, then, the theory that industrialization was the result of colonialism 
is unjustified, the related theory that the West, after its industrializa-
tion, became dependent on the colonial world as a producer of raw 
materials and a market for industrial commodities is also untenable. 
The Swiss economist Paul Bairoch has demonstrated that as far as raw 
materials are concerned, the developed world has been practically self-
sufficient until far into the twentieth century. In 1914, after a century of 
intense colonization, Europe provided 97 to 99 per cent of the miner-
als it needed and about 90 per cent of the raw material for its textile 
industry. As far as energy is concerned, Bairoch’s figures are even more 
striking. During the first half of the twentieth century Europe exported 
more energy to the Third World than it imported from it. In the nine-
teenth century the surplus on the energy balance was very big indeed. 
England played a major role in this. Coal amounted to about 14 per cent 
(in value) of British exports. To put it briefly, until the Second World 
War Europe itself provided about three quarters of the raw materials it 
needed for its industry.
Another myth concerns the role of the overseas world as a market 
for European commodities. Again, Bairoch’s calculations are interesting. 
In the nineteenth century — until 1914 — the developed world exported 
17 per cent of its export production to the overseas territories. In other 
worlds, 83 per cent of the export trade took place among the developed 
countries themselves. Moreover, the production for export was only 
a small part of the total production, roughly 8 to 9 per cent. The vast 
majority of production was for domestic consumption. To summarize: 8 
to 9 per cent of the production was exported and of this 17 per cent went 
to ‘Third World’ countries. If we restrict ourselves to industrial products 
the percentage is somewhat higher, 5 to 8 per cent, and this percent-
age was to grow during the twentieth century. One should however take 
into account that for some countries, like Britain, and for some sectors, 
like textiles, the export trade was really quite important. But taken as a 
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whole, Bairoch concludes convincingly the overseas world was not of 
prime importance.10
Neither Landes, nor Frank, nor Bairoch give definite answers to the 
question why some nations are rich and others poor, but they demon-
strate that at least some historians not only ask important questions but 
also come up with intelligent, albeit different, answers.
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The Expansion of Europe and the Development 
of Science and Technology
The history of the modern world has been dominated by two major 
events: the industrial revolution and the expansion of Europe. The 
expansion of Europe was a much encompassing process in which colo-
nialism was only one aspect. It included the peopling of new continents, 
the creation of the modern world economy and the diffusion of European 
culture and values among other civilizations. The industrial revolution, 
which originally began in Europe, spread all over the globe changing the 
way of life of all the world’s inhabitants. These processes were of course 
interrelated. On the one hand the expansion of Europe played a certain 
role in the coming into existence of the industrial revolution in Europe. 
On the other hand the industrialization of Europe dramatically changed 
Europe’s power and thus made it possible for her to conquer, administer 
and exploit vast portions of Asia and Africa. Expansion and industrializa-
tion went hand in hand. Science and technology played a major role in 
both processes. As we all know, the industrial revolution in its modern 
form was based on the systematic application of science and technology 
to industrial processes. The expansion of Europe was based on techno-
logical innovations. In its wake, modern technology was introduced in 
various parts of the world. New branches of applied and pure science 
were developed: for example, tropical medicine, tropical agriculture, ori-
entalism, anthropology and so on.
Let us first have a look at the original industrial revolution, the one in 
Britain in the 18th century. There is no doubt that this industrial revolu-
tion was based on a revolution in technology. To what extent was this 
technological revolution for its part connected with the so-called scien-
tific revolution that had taken place in 16th and 17th century Europe? 
This is a matter for debate. It has been argued that before the 19th cen-
tury, the influence of science on technology was non-existent. This is 
perhaps an exaggeration but it is true to say that science and technology 
are not necessarily interconnected. There has always existed technol-
ogy — and important technology for that matter — which was not based 
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on science but on practical experience. It is also true that modern West-
ern science, as it was developed during the scientific revolution, did not 
find its origins in technical needs or problems. The problems scientists 
were interested in were largely those of pure science. But on the other 
hand, it is also true that the great originality of the development of West-
ern science and technology in modern history was the strong intercon-
nection between the two.
This was the result of a long process of preparation. As one of the 
founding fathers of the history of technology, Lewis Mumford, wrote 
in 1934 in his Technics and Civilization: ‘Men had become mechanical 
before they perfected complicated machines to express their new bent 
and interest’. This was the result of a change of mind. ‘Before the new 
industrial processes could take hold on a great scale, a reorientation of 
wishes, habits, ideas, goals was necessary.’ This took place in Europe dur-
ing the transition from the Middle Ages to the modern period when tra-
ditional religion lost its impact on the European mind. Or, as Mumford 
remarked: ‘Mechanics became the new religion, and it gave to the world 
a new Messiah: the machine.’11
After about 1750 in Europe, science and technology became nearly as 
inseparable as Siamese twins. The results of this were overwhelming. In 
1800 the productivity of an English textile worker was about 100 times 
higher than that of one in India. That this was possible, was the result of 
industry, science and technology.
science and technology
We can fairly say that science and technology were the decisive factors in 
the historical process that led to the formation of the modern world and 
that they are still of decisive importance today. All the same, we maintain 
an uncomfortable relationship with them. On the one hand, we real-
ize only too well that we owe practically all our prosperity and most of 
our well-being to science and technology, that the future of mankind 
depends upon this. On the other hand, we also know that this knowledge 
carries problems. Knowledge in itself is not a boon, it has to be used in 
a sensible way. We might even go further and state that, to many peo-
ple, knowledge and science are something dangerous, even diabolical. 
 Science evokes forces it is not always able to control. The scholar is not 
only seen as a benefactor, but also as a menace. This is one of the West-
ern views on science. It is one of the leitmotifs in the well-known Faust 
saga, the notion that all human knowledge is inspired by the devil. There 
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is another vision as well, the one not of men producing useful knowledge 
but pure science, not Dr Faust but Archimedes of Syracuse who, when he 
was stabbed by a Roman soldier, merely asked him not to ruin his circles. 
Both types of scholars exist, however in practice the distinction cannot 
always be maintained, because even pure science may lead to practical 
results.
We also see this when we look at the role of sciences in European 
expansion. From the very beginning colonialism faced a dilemma: to 
develop or not to develop, to interfere or not to interfere, to impose 
Western values as a universal truth or to respect indigenous values. This 
is an old debate that is still going on. The British in India in the 18th 
century already wondered: What are we doing here? How should we act? 
What right do we have to meddle with this society, to interfere with this 
culture? We are all familiar with the outcome of the debate. Colonial-
ism followed its own inner dynamics. Economy, science and technology 
collaborated in the exploitation of the overseas territories. Knowledge 
about the East was absorbed and systematized in Western science. West-
ern science and technology were exported to the overseas world.
This process of exchange has been going on now for some five centu-
ries and in an ever more increasing way. How this process actually took 
place and whether there is a general pattern in this to be discovered we 
still do not know. We are only at the beginning of the study of this impor-
tant field of research. The first scholar to suggest that such a general pat-
tern can be distinguished was George Basalla who, in 1967, in a famous 
article in Science, presented a diffusionist model of the spread of Western 
science in non-Western areas. Basalla distinguished three phases. Dur-
ing Phase i, the non-European world acted only as an object of study 
for European science, it was followed by Phase ii, the one of colonial 
science. In Phase iii the transition took place to a situation in which 
non-Western countries developed an independent scientific tradition.12
This model has been criticized as being too simplistic and one sided, 
which undoubtedly it is. But what is true is that in the first stages of 
European expansion there was not much diffusion of European science 
and technology. Nor was European technology necessarily superior to 
Asian technology. On the contrary, the quality of Indian shipbuilding, for 
example, had been greatly appreciated by the British, and the same was 
the case with textiles. And even when Asian technology struck European 
observers as backward and unproductive — as for example was the case 
with minting — this was not necessarily true within the context of the 
Asian economy of those days with its own specific emphases.
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Generally speaking, one can maintain that, in the first stage of Euro-
pean expansion, the non-Western world functioned primarily as an object 
for Western scientific curiosity. Originally, of course, the need for knowl-
edge included the weather and climate, the geography and topography 
of the Eastern world, as well as astronomical observation, indispensable 
knowledge for shipping and exploration. Next, scientific concern turned 
towards the flora and fauna of the tropical world, another understanda-
ble field of interest. After all, in the beginning nearly everything revolved 
around spices!
But in addition there was an interest in Eastern culture and society, 
both in the material sense of products and artefacts, and in the immate-
rial sense of languages, customs and traditions. This interest also existed 
right from the beginning, but it has considerably increased since the 
18th century. There were three successive movements to provide it with 
strong impulses: the Enlightenment in the 18th century, the geographi-
cal movement in the 19th century, and finally full colonialism in the late 
19th and 20th centuries.
The Enlightenment gave the first impetus to the formation of numer-
ous learned societies in Europe as well as in Asia. The Batavian Society 
of Arts and Sciences was founded in Indonesia in 1778, just a few years 
before the well-known Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1784 by the 
famous orientalist Sir William Jones. In the 19th century, travels and 
particularly exploratory journals became the great passion of Europe-
ans. This also explains the rise of geography and ethnology. In the years 
between 1820 and 1830 geographical societies were founded in most 
European countries. Ethnology became popular in the late 19th century, 
the age of Darwinism. No wonder that ethnology — or anthropology as 
we call it today — also adopted the evolutionary perspective of Darwin-
ism and divided mankind into higher and lower races or — in a milder 
variety — into peoples at different levels of development. This taxonomy 
later invited severe criticism.
The greatest impulse for the diffusion of science and technology how-
ever was engendered by the colonial system itself. An increasing degree 
of involvement necessitated knowledge of all kinds of areas. It dawned 
on people that, as one colonial administrator observed, every form of 
government should be based on sound knowledge. If one were to respect 
the indigenous society, one would have to get to know it first. On the 
other hand, this also held true if one were to develop this society. This 
led to the dilemma that is known as the ‘Oriental-Occidental Controver-
sy’. The classical example of this almost universal debate we find in India 
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at the beginning of the 19th century.13 The issue at stake was whether 
the colonial power should promote the spread of Western education and 
science or rather stimulate indigenous civilization and traditions. In the 
Indian case both positions were defended by the British but also by the 
Indians. Thus, it was not purely a matter of colonialists versus colonized. 
Some British orientalists had a very high esteem of Indian civilization 
and scientific knowledge, some Indians on the other hand were crying 
for instruction in Western knowledge and languages. But there were also 
Indians who took the opposite view and there were British who found 
oriental sciences absurd and worthless. The famous British administra-
tor Lord Macaulay observed that ‘a single shelf of a good European library 
was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia.’14 Macaulay 
had his way and in 1835 the controversy was solved once and for all: the 
Government of India was to promote European languages, literature and 
science among the population of India.
As we all know this was to become the general pattern. In the 19th 
century Western science and technology became so overwhelmingly 
superior that nobody questioned the need to export them to the overseas 
world. The complaint now was not that the colonial power did too much 
in this respect but rather that it did too little and therefore was to blame 
for the tardy development of the non-Western world.
conclusion
This then brings us to our conclusion. We have seen that over the last 
five centuries an enormous transformation has taken place. The world 
was first interconnected by European expansion, than united by modern 
and industrial colonialism. After 1945 that particular system fell apart, 
but it was continued in the form of the capitalist world system that we 
know today. Economically speaking, our planet has become one world, 
although with different and competing blocs. On the other hand political 
and cultural divisions continue to exist and are, if anything, becoming 
deeper. It is interesting to observe how complicated the present situa-
tion from the Western perspective has become. On the one hand there is 
Japan, which is seen as an economic opponent but not as an ideological 
one. On the other hand there is the Arabic world, which is considered at 
least by some not as an economic but as a cultural danger. It is also inter-
esting to note that there is a definite globalization and westernization 
to be seen at the level of material civilization and popular culture (Coca 
Cola, jeans, hamburgers, pop music, soap opera’s), but also a revival of 
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traditional values as is illustrated by the rise of fundamentalism and vari-
ous forms of linguistic and cultural nationalism. These phenomena, as 
well as the recently discovered problems of the ‘acculturation’ of immi-
grants from the Islamic world, have led to an extensive debate in the 
West — in America and also in Europe — on the question of cultural uni-
versalism as against cultural relativism. Are Western values and ideas 
about human rights, democracy, rights of women, et cetera, universal or 
has every civilization the right to cultivate its own values that cannot be 
examined against some universal moral code?
This question, although recently rediscovered is really an old one. In 
one form or another it has been with us since the beginning of European 
expansion some five centuries ago. It became acute with the emergence 
of modern colonialism in the 19th century. When looking at it from 
this long-term perspective it is interesting to note that both schools of 
thought, universalism and relativism, have always existed. The dominant 
school however was the universalist one. In the early phases of European 
expansion, from the 16th to the 18th centuries, Christianity was the most 
important ideology. In the 19th century, as a result of the Enlightenment 
and the democratic revolutions of the 18th century, the dominant ide-
ology was liberalism, that is to say the belief in liberty, democracy and 
material progress. In the 20th century socialism became very important. 
Whatever the differences between these ideologies, what they all had in 
common was their claim of being universally valid.
On the other hand, there has also always existed a certain counter-
point to the value-imperialism of the West. In the old days there was the 
admiration for the ancient civilizations and the wisdom of the East. This 
was summarized in the well-known phrase: Ex Oriente lux (Light came 
from the East). In the 18th century, the philosophes criticized European 
societies by holding them up to the mirror of Eastern examples. Mon-
tesquieu’s Lettres persanes is perhaps the most famous example of this. 
Voltaire wrote that China was the best empire the world had ever seen; 
but Voltaire, of course, knew very little about China. At the same time, 
Rousseau and others developed the myth of the bon sauvage. In the 19th 
century, under the influence of romanticism and historicism, the argu-
ment was developed that every civilization was an entity of its own, with 
its own set of values that cannot be judged from outside. So Europe has 
always known both universalism and cultural relativism.
The debate seems to be as lively as ever. At the end of the Cold War 
and with the disappearance of the Soviet Empire, and indeed of the Sovi-
et Union itself, for a moment the world seemed to have become a very 
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simple place. After the death of fascism and communism only one ideol-
ogy survived, that of liberal democracy. As we all know Francis Fukuy-
ama called this: The End of History. If one looks more closely at the world, 
however, things are not simple and the triumph of the West, be it politi-
cal or ideological, is not altogether so self-evident.
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Imperialism
introduction: the problem of a definition
‘Imperialism is not a word for scholars’, Sir Keith Hancock remarked a 
long time ago, and he was right.15 Scholars have to make clear what they 
mean when they use certain concepts or terms, and therefore have to 
give definitions. This, however, is impossible with the word imperialism. 
The problem is not that there are no definitions of imperialism, rather 
the contrary. There are about as many definitions of imperialism as there 
are authors who have written on the subject. They vary from those which 
refer to one specific form of imperialism, mostly Europe’s 19th century 
colonial expansion, to others which give a very general meaning to the 
word, like the one in Webster’s Dictionary: ‘any extension of power or 
authority or an advocacy of such extension’. Clearly, such a definition 
can cover almost any situation. Not surprisingly therefore the word has 
often simply been used as an invective in order to criticize the policy of 
another country.
So defined imperialism is useless as a scholarly concept. In serious 
studies however the word has always had a more limited meaning. The 
problem is exactly how limited its meaning should be. Sometimes the 
word is used in a universal historical way in order to characterize the pol-
itics of a dominant power. Thus some historians have spoken of Roman 
or even Assyrian imperialism. But this is highly exceptional. In historical 
studies imperialism generally refers to the policy of European countries, 
and primarily of Britain, during the 19th and 20th centuries, aiming at 
the expansion of their power and influence over other continents. It is in 
this context that the term imperialism originated and began to be used as 
a political and historical concept. Historically speaking, the word impe-
rialism is therefore obviously closely associated with colonialism. But 
while colonialism was only used to refer to one specific form of alien 
rule, viz. the colonial one, imperialism acquired a wider meaning and 
included various other forms of influence over alien nations and states, 
such as the financial influence of France and Germany in the Russian 
and Ottoman Empires or such things as British ‘gunboat policy’ and 
American ‘dollar diplomacy’.
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After the end of the colonial empires the word ‘colonialism’ could 
only be used to refer to a phenomenon from the past and thus fell out of 
use. ‘Imperialism’ however continued to be used, and from then on also 
indicated those forms of domination that were formally different from 
but factually comparable to those formerly practiced by the colonial 
powers. For a while the word ‘neocolonialism’ was also used for this pur-
pose, but somehow that term was less successful. By the end of the Sec-
ond World War America had become the new superpower. Accordingly, 
imperialism was now mainly applied to describe the foreign policy of the 
United States vis à vis other countries, in particular in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa. There was also an attempt to make the concept applica-
ble to the policy of the Soviet Union with regard to the Central and East-
ern European countries that came under its influence after 1945, but this 
was not very successful. The reason for this is that, historically speak-
ing, imperialism has connotations with capitalism, and not with com-
munism, and with overseas possessions and not with adjacent countries. 
Although there clearly was a Soviet Empire, it was not considered to be 
an example of imperialism but of traditional power politics. Only in its 
very general meaning as another word for all forms of power policies or 
simply as an invective, was it also used to describe communist countries 
like the Soviet Union and China. After the end of the Cold War this use 
of the word imperialism lost much of its earlier attraction.
In this article imperialism is used in the sense of its initial meaning, 
that is to say as a term to indicate the extension of formal or informal, 
mostly European, rule over Asian and African countries in the late 19th 
and early 20th century as well as, more generally, for some other forms 
of western predominance during and after the colonial period.
imperialism: the history of a concept
Like ‘colonialism’, which was probably first used in the title of a book of 
a French socialist critic of the phenomenon, Paul Louis’ Le Colonialisme 
from 1905, ‘imperialism’ was originally a French word. It was from the 
1830s onwards that the terms ‘impérialiste’ and ‘impérialisme’ came into 
use in France. They referred to the empire of Napoleon and to the impe-
rial pretentions of his nephew Louis Napoleon, later known as Napoleon 
iii. The colonial connotation came only after the word had begun to be 
used in Britain in the 1860s. Then, of course, the empire it referred to 
was no longer the continental one of France but the overseas empire of 
Great Britain.
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Although the word imperialism was already used in Britain in the 
1860’s, the historical concept appeared only in 1902 with the publica-
tion of J.A. Hobson’s Imperialism. A Study. Hobson, a radical but not a 
socialist, was deeply impressed by the South African War (1899–1902). 
In 1900 he published a book on this subject, The War in South Africa. Its 
Causes and Effects, in which he argued that power in South Africa had 
fallen into the hands of a small group of financiers ‘chiefly German in 
origin and Jewish in race’.16 In his famous book Imperialism. A Study he 
elaborated this vision into a general theory of imperialism, and used the 
term imperialism to indicate the ‘expansion of Great Britain and of the 
chief continental Powers’.17 The word expansion referred to the fact that 
over the last thirty years a number of European nations, Great Britain 
being first and foremost, had ‘annexed or otherwise asserted political 
sway over vast portions of Africa and Asia, and over numerous islands in 
the Pacific and elsewhere’.18 For Hobson the meaning of the word impe-
rialism was very clear: it was the establishment of political control. He 
also was explicit about the forces behind it. Various people such as an 
‘ambitious statesman, a frontier soldier and an overzealous missionary’ 
might play some role in it, ‘but the final determination rests with the 
financial power’.19 Thus Hobson offered us a definition (imperialism is 
the expansion of political power of European countries over the non-
European world), a periodization (imperialism took place over the last 
thirty years, thus between 1870 and 1900) and an explanation: it was the 
result of the workings of the financial powers. In order to explain their 
behavior, Hobson argued that, as a consequence of the capitalist system, 
the British economy suffered from underconsumption. As a result of 
this, surplus capital could no longer be profitably invested in England 
itself. Therefore, the capitalists were ‘seeking foreign markets and for-
eign investments to take off the goods and capital they cannot sell or use 
at home’.20
As Hobson’s theory implied a criticism of capitalism, it had a certain 
attraction to Marxist thinkers. As a result of this, a new Marxist theory of 
imperialism was born. While originally Marx and Engels had considered 
colonialism as an ‘objective’ progressive force, now Marxist theorists like 
Karl Hilferding and Rosa Luxemburg scorned late 19th century impe-
rialism as a form of exploitation and suppression. The Marxist theory 
of imperialism became very influential when it was appropriated by a 
man who was not only a theorist but also a practical politician, Lenin. In 
1916 he published his famous brochure Imperialism. The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism.
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Lenin’s ideas were mostly based on the work of the previous men-
tioned Marxist authors who in turn had been inspired by Hobson’s the-
ory. It was therefore understandable that a direct link was seen between 
Hobson’s and Lenin’s theories, so much so that it became fashionable to 
speak of the ‘Hobson-Lenin thesis’. There are however two important 
differences between Hobson and Lenin. Firstly, for Hobson the flight of 
capital from the metropolis to the overseas world was a consequence of 
the development of capitalism, but not a necessary consequence. The 
origin of the problem was underconsumption. Therefore, theoretically, 
it should also be possible to solve the problem by increasing the pur-
chasing power of the working classes. Indeed Hobson remarked: ‘If the 
consuming public in this country [Great Britain, W.] raised its standard 
of consumption to keep pace with every rise of productive powers, there 
could be no excess of goods or capital clamorous to use Imperialism in 
order to find markets (...)’.21
Secondly and more importantly, Hobson and Lenin tried to explain 
two different things. Hobson, who wrote his book during the South Afri-
can War, wanted to explain the division of the world and more specifi-
cally of Africa, in the late 19th century. Lenin, who wrote in 1916, tried 
to explain the redivision of the world of which the First World War was 
the most spectacular outcome. In Lenin’s brochure the word Africa hard-
ly appears at all. The period he referred to was also different from the 
one dealt with by Hobson: not 1870–1900 but thereafter. He explicitly 
wrote about this: ‘I have tried to show in my pamphlet that it (imperial-
ism, W.) was born in 1898–1900, not earlier’.22 Thus Lenin parted ways 
with  Kautsky and Luxemburg for whom imperialism was little more than 
another word for colonialism.23 For Lenin it was something else: not the 
highest stage of colonialism but of capitalism.
Although the capitalist theory of imperialism was not generally 
accepted and alternative interpretations were launched and had some 
influence, some form of economic interpretation became the standard 
explanation of imperialism during the 1920s and 1930s. Imperialism 
was considered as having originated from economic problems in Europe 
that were characteristic for the late 19th century, in particular the need 
to guarantee the flow of raw materials to the industrialized countries 
and the protection of overseas markets for the sale of their industrial 
products. This consensus broke down after the Second World War under 
the influence of decolonization and the rise of the American empire. 
The new world political situation also had an impact on the theory of 
imperialism. In a famous article, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, two 
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Cambridge historians, Jack Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, developed 
the concept of ‘informal empire’.24 They argued that the real zenith of the 
British Empire was not to be found in the late 19th century but rather 
in the mid-Victorian period of informal British economic hegemony. For 
Britain, the entire 19th century was one of expansion. It was an imperial 
century. Britain’s imperial expansion manifested itself in various forms: 
emigration, trade, overseas investments, the establishment of naval bas-
es etc. The extension of political authority over foreign people was only 
one form of imperialism, and not even the most important one. The Mid-
Victorian empire was comparable to the informal American empire that 
came into being after 1945. It worked with informal means because that 
was the best way of doing things. The maxim of British policy makers 
was: informal empire if possible, formal only if necessary. Due to foreign 
competition and rivalry the late Victorians however were forced to for-
malize their Empire and they did so, willy-nilly.
While Gallagher and Robinson discovered imperialism before empire, 
other theorists also discovered imperialism after empire. This resulted 
not so much from a reflection on the rise of the American empire but 
from a reassessment of decolonization. While after the First World War 
the European powers had increased their territorial possessions, for 
example by the division of parts of the Ottoman empire, and stabilized 
their colonial rule, the situation was very different after the Second 
World War. In Asia the process of decolonization started immediately 
after the war and later on it was also followed on in Africa. Thus in the 
1960’s most of the former colonies had become politically independ-
ent. But political independence did not automatically bring an end to 
the social problems nor to the economic dependency of the ex-colonies. 
Some of the new states became even more dependent on the western-
dominated world system than they had been before. For many observers 
it was clear that the end of empire was not at the same time the end of 
imperialism. Some theorists worked this out in the theory of depend-
ency. According to the dependencianistas, imperialism was not only the 
extension of political control. It also included the dependency of less 
developed parts of the world on the industrial powers. Empire was only 
one form of imperialism, one stage in the history of western dominance.
However, why one form of imperialism was replaced by another 
remained a question, an answer to which was also given by Gallagher 
and Robinson in 1961 in their famous book on the partition of Africa: 
Africa and the Victorians.25 Here they argued that changes in the periph-
ery, that is in the overseas world, rather than in the mother countries, 
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were responsible for the changes in the ways and means of imperialist 
control. Although Africa and the Victorians also primarily dealt with Brit-
ish policy, the theories developed here had a wider meaning. While the 
theory of the imperialism of free trade was typically a theory about Brit-
ish imperialism, the peripheral theory was applicable to the imperialist 
activities of other nations as well. In many cases changes in the non-
western world were decisive in determinating imperialist action. Egypt’s 
financial problems for example led to increasing foreign interference, 
and this, in turn, to a ‘nationalistic’, or rather proto-nationalistic, reac-
tion which plunged Egypt into an internal political crisis which again 
led to foreign intervention and occupation. The discovery of minerals in 
South Africa, to give another example, led to a complete change in the 
balance of power in that part of the continent.
Ronald Robinson later elaborated this interpretation into a more gen-
eral theory based on the observation of the important role of the African 
and Asian partners of the imperialist rulers. In this so called ‘collabo-
rationist theory’, imperialism is conceived of as a system of collabora-
tion between European and non-European forces before, during and 
after colonial rule. The changing forms of imperialism are considered as 
changing forms of collaboration that resulted from changes in the bar-
gaining positions of the various parties.26
The Gallagher and Robinson theories were followed by a great num-
ber of studies on the economic significance of the British Empire and 
the role of economic factors in British imperialism. The important 
place of Britain in the debate on imperialism is understandable because 
Britain was the imperial power par excellence. But for that very reason 
Britain was not the most typical imperial power. Rather it was atypical 
and therefore the discussions in other European countries on imperi-
alism have followed different lines and focused on different questions. 
Chronologically speaking however the European revisionist theories 
were developed in the same years as the British: the debate started in the 
1960s and continued well into the 1980s.
national articulations
In France, Henri Brunschwig’s Mythes et réalités de l’impérialisme colonial 
français, 1871–1914, which appeared in 1960, set the tone for the debate 
on French imperialism. According to Brunschwig, the causes of French 
imperialism were not to be found in economic demands but in the devel-
opment of French nationalism after the defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
A Cape of Asia.indd  |  Sander Pinkse Boekproductie  |  10-10-11  /  11:44  |  Pag. 40
europe and the wider world 41
war of 1870. The protectionist factor was a myth, political factors were 
decisive. Given the specific intellectual climate that existed in France 
after the Second World War, and in which Marxism played such an 
important role, it was to be expected that Brunschwig’s book would lead 
to great controversy, as it did. But the Marxists could hardly deny the 
fact that the French colonial empire had been of little economic impor-
tance in France. In order to rescue the Marxist theory of imperialism 
they therefore argued that French imperialism was not to be found in 
the French colonies but elsewhere, in the Russian and Ottoman empires. 
They argued that French colonialism was not imperialist and French 
imperialism not colonial. In 1984 an important study by Jacques Mar-
seille, based on an extensive data bank on French colonial trade, threw 
new light on the question of economic interest. His conclusion was that 
in the beginning the colonies were useful to French industry from an 
economic point of view but subsequently became a burden.27
In Germany there also was a strong connection between imperialism 
and nationalism but it is not altogether clear to what extent imperialism 
was a result of nationalism. This is because the decision to found a Ger-
man colonial empire was very much the decision of one man, chancel-
lor Bismarck. Therefore in Germany the discussion on imperialism has 
always been concentrated on Bismarck and his motives. There were two 
main interpretations, a foreign political one (imperialism as a move in 
Germany’s international relations) and one in terms of domestic policy, 
like electoral success, financial pressure groups etc. The discussion was 
reopened when in 1969 H.-U. Wehler added new elements to this debate. 
Although he stressed the economic background of imperialism he agreed 
that, as in the case of France, the German colonial empire had not been 
very profitable. In his view, the link between economics and empire must 
be sought on a different level. He emphasized the social problems of the 
Reich (its lack of legitimation because of its creation von oben, by force) 
and considered Bismarck’s bid for colonies as a shrewd political move 
intended both as part of a general, more or less anti-cyclical, economic 
policy, and of a social policy seeking to unite the Germans around issues 
of foreign policy and thus to overcome internal tensions. Thus Wehler’s 
emphasis was more on the domestic than on the diplomatic motives of 
German imperialism under Bismarck.28 Here, the debate on German 
imperialism touches upon a wider discussion, the one on the problem of 
continuity and discontinuity in German foreign policy, the so-called Ger-
man Sonderweg and the place of national-socialism in German history.
Italian imperialism was also studied from a special perspective. It was 
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not very successful during the classical period of imperialism but it con-
tinued during the interwar years, under the influence of fascism. The 
French historian Jean-Louis Miège has emphasized not only the demo-
graphic factor in Italian imperialism, but also its political and ideologi-
cal dimensions — the nationalistic reaction to the loss of population as 
a consequence of emigration — comparing it in this respect to Spanish 
imperialism.29 The interpretation of Portuguese imperialism was long 
dominated by Hammond’s theory of an ‘uneconomic’, that is to say a 
primarily nationalistic, form of ‘imperialism’. Gervase Clarence-Smith 
later challenged this view by making a strong case for an economic inter-
pretation of Portuguese imperialism. He argued that economic motives 
went hand in hand with other ones such as missionary zeal, nationalism 
and others.30
The case of Belgium is very special because in the 19th century, Bel-
gium was an anticolonialist country, but in spite of this it was eventually 
to acquire one of the biggest European colonies in Africa, the Belgian 
Congo (later on Zaire, now again Congo). That this happened was due to 
the extraordinary zeal, tenacity, ruse and ruthlessness of one man, King 
Leopold ii. Jean Stengers has analyzed the singular nature of the king’s 
imperialism which was one of old fashioned economic exploitation and 
in this respect inspired by the example of the Netherlands.31
In the Netherlands the historical discussion on imperialism began 
rather late. The most important contribution to the debate came from 
a book by Maarten Kuitenbrouwer.32 In this he argued that the Dutch 
case was roughly analogous to others, and that the Netherlands followed 
more or less the general pattern. It has also been noted however that 
Dutch imperialism was defensive rather than offensive, reluctant rather 
than enthusiastic. In this respect it was comparable to Britain. In both 
cases there was more continuity than discontinuity, and what disconti-
nuity there was, derived from a change in circumstances, not in policy.
The historical debate on imperialism was mainly about the tradition-
al colonial powers of western Europe but observations have also been 
made about other countries. Russian imperialism poses interesting ques-
tions and offers paradoxical aspects because on the one hand, Russia was 
an object of western European financial imperialism but on the other 
hand it was also acting itself as an expansionist power by extending its 
empire to the East and eventually to the shores of the Pacific. The case 
of Japan is particularly interesting, because it is the only Asian nation 
which became an imperial power. Like other Asian countries it was first 
confronted with western influence but it reacted in a very different way 
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to this challenge. After having been forced to ‘open’ the country in 1853 
it very rapidly accepted Western notions and techniques, so much so 
that already in the 1890s it started its expansion into China. Japanese 
imperialism was continued in the 1930’s and of course during the Second 
World War. Some analysts have also considered Japan’s economic expan-
sion after 1945 as a form of informal imperialism.33
The concept of American imperialism is a very complicated one. Of 
course America has been considered as the main imperialist power since 
1945, but how this was related to its earlier expansion is unclear. While 
some authors consider the Russian expansion to the East as a form of 
imperialism, the American conquest of the West has hardly ever been 
interpreted in this way. Traditionally one has observed that American 
imperialism has come about only by the turn of the century, with the 
Spanish-American war of 1898 and the American take-over of Cuba and 
the Philippines from Spain.
explanation: motives and means
The rich literature on imperialism that has been published from the 1960s 
onwards, has led to a revision of the traditional views on the origins and 
meaning of late 19th century imperialism. Transformations in Europe 
but also in the overseas world have received attention as factors that can 
explain the new imperialist attitude. The main distinction is between 
European interpretations on the one hand, which underline economic, 
political, strategic and ideological motives, and peripheral interpreta-
tions which give special attention to activities and developments in the 
overseas world and in particular to the ‘frontiers’ of European influence. 
The new research has also given attention to such topics as the ecological 
aspects of imperialism, cultural imperialism, the impact of imperialism 
on the sciences et cetera.
Much of the debate on imperialism concerned the motives of the 
imperialists. In order to understand the origins of imperialism however, 
attention has also to be given to another aspect, not the motives but the 
means. The development of imperialism cannot be understood by look-
ing only at transformations in Europe and the overseas world and the 
incentives for imperialist actions that were created by these. What also 
was necessary for such action was the disposal of the necessary means. It 
had always been virtually impossible for Europeans to survive in the envi-
ronmental conditions of tropical Africa. New developments in the medi-
cal sciences, like the prophylactic use of quinine (as from the 1840’s), 
A Cape of Asia.indd  |  Sander Pinkse Boekproductie  |  10-10-11  /  11:44  |  Pag. 43
44 a cape of asia
made it possible for Europeans not only to live, but also to work and even 
to fight under such conditions. The development of new means of trans-
portation (steamships, railways), the opening of new sea routes (like the 
one via the Suez Canal), the revolution in the means of communication 
(the telegraph and later on the telephone and wireless communication) 
made the extension of imperial rule possible. Finally but perhaps most 
importantly the development of new weapons and in particular of the 
machine gun gave the Europeans an enormous advantage in their bat-
tles with non-European nations. Colonial wars became successful almost 
by definition and the European colonial armies became ‘ever victorious’ 
armies. Entire continents could be conquered at very small cost for the 
conquerors.
Thus the great technological superiority of the Europeans came into 
existence during the latter part of the 19th century due to the so-called 
Second Industrial Revolution which took place in Western Europe and 
created rivals for British trade. These technological transformations 
not only offered the means for imperial expansion but also led to new 
demands in the European societies which had their effects on foreign 
and colonial policy. Social and economic questions assumed increasing 
importance. State welfare provisions expanded. The import of tropical 
products at affordable prices was considered as a matter of public con-
cern. This called for sustained economic exploitation which presupposed 
the existence of peace and order, in other words, effective authority.
The balance of power in Europe also changed dramatically in the 
1870s. In the early 19th century, from Napoleon to Bismarck, Europe had 
found itself in an exceptional political situation. Germany and Italy did 
not yet exist. Britain had eliminated France as a maritime and colonial 
rival. Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands, the old colonial powers, had 
had their day. Hence, Britain enjoyed de facto world supremacy, much 
as the United States was to do after the Second World War. All these 
factors were swept away in the 1870s. After its defeat in 1870 France 
sought compensation for its loss as a continental power by strengthening 
its overseas role. Germany and Italy, newcomers both, claimed a place 
under the sun.
Internal political factors also played a part. European governments 
were faced with a new phenomenon: they had to take the wishes of their 
electorate into account. Economic growth and social harmony became 
declared objectives of government policy. The Paris Commune of 1871 
accentuated the danger of social revolution and hence the importance 
of social issues. The state was asked to do more things for more people. 
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Conversely, technical progress, economic growth and growing politi-
cal involvement by the citizens of Europe created the conditions for a 
strong state. The military might of the European powers reached unprec-
edented heights. At the same time in the overseas world transformations 
took place which often proceeded from previous contacts with Europe 
or European settlers, and which changed the existing internal balance 
of power. Thus in many respects a new situation came into being after 
1870, in Europe as well as in the overseas world, and therefore, after all 
forms of revisionism, it is still justified to speak of the period of 1870–
1914 as an age of imperialism, as Hobson did when he introduced the 
concept about a century ago.
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Changing Views on Empire and Imperialism
Words can be confusing and titles can be misleading, particularly if 
titles consist of one simple word. Two titles suffice to illustrate this phe-
nomenon. In 2000, a book appeared with the title Empire and in 2002 
another book appeared with exactly the same title. In the first Empire, 
Michael Hardt, an American literary theorist, and Antonio Negri, an 
Italian political philosopher, argued that although classical imperialism 
is over, Empire is alive and well, albeit in a new form. For them ‘Empire’ 
means the following: ‘Our basic hypothesis is that sovereignty has taken 
a new form, composed of a series of national and supranational organ-
isms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form of sov-
ereignty is what we call Empire.’34 This is a rather special definition of 
Empire because what one usually has in mind when using that word is 
something very different. It is the Empire that the other book, written 
by the British historian Niall Ferguson, is about.35 This book describes, 
as the subtitle indicates, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order. 
But it is also about something more, as is apparent from the rest of the 
subtitle: and the Lessons for Global Power. These lessons are intended for 
the rulers of the Empire of today, the Americans. While the first Empire 
is the Bible for anti-globalists, Ferguson’s book can be considered as the 
New Testament of the advocates of America’s imperial ambitions.
The two books clearly indicate that the word ‘Empire’ means differ-
ent things for different people, and has very different moral connota-
tions. For Hardt and Negri, Empire is bad; for Ferguson, it is good. This 
is even truer of words such as imperialism and colonialism, which refer 
to different phenomena that have been interpreted and appreciated in 
very different ways. From the very beginning the word imperialism has 
had unpleasant connotations. Hobson, who published his Imperialism: A 
Study, in 1902, was very critical of European and, in particular, British 
imperialism. So were the other authors who used the term to describe 
the exploitation of the overseas world by Western — in the first instance 
European powers. The same is true for the word ‘colonialism’ coined 
somewhat later by the French socialist Paul Louis, in 1905.
Authors such as Hobson and Louis however were in a minority. While 
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there have always been critics of certain abuses of colonial rule and Euro-
pean expansion, generally speaking the colonial systems were seen as 
beneficial for the colonized peoples. Lord Lugard, the famous British 
colonial administrator, was so strongly convinced of the benefits of Brit-
ish colonial rule that he even felt obliged to warn his readers that they 
should not believe that British penetration into Africa was taking place 
only to bring civilization, peace, and good government there. ‘However 
greatly such objects may weigh with a large and powerful section of the 
nation,’ he wrote in 1893, ‘I do not believe that in these days our national 
policy is based on motives of philanthropy only’. And he continued: ‘it 
is well, then, to realize that it is for our advantage — and not alone at 
the dictates of duty — that we have undertaken responsibilities in [...] 
Africa’.36 Please note the phrases ‘not only’ and ‘not alone’. Who would 
believe today that colonialism had philanthropy as its sole motive?
The moral justification of colonial rule was strengthened by the intro-
duction of modern colonialism, which aimed at economically develop-
ing the tropical colonies rather than simply taking away their products. 
This new policy was introduced in the last quarter of the 19th century. 
The French called it the ‘mise en valeur’ of the colonies. In the Nether-
lands Indies it was known as the ‘ethical policy’. The Dutch politician 
Abraham Kuyper — founder of the oldest political party in the Nether-
lands — wrote in 1878 in the party’s manifesto that the policy of exploita-
tion should make way for ‘policies of ethical obligation’. What Kuyper had 
in mind was a kind of guardianship, whereby the Dutch guardian would 
bring up the Indonesian people, uplift them morally, and later — ‘God 
willing’ — give them a more independent position. The Dutch liberal 
journalist P. Brooshooft used the same metaphor when he spoke of the 
Indonesians as a ‘childish people’ needful of protection. An Indonesian 
critic asked whether the Netherlands would also teach its children to 
stand on their own two feet! While earlier forms of European colonial-
ism (the Atlantic slave trade, the Dutch cultivation system in Indonesia, 
the atrocities in Leopold ii’s Congo Free State) had given rise to criti-
cisms and moral outcries of concerned Europeans, the new colonialism 
was defended with ethical arguments, thus giving the colonizer a good 
conscience.
This tendency became even stronger after the First World War. The 
Europeans were, and remained, convinced of the rightness of what they 
were doing. In the 1930s, the famous French historian Gabriel Hano-
taux — who in the 1890s had been minister for the Colonies and, later, 
for Foreign Affairs — edited a large five-volume history of the French 
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colonies in which, among other things he wrote: ‘By occupying Algiers 
France fulfilled the mission that Providence and history had entrusted 
to her. And this was another of those beautiful French adventures: the 
attraction of the unknown, the pleasures of taking risks, of sacrifices, of 
showing individual courage, disinterested devotion, the elan of a gener-
ous and educative creation. What a generous conquest: not one mer-
chant involved!’37
Not surprisingly, this attitude changed with decolonization. In Asia, 
decolonization came earlier than in Africa and, already in the 1950s, a 
critical reassessment of colonialism was taking place. As far as Africa was 
concerned, the good conscience of the colonizer was still alive and well 
around 1960. When in that year the Belgian Congo became independent, 
the Belgian King Baudouin, said at the ceremonial transfer of power: 
‘The independence of the Congo constitutes the end of an enterprise con-
ceived by the genius of King Leopold ii. He undertook it with tenacious 
courage, and it was subsequently continued with perseverance by Bel-
gium [...]. During the past 80 years Belgium has sent the best of its sons 
to your land [...]. When Leopold ii undertook this great work — today 
finding its crowning achievement — he did not present himself as a con-
queror before you, but as a civilizer. The Congo has been endowed with 
railways, roads, sea lanes, and airways, which, in bringing your peoples 
into contact with one another, have stimulated unity and have opened 
your country to the wider dimension of the world. A medical service 
requiring years to perfect, has been patiently organized, delivering you 
from manifold dangerous diseases [...]. We are happy therefore, to have 
given the Congo — in face of the greatest difficulties — those elements 
indispensable for the structure of a country that has started on the march 
along the path of development.’38
Here, of course, the former colonial master was speaking. But not so 
long before, a Congolese politician had written similar things: ‘With a 
most sincere and humanitarian idealism, Belgium came to our aid, and 
with the support of vigorous native troops she eventually chased away 
the enemy [the slavers, W.]; she checked the spread of disease [sleeping 
sickness, W.], instructed us, banned those of our customs that to some 
extent were inhuman, made us free, happy, vigorous, civilized [...]. All 
really human and rational men must express their gratitude and bow 
with respect before this grandiose task, realized in this country at the 
expense of incalculable material and human sacrifice’.39
This Congolese author was nobody less than Patrice Lumumba, the 
first Prime Minister of the independent Republic Congo.In that new role 
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and on the same occasion as King Baudouin, Lumumba expressed him-
self however rather differently. He said: ‘So far as our lot was concerned 
during the 80 years of the colonialist regime, our wounds are still too 
fresh and painful to be forgotten [...]. We were quite aware that the law of 
the state was never the same for a black as for a white, cruel and inhuman 
to the one, accommodating to the other [...]. We knew that in the towns 
there were magnificent houses for the whites and ramshackle straw huts 
for the blacks; that a black was admitted neither into cinemas, restau-
rants, nor shops, labeled with a sign inscribed ‘Europeans only’; that a 
black traveled at the bottom of the ship or at the feet of the white in his 
luxury cabin [...]. All that, my brothers [...] we have deeply suffered. But 
all this — all that I have described above — all of it, has now ended.’40
After decolonization this vision became the new orthodoxy: colonial-
ism was wrong. Thus the appreciation changed but the interpretation 
remained the same: colonialism had had a strong impact on the non-
Western world, a bad influence according to the new school, a good one 
according to the old one. Later on, a new interpretation also became 
apparent. It was now argued that Western influence had not been so 
influential after all. The few centuries of Western dominance in Asia 
had not had much impact on these old and well-established civiliza-
tions. In addition, as far as Africa was concerned, European colonial rule 
had been a matter of only a few decades, not even a full century. While 
thus the impact of colonial rule was minimized, at the same time other 
theorists argued that decolonization had not brought an end to Western 
dominance. This had been continued in a new form and the dependence 
of the former colonies on the West had become even stronger. First, this 
interpretation was called neocolonialism or dependency. In the present-
day it is known as globalization.
Here, as is always the case with history writing, the impact of the pre-
sent on the interpretation of the past is clearly visible. Under colonialism, 
colonial rule was mostly seen as benevolent and good for the colonized. 
After decolonization, colonial rule was blamed for the backwardness 
of what was then called ‘the third world’. In recent years opinions have 
changed again. The Arabic world is now often seen as a world of fun-
damentalism, terrorism and backwardness, Africa as a world of despot-
ism, civil war and starvation. Former colonial rule, it is heard, cannot be 
held responsible, or at least not alone responsible, for this sorry state of 
affairs. The British Empire, Niall Ferguson argues in his book on Empire, 
is nothing to be ashamed of. On the contrary, it has been beneficial for 
the world.
A Cape of Asia.indd  |  Sander Pinkse Boekproductie  |  10-10-11  /  11:44  |  Pag. 49
50 a cape of asia
There is of course no question that the age of the British Empire has 
been over for a long time. If today there is an empire at all, it is the 
American Empire. As far as rhetoric is concerned there seems to be a 
remarkable continuity between the two. When the British commander 
General F. S. Maude occupied Baghdad in 1917 he said to the people of 
Mesopotamia, as it then was: ‘Our armies do not come into your cities 
and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators [...]. It is [not] the 
wish of [our] government to impose upon you alien institutions. [It is 
our wish] that you should prosper even as in the past, when your lands 
were fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science 
and art, and when Baghdad city was one of the wonders of the world. It 
is [our] hope [...] that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish’.41
As Niall Ferguson has observed, President George W. Bush, addressed 
the people of Iraq, as it now is, in a very similar way in a television speech 
of 4 April 2003, where he said: ‘The government of Iraq, and the future 
of your country, will soon belong to you [...]. We will end a brutal regime 
[...] so that Iraqis can live in security. We will respect your great religious 
traditions, whose principles of equality and compassion are essential to 
Iraq’s future. We will help you build a peaceful and representative gov-
ernment that protects the rights of all citizens [...]. You are a good and 
gifted people — the heirs of a great civilization that contributes to all 
humanity’.42
One commentator called this ‘Democratic Imperialism’, a somewhat 
contradictory concept. But the history of the word ‘imperialism’ shows 
so many variations that a new one can easily find its place.
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Some Reflections on the History of the Partition 
of Africa, 1880–1914
Some twenty years ago I published a rather voluminous work in Dutch 
under the title: Divide and Rule. The Partition of Africa, 1880–1914. The 
English translation of it came out some years later, in America. The 
Romans had an expression saying that books have their destiny — or in 
the original Latin: Habent sua fata libelli — and indeed, there is a rather 
curious story about this book to be told. When it came out, it was the 
first comprehensive book on the subject that had been published since 
nearly a century. The last and indeed the only other book on the parti-
tion as a whole was the one by Scott Keltie: History of the Partition of 
Africa. That book came out in 1903 when the partition was not even yet 
finished. Surely, it is one of the ironies of history that there were nearly 
ninety years of silence and then, just six months after my book came out, 
another and an even bigger book on the partition was published, Thomas 
Pakenham’s The Scramble for Africa. It is not for me to comment on the 
differences between the two books. Others have done that and no doubt 
will continue to do so. Let me just say that there are many differences, 
not only as far as the composition is concerned but also in analysis and 
interpretation.
In this contribution I shall deal with the same subject, this time not in 
500 but in some 20 pages. This means of course that I can only give some 
of my views on the subject. What I will offer you are a few afterthoughts: 
conclusions and reflections on the history of the partition of Africa and 
on the problems that arise when writing that history. In order to do that, 
I shall first briefly introduce the subject. Then I shall discuss some of the 
main topics of the debate on the partition. Finally I shall sketch some of 
the problems of writing the history of the partition and the way I have 
tried to deal with them.
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the partition of africa: an overview
To all practical purposes the history of the partition of Africa began in 
1881 with the French occupation of Tunisia. To be sure some historians 
have argued that the revival of French expansionism after the defeat of 
1870 took place somewhat earlier, with the introduction of a new for-
ward policy in the Western Sudan. But this should not bother us here. 
Whatever happened in West Africa somewhat earlier, the foundation 
of a French protectorate over Tunisia in 1881 was the first clear official 
demonstration of a new French policy in matters overseas, and it was 
recognized as such. A few days after the event, Léon Gambetta, the par-
liamentary leader of the French Liberal Party, wrote to Jules Ferry, the 
Liberal Prime Minister who was responsible for the occupation, saying 
that ‘France has regained the status of a great power’.43 The Gambetta 
Note which a year later was presented to the Egyptian government by 
the short lived ministry of Gambetta himself was another indication of 
the same mood. But the government of Gambetta fell before anything 
had been done and the new French government procrastinated. Thus 
Britain had to go it alone. The British bombed Alexandria, landed an 
expeditionary force, built up an army, defeated Arabi Pasha and became 
the new masters of Egypt. Although the French had only to blame them-
selves for this blatant demonstration of instability and impotence, they 
did not blame themselves but the British and for more than twenty years 
Anglo-French rivalry formed the background of the partition of Africa. 
This rivalry, which reached its climax with the Fashoda Crisis of 1898, 
came to an end only with the Entente Cordiale of 1904. But by that time 
the partition was all but over.
The Anglo-French antagonism and the French frustration over what 
they considered as the ‘Loss of Egypt’ were to influence developments in 
other parts of Africa as well, as soon was to be demonstrated. In the late 
1870s a French naval officer of Italian extraction by the name of Pierre 
Savorgnan de Brazza had been pioneering in the Upper Congo area and, 
all on his own initiative, closing treaties with local chiefs. In these trea-
ties the chiefs transferred their sovereignty to France. In 1882 Brazza 
returned to Paris, orchestrated a promotion, press and public relations 
campaign for his new occupations and managed to convince the French 
Parliament and the French Government of the necessity to have them 
ratified.
The ratification of the Brazza treaties triggered off other imperial-
ist operations in the Congo area. King Leopold ii of Belgium sent the 
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famous traveller Henry Morton Stanley to the region. His mission was 
to have the Congolese signing similar treaties with King Leopold and his 
Congo Association as Brazza had had them signing with him. The Por-
tuguese who, as nearly everywhere in Africa, also had the oldest rights 
in the Congo Basin got nervous and found support from their traditional 
ally, Britain. This cooperation resulted in the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty 
of February 1884. The signing of this treaty however led to such tumul-
tuous reactions in Britain and Europe that it never was ratified. Under 
French and German pressure the British accepted to have these matters 
discussed at an international conference: the famous Berlin Conference 
of 1884–1885.
This conference has been the source of many myths and misunder-
standings. It is often considered as the meeting where the partition of 
Africa was masterminded. This is not true as we can see by simply read-
ing the Proceedings and in particular the General Act of the Confer-
ence. In this Act the decisions of the participating powers, that is to say 
nearly all European states as well as the United States and the Ottoman 
Empire, were laid down. As we can see by reading these documents the 
conference only dealt with three issues. The main issue was the deci-
sion to create an enormous free trading zone, including practically the 
whole of Central Africa. Then a number of humanitarian principles were 
accepted or confirmed: the abolition of the slave trade, the prohibition 
of the import of liquor, gunpowder etc. Finally there was the famous 
question of the formalities that were to be respected by states wanting 
to make new occupations in Africa. Here the conference ruled that in 
such cases the Powers that wanted to do so should notify the others of 
their claims and create sufficient authority on the ground to effectively 
control their new possessions. But all this was only applicable to new 
possessions and only to the coasts of Africa.44 When at the conference 
it was suggested that these procedures should also apply to the interior 
the delegates protested. ‘That would amount to a partition of Africa’, said 
the French ambassador and that was not the task of the Conference. Her 
only responsibility was to formulate certain rules for new occupations on 
the coasts of Africa. The other delegates agreed with this and so the par-
tition went off the agenda. This discussion however remains important 
because it is probably here that we find the origins of some of the myths 
concerning the Berlin Conference.
The first myth is a well-known one: the Berlin Conference partitioned 
Africa; it drew the boundaries of the various European possessions. Or, 
as Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana put it: ‘The original 
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carve-up of Africa [was] arranged at the Berlin Conference of 1884’.45 
This is a theory still to be found today, even with serious authors like 
Basil Davidson. But it is not true. The Conference drew only one bound-
ary, that of the free trading zone. But that was not a political, but only a 
commercial boundary.
The second theory is the so-called ‘hinterland theory’. This, again, is 
a theory that one still finds in many textbooks, for example in the well 
known and otherwise excellent textbook by Robert Palmer, A History of 
the Modern World. Palmer writes, that ‘a European power with holdings 
on the coasts had prior rights in the back country’.46 Nothing of this is 
to be found in the Berlin Act, but again it is a very persistent myth. The 
Belgian historian Jean Stengers had tried to trace back the origin of this 
theory. He found the first mention of it in a French textbook of 1918. But 
there are even older ones. According to my own research the original 
source of it might be a popular German textbook from 1908, Dietrich 
Schäfer’s Weltgeschichte der Neuzeit. This exercise in historiography, 
interesting though it is, should not occupy us here.
The next theory is that the Berlin Conference laid down the 
‘groundrules’ for the scramble or formulated a ‘code of conduct’ for the 
partition. It is true that the Berlin Act laid down a few general principles: 
two articles out of the twenty-eight of the General Act are devoted to 
this, the ones I mentioned about notification and effective occupation. 
These articles however were not directives for partition, but diplomatic 
precautions to avoid international problems.
Another very popular theory is that the Berlin Conference ‘fired the 
starting gun for the partition’. These kinds of metaphors are of course 
rather flexible, but if this was the start, it was a very false start indeed 
because most of the runners were already well under way. If the Con-
ference tried to do anything in this respect, it was to call back the com-
petitors. It was ‘a holding operation’. But it was a holding operation that 
failed.
Thus there are many factual errors to be found in the historiography 
of the Berlin Conference. There is however another side to all this as 
well. When the Conference was convened, politicians and public opin-
ion expected that something important was going to happen. The par-
tition was supposed to be on the agenda. A Dutch newspaper made a 
comparison between Bismarck and the Pope who in the 15th century 
divided the world and gave away entire continents. In the same way, the 
journal continued, ‘Bismarck is carving up a continent and in a fair man-
ner gives away empires and states’. This was literally speaking not true. 
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But what was true, was that the partition was taking place in high speed 
and under supervision of the European heads of state and government. 
The misunderstanding was that people thought that the partition took 
place at Berlin. But there was very little partitioning going on in Ber-
lin. As far as that was concerned, the only thing that happened was that 
during the conference — but not at the conference, because this was a 
matter of bilateral diplomacy in the lobbies and not of multilateral diplo-
macy — a few agreements between European states and the Congo Free 
State were signed. In actual practice however the partition took place 
on the shores of Africa and soon was to take place in the interior as well. 
The results of this were submitted for diplomatic bargaining between 
the European governments. This became a major preoccupation of Euro-
pean diplomacy in the decade after the Berlin Conference and resulted 
in what we now know as the ‘Scramble for Africa’.
Between 1885 and 1895 virtually the whole continent of Africa was 
partitioned and distributed between the European powers. West Africa 
was essentially a matter of Franco-British and East Africa of British-
German agreements. By 1895 this part of the partition was virtually 
over. Then the partition as well as the century ended with two great and 
well-known crises: the Franco-British clash over the Upper Nile in 1898, 
resulting in the spectacular French retreat from Fashoda, and the South 
African War, ending with the Pyrrhic victory of the British in 1902. The 
partition of Morocco was only an afterplay, indeed rather more the pro-
logue of the First World War than the epilogue of the Scramble for Africa.
the debate
This of course is a very brief story of what actually happened, but it 
might be enough of an introduction for a discussion of some topics of the 
historical debate on the partition and European imperialism in Africa. 
The first issue of this debate is of course the one about the causes and 
the chronology of the scramble. This debate essentially comes down to 
two questions: 1) Why did the scramble take place at the time that it 
took place? 2) And why did it take place in the way it took place? But 
there is a preliminary question to this as well, because not all historians 
agree on the question when the scramble actually did take place. Here 
the discussion is about the beginning and not so much about the end. 
That the scramble was over by about 1912 is no matter for discussion. But 
its beginning is a much more complicated issue. Historians have taken 
different positions on this. Many years and events have been suggested: 
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f. ex. 1884, because of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty; or the ratification of 
the Brazza-Makoko treaties in November 1882; or the British occupation 
of Egypt earlier that year; or the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881; or 
the forward policy introduced in French West Africa in 1879. The impor-
tance of this debate does of course not lie in the exact date itself but in 
the fact that every date implies a certain theory about the causes of and 
the responsibility for the scramble.
If I shall not discuss these problems at great length that is not because 
I would believe they are not important. On the contrary, I very strongly 
believe that they are important. But what I would also like to suggest is 
that one should not overestimate the importance of them. It is perhaps 
possible to find out what was the very first beginning of the scramble but 
that does not mean that when we have found that, we also have found 
its original cause, its prima causa as they say in natural philosophy. In 
mechanics one can indicate the first shock — and all that follows is pre-
dictable and can be traced back to it. But history is not like mechanics. 
Even if we find the original initiative, that says very little about what 
followed.
Imperialist acquisitions were not the result of one decision, but of a 
chain of decisions, a chain with at least three links: the local activities 
and possibilities, the actions and reactions of the government and the 
attitudes of public opinion, press and parliament. Between these three 
factors there was a permanent interaction and feedback. One element 
was useless without the others and, as with all chains, the chain was only 
as strong as its weakest link.
This is to say that the partitioning process could begin, but also be 
stopped, at every level. The British explorer Cameron annexed the Con-
go for the British government in 1874. The only reaction of the Foreign 
Office was that it was ‘an interesting proposal but of no practical use 
for our generation’.47 That was the end of it. Maybe a few years later the 
French government would have liked to treat Brazza’s annexation of the 
Congo for France in the same way, but by that time public opinion and 
parliament in France would not have accepted such an attitude. Thus 
neither the local nor the metropolitan factor alone was decisive — their 
interaction was.
Many imperialist operations originated in local initiatives, in local 
crises, subimperialisms, protonationalisms and what have you. But this 
does not mean that these initiatives automatically developed into impe-
rialist annexations. They could be stopped by politicians and indeed they 
were stopped many times. Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary, 
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scorned the ambitions of the Australians who wanted to have about the 
whole Pacific: ‘I asked them whether they did not want another plan-
et all to themselves and they seemed to think it would be a desirable 
arrangement if only feasible. The magnitude of their ideas is appalling to 
the English mind’.48 These subimperialists did not get what they wanted 
but were stopped by the metropolitan government. On the other hand 
such governments could do very little when there were no local activities 
or when there was too much opposition in Parliament.
What I intend to say is that we should be careful with concepts such 
as ‘scramble’ and ‘partition’. They are not things that existed in reality, 
but constructions of the mind, historical concepts, interpretations. That 
is perfectly all right. Historians cannot do without a certain ‘realism’, in 
the philosophical sense of the term. But one should realize that precisely 
because these are constructions of the mind and not processes in reality, 
there are no laws of causation that link one event to another. Therefore 
the search for a prima causa of the partition is useless.
What, however, we probably could agree upon is a certain chronologi-
cal scheme or framework. We can then distinguish a first or initial phase 
from 1879 to 1885; a second stage — the heyday of partition — from 1885 
to 1895; and an epilogue from 1895 to 1902 or even 1912 if one prefers to 
include Morocco. In this sense 1885 was the point of no return. But such 
a scheme of course is also only an analytical tool, an instrument to better 
understand a complex reality.
If such a scheme cannot explain why the scramble happened when 
it happened, it can help us in analyzing the conditions that had to be 
fulfilled in order to make the partition possible, which is not to say nec-
essary. For example the medical possibilities to survive in Africa had to 
be created and there had to be the military and technical superiority of 
Europe to make the price to be paid for the partition an acceptable one. 
These conditions were not fulfilled in the early 19th century. But there 
was another condition too, a political one. The two characteristics of the 
partition period — as compared to earlier and later years — were 1) that 
there was something for everybody; and 2) that everybody wanted some-
thing from Africa. This enables us to determine the time-limits of the 
partition. The first characteristic disappeared about 1914 — when Africa 
was partitioned. The second one came only into being after 1870. Before 
that year the political conditions for such a situation were not fulfilled. 
Germany and Italy did not yet exist as unified states and France had no 
motive to get seriously involved in these matters. Thus there was nobody 
to challenge Britain’s informal empire and thus there was no partition.
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All this however does not mean that after that the partition had to 
happen. The things I mentioned were necessary but not sufficient condi-
tions. Politics is the realm of freedom and not of necessity, as the German 
philosopher Hegel said. Thus, for the rest of the story we have to look 
at the motives for expansion. That there were many different reasons 
(political, strategic, economic and others) for various European nations 
to go into Africa, is obvious. There is such a vast literature on the various 
motives of European imperialism and it is such a well-known subject 
that I am not going to discuss it here. Rather than doing that, I shall now 
move to the other question I mentioned, the one not of chronology but 
of typology.
The partition was one form of imperialism among others. Thus the 
question is: why did imperialism in Africa take on this form rather than 
another? Let us then first see what was typical about imperialism in Afri-
ca. In my opinion the most interesting thing about the partition was not 
that it began, but that it never stopped. Once the partition had begun, 
one partitioned and partitioned and partitioned until there was nothing 
left to partition. Why did this happen? The best way to answer this ques-
tion is perhaps by asking another question: what could have stopped it? 
There are two possible answers to this: 1) a massive resistance by Afri-
cans; or 2) a major international crisis. Both would have raised the price 
of the partition to an unacceptable level. None of these happened. Why 
not? Why was Africa partitioned while China was not? Why did the First 
World War break out because of a Balkans problem and not about Africa?
History is about what happened and not about what did not hap-
pen. That is why there are hundreds of books on the partition of Africa 
and thousands of studies on the causes of the First World War. And that 
is also why there are practically no studies on the question why China 
was not partitioned nor on the question why the scramble for Africa did 
not lead to war between the European powers. These questions are of 
course in a way unanswerable. Still, such comparisons can help us to 
understand what happened. The partition of China was very much in the 
minds of men in the end of the 19th century. It was supposed to be immi-
nent. Politicians spoke of the ‘Africanization of China’. But it did not take 
place. To some extent of course the reason for this was domestic. China 
was a highly centralized polity, an empire. In Africa there was nothing 
like that. There only was political fragmentation. But there is another 
side to it as well: the international situation was different. Russia was 
on the march in East Asia and approached China over land. As early as 
the 1890s Japan became an imperial power in her own right. The United 
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States took an interest in China and preached the Gospel of the Open 
Door. Nothing of this happened in Africa. Here the Europeans were as 
it were on their own, among themselves. Here they could re-enact their 
traditional European policies, in a new and different context.
Thus the partition of Africa was — to paraphrase a famous remark by 
A.J.P. Taylor — in the ‘best tradition’ of European politics: it was about 
territorialization, about borders and boundaries. We often speak of the 
‘artificial boundaries’ of Africa, but were they more artificial than the 
European ones? In a way the partition was nothing but the entire Euro-
pean history since the Middle Ages all over again, but then in a very 
accelerated way: 400 years of history repeated within 30 years time! 
There was however one big difference: in European history one started 
with annexations and wars and ended with peace treaties and bounda-
ries and maps. In Africa they started with maps and treaties, and war 
came later, if it came at all. And if war came, it was not among Europeans 
but between Europeans and Africans. This explains one of the most curi-
ous phenomena of the partition: its peacefulness. Most of the partition 
took place between 1885 and 1895. That was, as we know, about the most 
peaceful decade in modern history. In the great statistical study on war 
by Singer and Small we see for example that in that period there was only 
one great war (between China and Japan) and one smaller war (between 
the Congo State and the Arabic slave traders). This is to say that during 
the partition itself there were practically neither European nor colonial 
wars.49
There are two possible explanations for this strange phenomenon. 
In the first place there is the danger of a conceptual fallacy: maybe the 
application of violence as used in Africa did not fit with the criteria of tra-
ditional war, was therefore not classified as such and thus not counted. 
This might be the case but probably only to a very small extent. Another 
factor is more important. That is that during the heyday of the partition, 
in Africa itself very little happened. Thus, what these maps showing the 
partition illustrate is not reality but fiction. They illustrate the agree-
ments on boundaries as made in European chanceries and offices, not 
the occupation itself. That came later and cannot be dated so easily.
This order of things was very different from European history. It was 
not so much European history repeated, but European history put upside 
down. In European history there is first annexation, war, negotiations, 
peace etc. and finally there are maps that represent the results of this. In 
Africa one began with maps, but in the beginning these maps represent-
ed nothing but themselves. Normally a map is a representation of reality 
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in some coded form. Not so ‘The Map of Africa by Treaty’. Here there 
was no reality to be represented. Here, to use that well known expression 
from the 1960s, the medium was indeed the message.
This explains much of the peacefulness of the 1885–1895 decade: 
not much happened except on paper. It also explains why the Europe-
ans could so easily avoid getting involved in major conflicts. Territorial 
questions were settled in advance. Moreover, these were arrangements 
about regions one did not know and certainly one did not care very much 
about. All this lightheartedness is perfectly illustrated in a speech by Lord 
Salisbury, in the House of Lords in 1890, where he said: ‘I will not dwell 
upon the respective advantages of places which are utterly unknown not 
only to your Lordships, but to the rest of the white human race’.50 To 
quote another famous expression of Salisbury, most of Africa was ‘very 
light soil’ indeed! The rivalry between Russia and Britain on the North 
West Frontier was known as ‘the Great Game’. But as compared to Africa, 
that was not a game but business. In Africa — apart from the Mediterra-
nean — European rivalry never became more than a game.
writing the history of the partition
Let me now finally say a few words about the problems of writing the 
history of the partition of Africa, or at least about my own problems and 
the way I have tried to solve them. What I have done in my book is to 
try and analyze the decisions concerning the partition of Africa and the 
considerations that led to these decisions. In doing so I continued the 
work done by the many historians who over the last thirty years or so 
have tried to analyze aspects of the decision making process that led to 
the partition. I am not sure that we have done this in a satisfactory way, 
but for the sake of argument, let us for a moment assume that we have 
done so. Even then immediately a new question comes up: when we 
have found the answers to these questions, that is to say reconstructed 
the motives of the statesmen, do we then also know the causes of the 
partition? Let me, in order not to be too abstract, illustrate this by giv-
ing another example of the same sort of question. When we have recon-
structed the decisions and patterns of thinking of the German Kaiser 
and the Russian Czar, of the French President Poincaré and the German 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in 1914, do we then know the causes of 
the First World War? Obviously the answer is: No. At least that is what 
most historians believe and that is why they look for ‘deeper causes’ and 
forces profondes.
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Jack Gallagher and Ronald Robinson when writing the conclusion of 
their famous book on Africa and the Victorians, faced the same problem. 
Their answer to this question was that ‘the subjective views of the British 
partitioners (...) were one of the many objective causes of the partition 
itself’.51 I am full of admiration for this book but I must admit that I do 
not find this approach very satisfactory and personally I would prefer to 
put it a little differently. I would say that, when moving from motives 
and decisions to causes and consequences, we enter into a different field 
of analysis altogether. The French would call it a different historical 
discours. With most historical problems our discussion is exclusively in 
terms of causes and consequences. We discuss the causes of the fall of 
the Roman Empire, the causes of the expansion of Europe, of the rise of 
the middle class, of the industrial revolution, etc. In analyzing political 
problems however we often begin with a different type of historical anal-
ysis, one in terms of motives and men. In political history we see men 
trying to change the destiny of the world and we want to understand 
what they did and why. But this reconstruction of the past as expérience 
vécue, as it was consciously lived by contemporaries, is only one part of 
the historical explanation. Historians should not only look at the past as 
it was seen by contemporaries, but also as we see it now, knowing what 
they did not know and using concepts that they had not heard of.
This type of historical analysis is an anachronistic analysis. We know 
that by 1885 Britain’s power was already in decline. In 1885 some peo-
ple in Britain feared and elsewhere hoped that it was, but they did not 
know. We know that the beginning of the expansion of Europe coincided 
with a secular trend of economic growth (Braudel’s ‘long 16th century’ 
or Simiand’s ‘Phase A’). This is a thing neither Columbus nor Vasco da 
Gama knew — nor would they probably have cared about it. Thus these 
concepts are anachronistic. Nevertheless these are perfectly acceptable 
and indeed accepted historical categories.
What I intend to say is that so far we have been discussing one side of 
the story: men making history. But there is another side to it as well: his-
tory making men. In the 18th century Britain became the leader of the 
world economy. In the 19th century she was for a while the master of the 
world. Britain got this position — to use the phrase of Dale Carnegie’s 
well-known success guides — ‘without really trying’. It lost it soon and 
then tried very hard to get it back. But in vain. The same is true for the 
Dutch Republic a century earlier. Jean Baptiste Colbert, to give another 
example, tried very hard to industrialize France, but he failed. A century 
later the manufactures came into being spontaneously. History is the 
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result of what people try to do and what time permits, of personal and 
impersonal forces. The historian’s task is to make sense of the past and 
in doing so he will use both forms of historical explanation, the personal 
and the impersonal one, the motives-and-men as well as the causes-and-
consequences-approach.
When we now look at the partition of Africa, not from the personal 
but from the impersonal forces perspective, we find not just one but even 
two different stories, depending on whether the vantage point is primar-
ily political or economic. We also get two different chronologies. Politi-
cally speaking the partition was a period of transformation. It was the 
prelude to colonial rule. Full colonialism came to Africa only about 1914, 
because only by that time Africa was almost entirely under colonial rule. 
But the colonial period was a very short one — particularly in the time 
perspective of a continent where once the cradle of humanity stood. It 
lasted only half a century. By the 1960s it was virtually over. Short as it 
may have been, it was a very painful period in African history. The loss of 
sovereignty and dignity, the subordination to the rule of ‘alien races’, as 
our 19th century colleagues used to say, made a sad page in the book of 
African history. In this respect decolonization was a major change.
Economically speaking however this period does not seem to be such 
an important phase in European colonialism. As seen from the post-colo-
nial perspective, the colonial period of African history was only a rather 
unimportant stage in a much longer process. This process brought about 
the incorporation of Africa into the world economy and the spread of 
industrial civilization over the continent. From this point of view the par-
tition was not a major episode. The major events came later. The transfer 
from commercial to economic exploitation took place in the 1920s and 
these years were more of a watershed than the 1880s. On the other hand, 
decolonization did not bring an end to this process. As seen from the 
African perspective dependency and interconnection were continued 
and, according to some, they became even stronger. From a European 
perspective, imperialism and colonialism in Africa had always been of a 
rather marginal importance. Therefore, for Europe also, the decoloniza-
tion of Africa was by no means a major shock.
Only now and thus rather belatedly I have come to the subject of the 
Africacentric as against the Eurocentric approach to African history and 
imperialism. This means that the history of the partition of Africa, as I 
have discussed it here and as I have written about it in my book, is essen-
tially a Eurocentric way of doing this history. I have studied the history 
of the partition from the point of view of European actions and actors. Is 
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that acceptable? Should not the history of Africa and thus also the his-
tory of the partition of Africa, be written from an African perspective? In 
other words should one not primarily give weight to the African actors 
and their decisions? This is a very complicated as well as a very impor-
tant problem, but one with which I can only deal rather shortly here. 
Let me therefore simply present my conclusion about it. I think that a 
history of the partition written from the African perspective would be 
very interesting, but I also believe that there is room for a history written 
from the European perspective. I would even go a little bit further and 
suggest that this last one is perhaps more interesting than the other.
The reason for this is very simple and I can illustrate it by quoting 
the words that Andrew Roberts wrote in his ‘Introduction’ to Volume 7 
of the Cambridge History of Africa, the volume that deals with the period 
1905–1940: ‘Between these dates’, Roberts wrote, ‘the history of Africa 
was more obviously being made by Europeans than by Africans’.52 In my 
opinion this is also, and maybe even more so, true for the preceding peri-
od, thus the period of the partition.
This is not to deny that Africans played an important role in the parti-
tion. They did and they did so in various ways: as brokers and middle-
men, as guides and interpreters, and even as soldiers in the European 
armies, thus in a way as collaborators. But of course there was not only 
collaboration but also resistance. Famous names such as those of Samori 
in West Africa, Cethswayo in South Africa, Abushiri in East Africa, the 
Mahdi in the Sudan or the Negus Menelik of Ethiopia eloquently witness 
of that. With the exception of Menelik however ultimately the Europeans 
always had their way. Africa was partitioned according to the agreements 
European politicians and diplomats made in European chanceries.
Therefore, for the historian, the most important actors in this process 
were not the Africans but the Europeans. That is to say, if we want a his-
tory that tries not just to describe but also to understand what happened. 
Here a comparison with another historical event of great importance, the 
history of the persecution of the Jews and of the holocaust, may be illu-
minating. If one writes the history of that tragedy one should of course 
give ample attention to what happened to the Jews. But if one wants to 
understand the holocaust, one should not primarily study the conduct 
of the Jews but the plans and the actions of the Nazis. This is not to say 
that the scramble for Africa was something similar to the holocaust but 
only that in both cases the historian first of all will be interested in the 
decision makers and not so much in the victims. But what is true for 
the partition is of course not necessarily true for other episodes of Afri-
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can history. On the contrary. Apart from this very short period, during 
most of their history Africans have been masters of their own destiny, as 
indeed they are today.
What all this amounts to, I am afraid, is really not more than a truism, 
viz. that we can look at African history from various perspectives and 
that in my book and in this article I have presented only one of them.
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Imperialism and the Roots of the Great War
In history textbooks, the period from 1871 to 1914 is known as ‘the age of 
imperialism.’ In this period, the European powers extended their control 
over the rest of the world to an extent never seen before. In 1870, Dutch 
control over the Netherlands Indies was effectively limited to Java and a 
few outposts on the other islands. French rule in Indochina was virtually 
negligible while the British were only just beginning to re-establish con-
trol of India after the Mutiny of 1857. By 1914, the Europeans ruled over 
nearly the whole of South and Southeast Asia. Similarly, in 1870 Africa 
was still largely terra incognita for the Europeans. Settlements were lim-
ited to South Africa and Algeria although there were a few scattered pos-
sessions on the coast of West Africa (as well as the Portuguese territories 
in Mozambique). However, by 1914, European rule had spread to the 
entire continent, with the exception of Liberia and Ethiopia. At the same 
time, European influence also grew in the Ottoman Empire, Persia and 
China.
It seems extraordinary that a period during which the European pow-
ers so obviously conquered the world is also generally considered to have 
been a period of relative tranquillity, sometimes called ‘the age of armed 
peace.’ This can be explained by the fact that most historical texts have 
been written by Europeans, and that Europe in fact experienced a period 
of prolonged peace between 1871 and 1914.
Still, in the imperial hinterlands, wars were constantly being 
waged — to colonize new areas, and to crush episodic rebellions. The 
best-known examples of such imperialist conflicts are the Boxer Rebel-
lion in China, the German wars against the Herero people in Southwest 
Africa, the South African war, and Kitchener’s conquest of the Egyptian 
Sudan. There were also many other conflicts that received a lot of cov-
erage in the newspapers of the day, but most have long been forgotten. 
These include the prolonged struggle of the French against the African 
resistance leader Samori in West Africa, the Maji-Maji wars in East Afri-
ca, the French conquest of Madagascar and the Dutch wars against Aceh 
and Lombok in Indonesia, etc. Moreover, some forms of colonial vio-
lence were described as ‘punitive expeditions’ or ‘police actions’. In most 
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cases, annexation preceded war, because resistance came only later. In 
these instances, the military operations were not considered to be acts of 
‘war’, but rather campaigns against rebels.
As a result, it is not easy to quantify the military activities that took 
place during this period. Nevertheless, we do have some statistics at our 
disposal. In their book The Wages of War, 1816–196553 the political scien-
tists J.D. Singer and T.M. Small surveyed all the disputes that took place 
during that period. They classified disputes on the basis of certain crite-
ria, the most important being the number of casualties. They found that 
ten larger disputes during the period 1871–1914 qualified as a colonial 
‘wars’. Among these were four British wars (against the Zulu’s, against 
the Mahdists, the Second British-Afghan War of 1878–1880 and the Boer 
War in South Africa, 1899–1902), two French wars (in Madagascar and 
Indochina), one Dutch war (in Aceh, North Sumatra), two wars in the 
Philippines and one Italian war in Ethiopia in 1895–1896. They also 
specify seven smaller wars. Thus, of all the many military operations only 
seventeen could be classed as fully-fledged wars
In his book on Britain’s Colonial Small Wars, 1837–190154, Donald 
Featherstone describes twenty-two important wars during the period 
1871–1900, as well as an apparently infinite number of incidents and 
skirmishes along the Northwest Frontier of India. The period after 1900, 
which saw the ‘pacification’ of Kenya, Nigeria, and the Gold Coast as 
well as several operations in the Southern Sudan and the Red Sea area, 
was not much better. A book on the Netherlands Indies Army during 
the period from 1871 to 1914, provides a colorful list of ‘troubles’, ‘irregu-
larities’, ‘expeditions’, ‘disturbances’, ‘actions’, and ‘uprisings’ in which 
this army was involved. In all it lists thirty-two operations for the peri-
od 1871–1914, even if the thirty years of war in Aceh are considered as 
one single military operation.55 There has been no comparable review of 
French warfare, but there is a French publication by Gabriel Hanotaux 
and A. Martineau entitled Histoire des colonies (1930), in which about 40 
colonial operations and campaigns are described.
Overall, it can be concluded that during this period three major colo-
nial powers were involved in at least one hundred colonial military oper-
ations.
colonial wars
Several case studies on specific regions offer a more detailed insight into 
what actually took place. Helga Kjekshus’s study of German warfare in 
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Tanganyika is especially illuminating in this respect.56 The most impor-
tant war in Tanganyika was the German campaign waged to suppress 
the Maji-Maji Rebellion. The rebellion was named after the magic water 
(maji-maji) that the Africans believed changed bullets into water. This 
war raged from 1905 to 1907 and because traditional military methods 
were not effective in dealing with guerrilla warfare, scorched earth tac-
tics were applied on a large scale. By targeting the civilian population 
in the agricultural regions, particularly during the sowing season, the 
Germans broke armed resistance by means of starvation. In the fourteen 
years running up to this major war there had already been 84 military 
operations classed as ‘battles’ according to German law. This law, passed 
27 June 1871, stipulated that German soldiers involved in an official bat-
tle were entitled to a government pension. In Tanganyika, a ‘quiet year’ 
thus meant about six battles, that is one every two months, as well as 
many other violent acts such as burning huts or stealing livestock.
In his article on ‘The Politics of Conquest’, John Lonsdale paints a 
similar picture of British activities in western Kenya between 1894 and 
1914.57 In this twenty-year period, there were nearly fifty incidents in 
Kenya that were so serious that the British thought it necessary to resort 
to (or at least consider the use of) force. In eleven cases, the British 
refrained from action because they lacked the necessary military equip-
ment; on two occasions the expedition ended in defeat or retreat; in thir-
teen cases a display of military power alone was sufficient and on twenty 
occasions, a punitive military expedition battle ensued. This means that 
on average during this period the British military engaged in one official 
battle per year. These data clearly indicate that the conquest and pacifi-
cation of Africa by Britain and Germany was a continuing process. Not 
a single year passed without their being a war, in fact not one month 
passed without there being some kind of violent incident or act of repres-
sion.
Some historians have tried to calculate the total loss of human life 
ensuing from violent encounters between Europeans and the colonized 
peoples. Up to now, no research has been performed specifically on the 
period between 1870 and 1914. However, according to the well-known 
economic historian Paul Bairoch, a reasonable estimate is that between 
1750 and 1913 the lives of 300,000 European and 100,000 non-Euro-
pean soldiers were lost in the process of conquering 34 million square 
kilometres of African and Asian territory and subjecting 534 million 
people to European rule. The number of lives lost by their opponents 
is estimated to have been somewhere between 800,000 and 1,000,000. 
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However, the total number of deaths resulting from the wars and subse-
quent forced migrations and famines was probably more like a stagger-
ing 25,000,000.58
Overall, the European armies did not suffer great losses in battle dur-
ing their campaigns. Eighty to ninety percent of deaths were related to 
disease and exhaustion rather than to actual combat. The British colo-
nial war theorist Colonel C.E. Callwell rightly called the colonial wars 
‘campaigns against nature’59 and the British Colonial Secretary Joseph 
Chamberlain quipped: ‘The mosquitoes saved the West Africans, not the 
eloquence of the intellectuals.’60 Asian and Africans were more likely to 
die in battle than of disease and exhaustion. However, it is difficult to 
assess the loss of life accurately because only the Europeans kept records. 
They recorded the deaths of their own troops but rarely of their oppo-
nents, and if they did, only the deaths of warriors and not women or chil-
dren. As the German poet, Bertold Brecht said, ‘Die im Dunklen sieht 
man nicht.’
Nevertheless, there are some figures available, for example, on the 
Maji-Maji Wars. The official German report, which was presented to 
the Reichstag in 1907, states that 75,000 Africans died. Other estimates, 
however, suggest that 120,000 to 145,000 died; some even estimated 
250,000 to 300,000, which is a huge number for such a relatively small 
region within Tanganyika. More than ninety percent of some tribes per-
ished. A variation on Tacitus’ famous quote is applicable here: ‘They left 
a void and called it peace.’
The figures for the British-Zulu War of 1879 are equally staggering. 
Half of the 50,000 Zulu warriors who fought in this war were either 
killed (8,000) or wounded (16,000). On the British side, 1,430 white 
men died and 1,000 ‘Natal Kaffirs’ were killed in a war that had lasted 
only six months.
It was not only Britain and Germany that conducted wars on such a 
scale. The Aceh War waged by the Dutch in Indonesia was no less devas-
tating in terms of intensity and casualties. Here also the European casu-
alties were recorded in more detail than those of the opposition forces, 
in this case the Acehnese. During the entire conflict, 2,000 soldiers of 
the Netherlands Indies Army were killed in action and another 10,000 
died from disease. On the Indonesian side, it is estimated that 60,000 to 
70,000 Acehnese were killed and 25,000 died from disease and exhaus-
tion in labor camps. In total, therefore, approximately 100,000 men per-
ished and another 500,000 people were wounded in the Aceh War. As 
mentioned previously, the Netherlands Indies Army was also involved in 
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another thirty-one military operations at the time, although these were 
of far less importance.
The huge discrepancy between European and non-European lives lost 
in battle can be attributed to the superiority of the European firearms. 
This is apparent from Hilaire Belloc’s famous lines:
Whatever happens, we have got
The Maxim gun and they have not.
The effectiveness of these weapons was a cause for great pride among 
European officers, politicians and reporters. A well-known example of 
how successful these weapons were was the Battle of Omdurman, near 
Khartoum, in the British campaign against the followers of the Suda-
nese religious leader known as the Mahdi. As the sun rose on 2 Sep-
tember 1898, battle commenced. At the end of the morning, the British 
commander, General Horatio Kitchener, put away his binoculars and 
remarked that ‘the enemy had been given a good dusting.’ This was an 
understatement. By 11.30 a.m. nearly 11,000 Mahdists had been killed 
and another 16,000 wounded. In contrast, the Anglo-Egyptian army 
counted 48 dead and 382 wounded. Winston Churchill, who took part in 
the campaign as a journalist and as a soldier, called the battle ‘the most 
signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians.’61 The 
Mahdi’s tomb was opened, his nails were taken as souvenirs and the rest 
of his body was burned. The Madhi’s successor, the Khalifa, escaped and 
was not seen again until a year later, when he was killed in battle on the 
24th of November 1899.
pacification
The most successful way for the colonized peoples to fight the Europeans 
was to refuse to engage in battle. In regular battle, the superiority of the 
European firearms was overwhelming. The annihilation of the Mahdi’s 
army illustrates this. A much more successful tactic was guerrilla warfare 
in which local skills, such as knowledge of the terrain, popular support, 
being accustomed to the local climate and conditions, gave the indig-
enous peoples an advantage. Where this was the case, as in Madagascar, 
Indochina and Morocco, the ‘pacification process’ took much longer and 
required far more effort from the Europeans.
The process was called pacification because the aim of these military 
operations was to create a permanent state of peace by gaining absolute 
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control. In this respect, these conflicts differed from classical European 
warfare. The main characteristic of colonial wars was that they were not 
just instigated to defeat an enemy but were also intended to annex the 
opponents’ territory and to subject the population. The first element that 
these colonial wars have in common is thus their war aims.
As Clausewitz’s famous formula has it ‘war is the continuation of poli-
tics by other means.’ In other words, political aims determine wars. In 
the ‘ordinary’ wars in European history, the aims were usually limited. 
The peace agreements often included ceding territory but usually this 
would only be about a particular region. In contrast, colonial wars were 
absolute. The colonial conquerors came to stay. Their aim was the per-
manent and total subjection of the population — in other words, ‘pacifi-
cation’.
The nature of the aims driving the colonial wars had consequences 
for the outcome. Normally, a war is said to have been won when the 
opponent is beaten and accepts the victor’s terms. But when is a colonial 
war won? When is an opponent defeated? How can victory be defined? 
There were usually no peace conditions and often it was not even known 
who the opponent actually was. Colonel Callwell drew attention to this 
problem in his book about what he called Small Wars. He claimed that 
in contrast to ‘civilized’ wars, in Small Wars there were no clear targets, 
such as a ruler, the seat of government, a capital city or any other large 
group of people. Callwell exaggerated somewhat, but in many cases the 
enemy was indeed difficult to identify.
The Europeans not only had to defeat the opposition but also had to 
make sure that they were, subsequently, accepted as the rulers by the local 
population. The French generals, Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey 
developed a general theory of colonial warfare in which they addressed 
this issue. They made a distinction between ‘slow action’, which was 
aimed at gradually purging the resistance in a particular region while 
establishing permanent occupation, and ‘quick action’, which referred to 
military action against the enemy. Gallieni’s and Lyautey’s strategy has 
been summarized as, ‘Fight if necessary, but fight as little as possible’. 
Their own two most famous maxims were, ‘To destroy only to recon-
struct’ and, ‘With pacification a great wave of civilization spreads out 
like an oil slick.’
Unfortunately, the theory was often not born out in practice. The 
famous British colonial commander, General Sir Garnet Wolseley main-
tained that in a war against an ‘uncivilized nation’ (that is, a population 
without a capital city), your first objective should be the capture of what-
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ever they prize most. For Callwell too this was the crux of the matter: ‘If 
the enemy cannot be touched in his patriotism or his honor, he can be 
touched through his pocket.’ This meant that the invaders often resorted 
to stealing cattle and burning villages, ‘and the war assumes an aspect 
which may shock the humanitarian’.62
Sometimes the goal of pacification and civilization turned into an 
operation of elimination and extermination. The most notorious example 
of this is the so-called Vernichtungsbefehl (‘extermination order’) issued 
by General Lothar von Trotha in the German war against the Herero’s in 
Southwest Africa in 1904. In this notorious proclamation, he declared: 
‘Within the German borders, every Herero, with or without a gun, with 
or without cattle, shall be shot down. No woman or child shall be admit-
ted: I shall send them back to their people or have them shot. These are 
my words to the Herero people.’ It was signed: ‘The great general of the 
all-powerful emperor, Von Trotha.’63
Similarly, when the war in Aceh was going badly for the Dutch, a 
commentator remarked: ‘Our policy should no longer be aimed at their 
assimilation but at their elimination’. In his so-called ‘Hun Speech’ of 27 
July 1900, The German Kaiser said as much to German soldiers partici-
pating in the international force being sent to China to quell the Boxer 
Rebellion: ‘No pardon will be given, and prisoners will not be made. 
Anyone who falls into your hands falls to your sword! Just as the Huns 
(...) created for themselves a thousand years ago a name which men still 
respect, you should give the name of German such cause to be remem-
bered in China for a thousand years that no Chinaman (...) will dare to 
look a German in the face.’64
All these statements illustrate the political climate prevailing in 
Europe, which had become harsher under the influence of social Dar-
winism. Even such a respectable and wise statesman as the British Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury expressed such views: ‘‘Eat and be eaten’ is the 
great law of political as of animated nature. The nations of the earth 
are divided into the sheep and the wolves (...).’65 Similar views appear 
in many writings from the decade before the First World War. It was 
widely assumed that one must prepare oneself for a war that was inevita-
ble in the never-ending struggle for the survival of the fittest among the 
nations.
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colonial warfare and military thinking
During the years of the ‘armed peace,’ the armies of the great powers 
apart from Russia did not engage in major warfare in Europe. This meant 
that the only way to see action and obtain fighting experience was to 
join the colonial army. Moreover, as the colonial officer also had to be a 
good administrator there were more skills to learn than fighting alone. 
Gallieni and Lyautey strongly emphasized this particular aspect of a colo-
nial officer’s work. The collection of letters that Lyautey wrote between 
1894 and 1899, Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar, have become a classic 
example of French colonial literature (Lyautey later became a member 
of the Académie Française). In these letters, as well as in other publica-
tions, he gives a lyrical description of the life of the colonial officer. He 
describes with obvious pride the results of the ‘creative feats’ of the colo-
nial leaders: land reclamation, paddy fields, sleepy valleys transformed 
into hives of activity. How great his satisfaction was may be gathered 
from his exclamation, ‘What nobler task for a man of action!’
There is at first glance little that is heroic or soldierly in this interest 
in markets and paddy fields, in these ‘laborious, thankless and lowly jobs 
which are the daily and only productive task of the colonial officer,’ as 
Lyautey put it, and in preparing, realizing, and bringing to fruition such 
peaceful achievements. One may even ask if this work did not divert 
attention from the soldier’s real task of defending his native soil, and 
have a demilitarizing effect? Lyautey anticipated these questions and 
answered no. To him, the essential features of the military vocation were 
its vitalizing and active aspects. These two aspects were present in ample 
measure. Therefore it was nonsense to suggest that officers serving in 
the colonies were demilitarized when such manly qualities as initiative, 
responsibility, and militancy were constantly needed. On the contrary, ‘it 
is the grandeur which colonial warfare alone, understood in that sense, 
bestows upon life.’
The texts of Gallieni and Lyautey were published in distinguished 
journals and read by the intellectual elite. French newspaper readers 
however were more interested in the more spectacular aspects of colo-
nial warfare. Never before had the printed press reached an audience 
as large as it did in those years. In 1910, the Parisian daily newspaper Le 
Petit Journal sold 835,000 copies a day and the Petit Parisien even more at 
1,400,000 copies. These popular newspapers featured colorful, full-page 
illustrations of the heroic feats of the French colonial armies. For exam-
ple, the struggle with the river pirates in Indochina, the execution of the 
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rulers of Madagascar, the battle against the female soldiers of the King 
of Dahomey and the entrance of General Dodds into their capital, the 
conquest of Morocco, etc. Novelists also wrote about the colonial world 
and military glory. Rudyard Kipling is of course the best-known English 
apologist and prophet of Western expansion and the British Empire. A 
less well-known but very successful and famous writer in his day, was the 
French author Ernest Psichari, grandson of the great scholar and writer 
Ernest Renan, who was a colonial soldier. In his novels, he idolized the 
colonial army whose deeds in the tropical forests of Central Africa and 
the immeasurable plains of the North African desert seemed to embody 
the great French traditions that were absent in urban France. In his work, 
he merges heroism, exoticism and nationalism to produce a lyrical hymn 
praising the colonial soldiers who do not indulge in the materialistic and 
decadent urban life-style of France but live an austere life of devotion 
and self-sacrifice in the colonies overseas.
Colonial warfare also influenced military thinking. Although there 
was peace in Europe during these years, there was an international arms 
race. The costs were so high that the Russian Tsar convened an inter-
national conference in The Hague, in 1899, to see whether the ongoing 
increase of armaments could be stopped or at least reduced. The confer-
ence took place and some decisions were taken: for example, a Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration, was set up. However, the arms race continued. 
Another conference followed in 1907 — but still the arms race went on. 
At the same time, disarmament fell into disfavor. The Russian Foreign 
Minister Isvolsky called disarmament ‘a craze of Jews, socialists and 
hysterical women’.66 Military experts studied the wars that were being 
waged, especially the Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902) and the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. According to the experts, these wars 
confirmed the theory that willpower and moral fibre were the most vital 
qualities in war and that, therefore, an offensive attitude was all impor-
tant.
The colonial wars supported this theory. Callwell’s book on small 
wars argues for offensive warfare that is directed toward breaking the 
morale of the opponent. This effect should be achieved by means of a 
combination of strength and bluff. The commanding officers must con-
tinually seek and hold the initiative. They must fight — not manoeuvre: 
‘the enemy must not only be beaten. He must be beaten thoroughly.’ Ulti-
mately, a colonial war is a psychological battle that must respond to the 
nature of the colored peoples: ‘This is the way to deal with Asiatics — to 
go for them and to cow them by sheer force of will.’
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This view, widespread in Europe at the time, gave the strong the moral 
right to subject the weak, who were by definition inferior. Colonial wars 
were not only exciting — they were justified. More important, colonial 
wars were nearly always successful and the colonial armies were there-
fore almost always triumphant. Of course, there were some exceptions 
such as the British defeat at Isandlwhana and the Italian humiliation at 
Adowa, but these incidents were rare. As a rule the colonial armies came, 
saw, and conquered.
There are striking similarities between the ideas expressed by the 
colonial war theorists and the ideas of the great military theorists of the 
pre-World War I period. Lyautey’s colonial warfare theory that ‘passive 
defence can only lead to being overrun’ differs little from Ferdinand 
Foch’s claim that ‘passive defence cannot avert defeat.’ Similarly, Colo-
nel Callwell’s statement that, ‘moral effect ranks almost before material 
gain,’ is echoed by Colonel Grandmaison’s remark that ‘moral factors are 
not the most important; they are the only ones that matter in war.’
There was also another important and tangible link between the colo-
nial wars and the Great War. Colonel Grandmaison had been Gallieni’s 
adjudant in Tonkin. The British generals Allenby and Wilson had studied 
under the English theorist of guerrilla warfare Miller Maguire. Some of 
the best-known generals from the colonial wars, such as Kitchener, Gal-
lieni, and Lyautey, later became Ministers of War during the First World 
War. Joffre had been with Gallieni in Madagascar before he became the 
first colonial officer to be appointed head of the French General Staff. 
Within the first months of the war, he nominated many ‘colonial’ officers 
to high positions: Mangin, Franchet d’Esperey and others. In his view, 
these were the best-equipped men for the job as they had practical expe-
rience of warfare.
Soon the ideas about moral factors and the offensive spirit were put to 
the test. The First World War was characterized by large-scale offensives 
accompanied by massive slaughter. This strategy was directly related 
to the colonial belief that willpower and morale were the decisive fac-
tors in war. As Foch said, ‘Victoire égale volonté’. This belief that vic-
tory is achieved by breaking the will of the enemy is based on a number 
of assumptions both psychological and philosophical. However, these 
beliefs were supported by expert analyses of imperial conflicts and colo-
nial wars.
At the same time, colonial military novels presented a romantic view 
of the military life. Colonial wars took place in a world of exoticism and 
heroism. War was difficult and harsh but the rewards were rich. These 
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writings painted an image of war that made it possible, fifty years after 
the Battle of Solferino, again to believe in the glory of war. In this way, 
the ‘small wars’ in the colonies paved the way for the Great War.
The colonial armies were accustomed to continually mounting attacks 
regardless of the chance of success, in order to sustain an image of Euro-
pean superiority. It is not difficult to see the connection between this 
approach and the predominant mentality of the generals of the 1914–
1918 war, who valued willpower, moral fibre, and bold attack. However, 
the First World War infantrymen soon discovered that machine guns and 
barbed wire were not as easily subdued as the poorly armed Asians or 
Africans.
As V.G. Kiernan ruefully wrote in The Lords of Human Kind: ‘Their 
generals in the rear, many of them with minds still farther away in the 
Asian or African campaigning grounds of their youth, could not be got 
to see the point.’67
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Migration and Decolonization: 
the Case of The Netherlands
The expansion of Europe meant many things to many people. It includ-
ed the expansion of the European economy into a world economy. It 
brought with it the expansion and interaction of ideas, values, habits and 
life styles. It led to the expansion oi European state power over vast por-
tions of Asia and Africa. And it included many other things as well. But 
the expansion of Europe was first and foremost the expansion of people.
During the course of the great world historical process that began in 
the 1490s with the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama and end-
ed in the 1960s with the end of empire, millions of people travelled or 
were transported to various parts of the world. Millions of Europeans 
moved to the New World, sometimes as indentured labor, later on and 
more often as emigrants. Six million Africans were shipped as slave labor 
across the Atlantic to the Caribbean and parts of the America’s. Europe-
ans founded settler colonies in North and South Africa. Chinese people 
spread all over South-East Asia as well as over some regions of Africa 
and America. In the wake of decolonization millions of people from the 
former tropical colonies, both whites and non-whites, found their way 
to Europe.
These are all well-known facts but when one goes a little deeper into 
them, one is confronted with many questions and problems that, surpris-
ingly, have hardly been studied — questions, for example concerning the 
exact numbers in these movements. At first sight this simply seems to be 
a matter of archival research, but it is not all that easy. The figures are 
often very difficult to trace back, and many questions of methodology 
and terminology arise. Also important and difficult to answer are ques-
tions concerning the motivations for departure — such as push and pull 
factors — and the adaptation to the new circumstances. Indeed there are 
many other questions as well. Thus, when in 1986 the European Sci-
ence Foundation (esf) founded a Network for the History of European 
Expansion and whose goal was to study European expansion from a long-
term perspective and in a comparative way, one of the first issues to be 
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studied was the subject of migration and expansion. Research groups 
were set up, conferences were organized and all these activities resulted 
in a number of publications.
The first of these was a general book of essays under the title European 
Expansion and Migration edited by Pieter Emmer and Magnus Mörner.68 
The book dealt with the entire classical period of European expansion, 
that is to say from the fifteenth to the twentieth century and with all 
types of emigration, including also some forms that were not related to 
colonialism. Thus the Scandinavian, German and Italian emigration, 
basically an emigration to America, also received attention. Although 
the early period was also dealt with, the emphasis of this volume was on 
the nineteenth century.
The book had some interesting conclusions. One of the editors, Pieter 
Emmer, pointed out that the European participation in intercontinental 
migration was very high and amounted to 80 percent of the total.69 Even 
today the emigration of Europeans is higher than that from the other 
continents. Another of Emmer’s conclusions was that Europe had ben-
efited from it in many ways: The emigrants lived longer and better than 
their fellow Europeans who stayed behind, while they were also reliev-
ing the population pressure that resulted from the strong demographic 
growth in Europe.
As the emigration of the Ancien Régime was somewhat neglected in 
that volume it was decided that a special volume should be devoted to 
this subject alone. This resulted in an important book of essays, edited by 
Nicholas Canny under the title Europeans on the Move. Studies on Euro-
pean Migration, 1500–1800.70
While much was known about European migration in the period 
before the end of Empire, it became increasingly clear that we knew 
relatively little of the so-called return migration to Europe, which took 
place after decolonization. It is of course well-known that there was such 
a movement. Colonial civil servants, military men and other Europeans 
connected to the colonial system returned to the motherland, as also did 
colonists, like the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique and even 
more famously or infamously the French pieds noirs. There were also the 
many colored people holding European passports and living in the West 
Indies and elsewhere, who came to Europe.
The problem here is not only that little research has been done, but 
also that statistics are often lacking because there was little interest in 
these matters when they were taking place, that is to say during the 
period of decolonization. There are also problems of definitions, due, 
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among other things, to the fact that an initial migration to Europe was 
sometimes followed by a later return migration to the colonies and then, 
finally, again by a definitive migration to the metropolis. There are also 
phenomena like the return of Greek emigrants that would easily escape 
attention because Greece never was a colonial power. The research 
group that was set up presented its results in 1994 in a book published in 
French, L’Europe retrouvée. Les migrations de la décolonisation, edited by 
Jean-Louis Miège and Colette Dubois.71
migration and decolonization: facts and figures
The book offers some fundamental research and as far as I know it is the 
first to give exact numbers and figures on the migration movements that 
resulted from or were connected with decolonization, not only for the 
colonial powers but also for other nations like Greece. The chapter on 
the Netherlands was written by Herman Obdeijn. I would first like to 
present some of his quantitative data before discussing the social, politi-
cal and psychological results of decolonization and return migration for 
the Netherlands.
As I have already said about figures in general, one is surprised to see 
how difficult — even in our contemporary age of statistics and comput-
ers — it is to come up with reliable answers to such simple questions 
as: How many people came to Holland as a result of decolonization? 
When? From where? Et cetera. The basic facts, however, are simple. The 
Netherlands possessed two colonies: the East and the West Indies. The 
East Indies, which is now known as Indonesia, was of course by far the 
most important of these possessions. The total population of Indone-
sia before the Second World War amounted to some 60 million people. 
There were three official categories of population: the Europeans, the so-
called “Foreign Orientals” (such as the Chinese and the Indians) and the 
indigenous. The group of Europeans that amounted to about 300,000 
people included also the Japanese, a small number of Chinese and some 
Indonesians, as well as Germans and British (see figure 1).
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Figure 1 Population of the Netherlands Indies According to the 1930 Census
‘Europeans’ 240,417





241,669 Dutch and others
‘Foreign Orientals’ 1,339,000
of whom: 1,233,000 Chinese
106,000 Indian, Arabic and others
‘Indigenous’ 59,138,000
Total 60,717,417
Source: Census of the Netherlands Indies, 1930
The majority of these, however, were Dutch. But there was ‘Dutch’ and 
‘Dutch’, and the majority (170,000) of the ‘Dutch’ in Indonesia were 
in reality those of mixed blood. They were known as Indo-Europeans. 
The majority of them returned to the Netherlands after decolonization, 
although return is perhaps not exactly the right term because the great 
majority of them (75 percent) had been born in the East and most of them 
had never previously seen the Netherlands. Altogether some 280,000 of 
these people came to the Netherlands, mostly between 1945 and 1963. As 
I have already said, the statistical evidence is by no means impeccable, 
but I do not want to go into the technical details of these calculations and 
would rather prefer to simply accept the figures given by Obdeijn which, 
on the whole, are the most reliable figures we have (see figure 2).
the moluccan question
One particular group of immigrants from Indonesia were not Europe-
ans but belonged to the indigenous population. They are known as the 
Moluccans. Their coming to the Netherlands can only be explained by 
their historical role in the Netherlands Indies and by the policy followed 
by the Dutch government with relation to Indonesia’s independence.
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Total  280,000 12,500 178,000 56,700
Source: Herman Obdeijn, ‘Vers les bords de la Mer du Nord. Les retours 
aux Pays-Bas induits par la décolonisation’ in Miège/Dubois eds., L’Europe 
retrouvée, pp. 49–74.
By the Linggadjati Agreement of 15 November 1946, the Netherlands 
recognized the Republic of Indonesia as the government which exercised 
de facto power over Java and Sumatra. But Indonesia consisted of many 
other regions as well, and in various parts of the huge archipelago Dutch 
power had already been re-established at an early stage. Wishing to 
maintain its influence in Indonesia in so far as possible, the Netherlands’ 
government found it necessary to restrict the power of the Republic and 
by means of the so-called ‘federal solution’: Indonesia would become a 
federation, in which the Republic of Indonesia (consisting of Java and 
Sumatra) would be no more than one state among others. Numerous 
states were to be created (eventually there were sixteen) and the whole 
federation together would form the United States of Indonesia, which 
in turn would be linked to the Netherlands by the Dutch Indonesian 
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Union. At the time of independence, sovereignty was handed over to 
these ‘United States of Indonesia’.
Predictably, the nationalist movement of the Republic considered 
the Dutch federal policy simply as a strategy of ‘divide and rule’. They 
were therefore not particularly inclined to respect the federal structure 
and, immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, a strong drive towards 
unification developed, which found a general echo among the people of 
Indonesia. The Moluccans, however, who lived in the Federal State of 
East Indonesia showed a decided resistance to the loss of their independ-
ent rule to the government of the Republic. When it became obvious that 
the Federal State of East Indonesia was to be eliminated, the Moluccans 
set up the Republic of the South Moluccans on the island of Ambon on 
25 April 1950. Many fierce battles were fought until eventually the area 
was occupied during 1950–1951 by the central Indonesian government.
The resistance of the Moluccans arose from their historical ties with 
the Dutch government. They had long provided many of the soldiers for 
the Netherlands Indies Army. At the time of the Moluccan uprising this 
army had practically been disbanded, but there were still 4,000 Moluc-
can soldiers awaiting discharge. Understandably they did not want to 
submit to the Indonesian government fearing that they would be con-
sidered traitors, and a Dutch judge ruled that they could not legally be 
forced into this position. The Moluccans wished to move to New Guinea 
(at that time still a Dutch possession, and now known as Irian Barat) or 
Ceram, one of the Moluccan islands which continued to fight the central 
government. But neither alternative was acceptable to the Indonesian, 
nor therefore to the Dutch government. The only remaining choice for 
these people was to depart for the Netherlands, a decision taken in Feb-
ruary 1950.
I shall return to the subject of the integration, or rather the lack of 
it, of the Moluccans into Dutch society, later, as I would first like to fin-
ish the statistical overview and give the figures for the West Indies. The 
Dutch West Indies included two parts, Surinam, or Dutch Guyana, on 
the South American continent, and the Dutch Antilles, in the Carib-
bean. In every respect their importance was very small as compared to 
the East Indies and particularly in so far as population is concerned. The 
total population of Surinam in 1971 was approximately 385,000 people 
and of the Netherlands Antilles approximately 250,000. There was mas-
sive immigration into the Netherlands from Surinam in the 1970s. It was 
hoped that this would come to a halt with the coming of Surinamese 
independence in 1975. But this was not to happen. The Surinamese emi-
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gration continued and was reduced only after 1980 by some new restric-
tive measures by the Dutch. The Antilles have continued to be part of 
the kingdom of the Netherlands, and a continuing emigration is taking 
place from there into the Netherlands although this is largely only for 
temporary reasons, like study and temporary employment.
An element which had less to do with decolonization than with 
general economic and demographic developments after 1945, was the 
opposite phenomenon, that of an important emigration from the Neth-
erlands, particularly in the 1950s. About 150,000 people left the country. 
They did not go to the overseas possessions and former colonies but went 
mostly to America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In 1960, with 
the beginning of the economic boom in Europe, this movement came to 
a rather abrupt standstill.
In conclusion we can say that from the present-day Dutch population 
of some 15 million people, approximately 407,000 immigrated from the 
former colonies while another 405,000 are descendants of these. The 
geographical breakdown of this group is to be seen in figure 3.







Country of birth 250,000 40,000  87,000 28,000
Country of birth 
of at least one 
parent
175,000 10,000 163,000 59,000
Total 425,000 50,000 250,000 87,000
Source: Obdeijn, ‘Vers les bords de la Mer du Nord’, p. 71.
Let us now have a look at the way these immigrants were received in the 
Netherlands and discover what happened to them.
return and re-adaptation
I shall begin with one group that I have not yet mentioned because, 
strictly speaking, they were not immigrants although they also returned 
from the Indies. This is the group of some 100,000 conscripts who 
had served in the Indies during the process of decolonization. Little is 
known about their adaptation at home. No doubt their overseas expe-
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riences have affected these men, generally very young, who had seen 
guerrilla warfare, had been in contact with an alien society, and borne 
isolation and enforced idleness. Occasionally, stories of incidents and 
excesses came to light, but there was never any question of a public dis-
cussion of — let alone an inquiry into — the conduct of the soldiers in 
the Indies. Nor was any general concern shown as to their reception and 
re-adaptation at home. Perhaps the most marked result of their service 
in the East Indies is the popularization of Indonesian dishes in the Neth-
erlands. There had, of course, always been returned expatriates, but they 
were too few and too localized to influence Dutch eating habits. The 
influx of some 100,000 people from the Indies brought with it a pas-
sion for Indonesian food and Indonesian restaurants. Nasi (fried rice), 
bami (noodles) and loempiah’s (egg-rolls) have become an integral part 
of Dutch culture. Once or twice a week many Dutch housewives prepare 
an Indonesian meal (or what she believes to be such a meal) and there 
are now over 2000 Chinese-Indonesian restaurants to be found through-
out the country.
A second, even larger, body of repatriates were the Indonesian Dutch 
of which I already have given some general figures. They came in waves, 
the first of which occurred between 1945 and 1948. Members of the first 
group, in many cases, came to the Netherlands for rest and rehabilitation, 
but did not intend to remain there. The second wave, which developed in 
1949–1951 as a result of the transfer of sovereignty, consisted mainly of 
civil servants and military personnel. Neither they nor the group arriv-
ing between 1952 and 1955 proposed to return to the East. The latter, 
somewhat lower in social status than the earlier repatriates, were often 
Eurasians or Europeans who had never been in the Netherlands; these 
people had waited to see which way the wind would blow. A fourth and 
last wave came in 1957/58 as a result of the Indonesian nationalization 
of Dutch businesses. Included in this group were the spijtoptanten, those 
who had at first opted for the Indonesian nationality, but subsequently 
felt that they were not treated as full citizens, and so came to Holland, 
having spijt van, that is to say regretting their initial option.
Little is known about how these people fared. Economically, hard-
ships were few: Jobs were easy to find in these years of increasing pros-
perity. Socially, however, the repatriates encountered many problems, 
such as the loss of status and the difficulties of adaptation to a different 
and often simpler way of life, apart from adapting to our cold climate. 
The greatest difficulties were probably experienced by the ‘stayers’- 
Dutchmen born and raised in the Indies — to whom the Netherlands 
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was an unknown foreign country. They included many Eurasians who 
had problems in finding social acceptance as they also had had within 
the framework of the colonial society. In contrast, the higher-ranking, 
academically-trained colonial civil servants had few problems. These 
mostly took up satisfactory second careers in the Netherlands’ civil ser-
vice, administration, judiciary and universities. Their numbers, howev-
er, were very small.
The fate of the third group, the Moluccans, was very different. It 
was presumed that the Moluccans would only remain in the Nether-
lands temporarily, as is obvious from the fact that the 4,000 families, 
12,500 people in all, were housed in camps. This group, therefore, stayed 
together in the camps, was cared for by the government, was not per-
mitted to work and remained completely isolated from Dutch society, 
awaiting a return to Indonesia and dreaming of an independent repub-
lic. In the 1950s, this situation began to change. Increasing prosperity 
made it possible for the Moluccans to take part in the work process, a 
return to the East Indies became less realistic as the relationship with 
Indonesia deteriorated. Instead of the camps, residential areas in various 
Dutch towns were made available for housing. This group of Moluccans, 
about 90 percent of whom are Christians and belong to the Evangelical 
Moluccan Church, now numbered 32,000. They enjoyed the benefits of 
a flourishing economy and an emerging welfare state. Nevertheless, the 
nucleus of the problem remained. The Dutch government considered 
the Moluccan question to be a social problem, a matter for the Minister 
of Social Welfare. The Moluccans considered it as a political problem, 
the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1975, impatient 
with the attention of social workers only, they turned to more up-to-date 
methods of terrorism. On three occasions, in 1975, 1977 and 1978, they 
occupied a school, a train, an embassy, a consulate and a county house, 
killing several people in the process. The Dutch government developed 
unexpectedly successful tactics — persuasion, exhaustion and mili-
tary power — to end these actions. Dumbfounded, the Dutch watched 
their television screens, as jets dived over one of their trains and tanks 
attacked one of their schools. The indiscriminate killing of Dutch citi-
zens did indeed draw attention to the cause of the Moluccans but hardly 
gained public sympathy for it. The result of these activities is that the 
Moluccan question is now considered more seriously, but not that their 
political aims have been accepted by the Dutch government.
The first Moluccan terrorist action occurred in 1975, the same year 
in which immigration from Surinam reached its zenith, in anticipation 
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of the colony’s independence which was to be granted in November 
1975. Thereafter the Surinam people could indeed enjoy the vast sums 
in development aid which the Netherlands were to pay as an alimony 
in this divorce, but they could no longer expect the extremely favorable 
social benefits available to Dutch citizens. The lure of these fabulous pay-
ments was great. In 1973, 11,000 Surinamese came to the Netherlands, in 
1974 almost 18,000 came and in 1975, when independence was breath-
ing down their necks, nearly 40,000 bought oneway tickets to Amster-
dam Airport. At least, the Dutch felt not without some relief, there could 
never come more than 385,000 immigrants, since that was the total pop-
ulation of Surinam. By 1975, a total of 115,000 Surinamese had settled in 
the Netherlands. Not only was this a very large group for such a densely-
populated country — it just about compensated for the total emigration 
of the 1950s — but it also involved a group of easily recognizable colored 
people. The Dutch realized in 1975 that they had in their midst not only 
a dissatisfied Moluccan population — 32,000 strong — but also over 
100,000 potentially dissatisfied and poorly-adapted Surinamese. The 
280,000 repatriated Indonesian-Dutch had been smoothly assimilated 
into Dutch society. But now it suddenly became clear that the inherit-
ance of the colonial past also included some 150,000 colored inhabitants. 
This belated discovery that the Netherlands had become a multi-racial, 
or as we now say a multicultural, society caused the country its first true 
imperial hangover.
It is apparent that decolonization had several unfavorable effects in 
the Netherlands’ collective psychology.72 Various sectors of commerce 
recovered only partially or not at all from the shock; the trauma of the 
loss of Empire had a negative influence on Dutch politics; failure to set-
tle the Moluccan question has saddled the country with a dangerous 
inheritance. On the whole, however, the shock was absorbed without 
too much trouble. The feared economic disintegration never occurred; 
on the contrary, prosperity increased as never before. Adaptation to the 
new state of international affairs proceeded fairly smoothly. The assimi-
lation of 280,000 Indonesian Dutch was barely noticed. When in 1969 
the economic historian Henri Baudet published an article about ‘The 
Netherlands after the Loss of Empire’, he could justifiably argue that, for 
the Dutch, colonization appeared to be a turned page, the past, a closed 
book.73
Ten years later, however, the picture looked somewhat different. 
In the course of the 1970s, there were several crude reminders of the 
imperial past, not only the activities of the Moluccans and the arrival 
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of the Surinamese but, even earlier, heated discussions on the behavior 
of Dutch troops in Indonesia. Until then the history of the Dutch war 
in the Indies had received virtually no attention at all: no institute, no 
television series, no scholarly articles, official or unofficial. In contrast 
to the stream of literature about the Second World War, there existed 
only a few unread novels and some forgotten memoirs. Colonial history 
was also out of favor: At the universities, it attracted very few students. 
In short there existed no historical view of colonization and decoloniza-
tion; no-one needed it; it was the past, but it had not become history. It 
had simply been pushed aside, obliterated, wiped out. Of course many 
war veterans knew that many atrocious things had happened, but only 
a few of them had actually fouled their hands with these acts. The rest 
knew what had happened, but they kept quiet and accepted no criticism 
from outsiders. There was in fact almost no criticism.
In 1969, public opinion was shocked by the so-called Hueting affair. 
The Hueting affair developed from a television programme on 17 January 
1969 in which a veteran of the colonial war, the psychologist J.E. Hueting, 
revealed details of excesses by Dutch troops in Indonesia. This really was 
a bomb-shell, and reactions ranged from angry denials by former soldiers 
to demands that the guilty should stand trial. The government did what 
it had to do: It ordered an investigation. The report, which appeared very 
quickly, was vague and said little, restricting itself to recording a few 
incidents. These affairs like other ones illustrate the crises de conscience 
which appeared so frequently in the Netherlands in the 1970s — but not 
only in the Netherlands. The entire western world was to learn this need 
for adaptation, purification and catharsis, with Vietnam and Watergate 
as the symbols of moral issues in foreign and domestic politics.
These developments also affected the historical profession. In the 
Netherlands, the interest for the colonial past was to develop slowly, but 
since the 1970s, the interest among students for this subject has definite-
ly been growing. At least some fifty overseas history specialist in work 
at Dutch universities and research institutes. There also is a constant 
stream of Ph.D. students and post-docs. The number of publications is 
vast and many historians reach a wider audience with books that are 
accessible to the general public.
This is not to say that the colonial past has now been digested. On 
the contrary, on various occasions, for example with the case of a former 
defector of the Netherlands Army in the Indies who wanted to come to 
the Netherlands, or with the official state visit of the Queen to Indonesia 
in 1995, the sentiments immediately became very heated again, and for a 
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time public opinion was concerned by some aspect or other of the colo-
nial past and the decolonization period. The same is true for the history 
of the Second World War and the German occupation. We see similar 
developments in France à propos of the Algerian War of decolonization 
and the process of Maurice Papon. And in America concerning the Viet-
nam War. The past needs much time to become history.
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What is Europe?
Words like Europe and European are used daily by millions of people in a 
completely routine-like way, rather more unconsciously than conscious-
ly, thus suggesting that everybody knows what they mean, that we all 
know what is European and what is not, where Europe begins and where 
it ends. But this is not the case at all. On the contrary, the concepts are 
unclear and ill-defined. Indeed they might well be indefinable. This is 
indeed a curious situation, but it was not a problem before 1989 when 
the world was simple and Europe was conveniently divided into a free, 
democratic and prosperous Western Europe and a subjugated, totalitar-
ian and stagnating Eastern part of it. Now, however, things are no longer 
so simple and the question of what Europe actually is has become a prob-
lem and will increasingly become a problem in the future.
Therefore we should now ask ourselves the question of whether the 
old and rather vague notions about Europe and the Europeans, notions 
with which we have lived for the past half century or so, are still valid. 
The basic assumptions of the last fifty years were that Europe in fact 
meant Western Europe, including only the western half of Germany, 
and that this ‘little Europe’ would, as it were, automatically become ever 
more united so that eventually we would all become Europeans rather 
than Germans, Italians et cetera. These two basic assumptions are now 
in question. Europe will not be the federal Europe dreamt of in the phi-
losophy of some European idealists. Whatever the future of the European 
Union might be, it will be very different from the idea of a United States 
of Europe. What is also clear is that, however small or big it becomes, 
it will certainly be — and indeed already is — considerably more exten-
sive than the original Europe of the Six, the Nine or the Twelve. The 
question of ‘What is Europe?’ is therefore of great importance. When we 
use the word Europe, are we then referring to a geographical, a social, 
an economic or a cultural entity? What are its borders? Is our civiliza-
tion a European civilization or rather a Western one, incorporating also 
America into its fold?
Obviously Europe is primarily a geographical expression denoting 
one of the five continents. But here there is an important difference with 
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continents like America, Africa, and Australia, that are surrounded by 
oceans and seas: between Europe and Asia there is no clear geographi-
cal boundary. The Germans have an expression: ‘Asia begins at Vienna’ 
(Asien fängt an in Wien). The famous Dutch historian Huizinga went even 
further when he declared that Asia begins east of the line that can be 
drawn from Groningen to Maastricht (Groningen is known for its natu-
ral gas and Maastricht for its treaty). Surely we cross a border there, if 
only from the world of blankets and sheets to the world of sumptuous 
eiderdowns, but whether this is the border between Europe and Asia is 
open to debate. Anyway, eiderdowns have now become fashionable in 
Western Europe as well.
It was General de Gaulle who coined the expression ‘Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals’. But what he had in mind when using this phrase 
remains a mystery. Certainly the Urals have never functioned as a border 
between Europe and Asia. Nor for that matter has the Aegean Sea. The 
Greeks have lived on both sides of that sea from times immemorial, as 
the Turks later came to do. For centuries the Asian peoples have invaded 
Europe, as we remember from our schooldays, when we learnt about 
Attila and the Huns. And we must not forget the Russians who subse-
quently colonized all over Asia, ending up in Vladivostok on the Pacific.
So, what we understand by the word Europe is not a geographical 
unity. Nor is it a political or economic one. In fact Europe has never been 
a unity — neither politically nor economically. On the contrary, Europe 
has always been, if anything, a continent of political divisions and eco-
nomic rivalry between nation-states. Thus the words ‘Europe’ and ‘Euro-
pean’ can only refer to something cultural. Here, however, we enter into 
a very difficult field where the possibilities for myths and mystifications 
are legion. Let us therefore try to agree on some basic facts.
What we typically understand when we talk of European civiliza-
tion is essentially the civilization of Western and Central Europe. And 
the common denominator for these parts of Europe is that they were 
once part of the Latin Christian Church and shared the experience of 
the Renaissance and the Enlightenment — that is the Scientific Revolu-
tion and Rationalism. They thus developed a new type of society and 
civilization, one that we might call modern civilization. This new order 
of things was strongly influenced and revolutionized by the Industrial 
Revolution of the late 18th century. But its foundations were laid down 
much earlier, in the 16th century in fact, by what an American economic 
historian with the very Dutch name of Jan de Vries has ingeniously called 
‘the industrious revolution’. This brought about a new social pattern 
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which systematically aimed at maintaining and improving the standard 
of living and the quality of life of the community.
If this analysis is indeed correct, it has two consequences. First, 
that European civilization is not limited to Europe only, because it was 
exported to the new worlds of America and Australia. Secondly, that not 
the whole of Europe is European in this sense of the term. It is not clear 
where exactly the dividing line lies, but roughly speaking it would run 
from Kaliningrad to Sofia. East of that line we enter a different world, a 
world that has not shared in the above mentioned experiences.
Clearly, then, it is not only as a consequence of World War ii and the 
Cold War that the western part of Europe has entered into a process of 
creating an economic and political union. There is a more fundamen-
tal basis for this in the historical background as described above. It is 
also for that very reason that the entry of countries like Poland, Hun-
gary and Czechia into the European Union was a logical development. 
The ‘Europe 1992’ schedule has been overthrown by the dynamics of the 
political revolution of 1989–1990. To give priority to the deepening of 
the European Community rather than to the enlargement of it — to put 
the options in Euro-jargon — would be like giving priority to embellish-
ing the rich suburbs rather than extinguishing the fires that are burning 
in the old and poor neighborhoods. It would not only be unfair but also 
unwise to do so if only because we have anyway to rethink our traditional 
ideas about the future of the European Union and the growth of a Euro-
pean identity.
Many historians are actively involved in discussing these issues. Some 
historians like Tony Judt have argued that the idea of admitting the coun-
tries of Central Europe is a ‘grand illusion’, because it will dramatically 
change the future of the European Union and is based on a false interpre-
tation of European history. Others go in a very different direction. They 
consider not only Central but also Eastern Europe as an integral part of 
a future European Union. Others would like this Europe also to include 
Turkey. They accept that the conditions in that country would have to 
change considerably and that there are great economic difficulties con-
nected to its entry into the European Union. But they also argue that 
essentially Turkey is part of Europe and thus belongs to the European 
Union. The argument that there exists an unbridgeable gap between the 
Islamic culture of Turkey and the classical and Christian one of Europe, 
as the leaders of the Christian-Democratic parties have often argued, 
is considered as unrealistic. Both civilizations, they say, stem from the 
same tree.
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Following this line of argument one could also plead for the entry of 
North Africa and the Middle East into the European Union, and indeed 
some intellectuals have done so. That also is an answer to the question: 
‘What is Europe?’, but it is certainly not the answer the founding fathers 
of Europe had in mind when they asked themselves the same question. 
And it is probably also not what the political leaders of France and Ger-
many have in mind now. A Europe that would extend itself to Vladiv-
ostok and Pakistan in the East and to the Sahel and Sudan in the South 
is hardly European at all. So, it seems about time to ask ourselves the 
question what Europe really is or should be. The issue is too important 
to leave it to politicians only.
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Realism and Utopianism
Some twenty years ago, in 1988, the then Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher delivered her famous Bruges Speech. In this, among other 
things, she said the following: ‘To try to suppress nationhood and con-
centrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly 
damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe 
will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as Spain, 
Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It 
would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European per-
sonality. Some of the Founding Fathers of the Community thought that 
the United States of America might be its model, but the whole history 
of America is quite different from Europe. People went there to get away 
from the intolerance and constraints of life in Europe. They sought liberty 
and opportunity and their strong sense of purpose has, over two centu-
ries, helped to create a new unity and pride in being American, just as our 
pride lies in being British or Belgian or Dutch or German’.74
When saying this she was, of course, simply echoing what General 
de Gaulle had said nearly thirty years earlier at an equally famous press 
conference:
‘I do not believe that Europe can be a living reality if it does not 
encompass France with her French, Germany with her Germans, 
Italy with her Italians and so on. Dante, Goethe, Chateaubriand 
do belong to the whole of Europe for the very reason that they 
were pre-eminently Italian, German and French. They would not 
have meant so much for Europe if they had been apatrides and 
had thought and written in some sort of ‘integrated’ Esperanto or 
Volapük’.75
De Gaulle later repeated the same message in a television interview with 
Michel Droit in which he said:
‘Of course we can jump on our chairs and dance and shout 
“Europe! Europe! Europe!”, but that does not mean anything and 
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it does not bring us anywhere. Therefore I say once more: We 
have to take things as they are. How are they? There is a nation 
France. This cannot be denied. It exists. There is a nation Ger-
many. This cannot be denied. It exists. There is a nation Italy, a 
nation Belgium, a nation Holland and, somewhat further away, a 
nation England and a nation Spain. Nations they are. They have 
their history, they have their language, they have their way of 
life’.76
Both statesmen were right. The creation of the Common Market, the 
European Community and even the European Union has not brought 
about the end of the nation-state. We cannot really imagine a Europe in 
which there would no longer be a Germany, a France or a Holland. The 
idea of a process in Europe following the same pattern as that which 
led to the creation of the United States is clearly an illusion. As the for-
mer German Chancellor Helmuth Schmidt wrote some years ago in an 
article in Die Zeit: ‘It is about time to finally recognize that Charles de 
Gaulle was right with his concept of a Europe des patries’. Now, De Gaulle 
never used the term l’Europe des patries. He actually said l’Europe des 
Etats, which is indeed more correct, although such nuances are not very 
important in this context. What all three politicians intended to say is 
that the original federalist approach to Europe was an illusion. And in 
this they are undoubtedly right.
Thus, at first sight, it looks as if the federalists are the utopianists and 
the nationalists are the realists. Although this is true, it is not the entire 
truth. Nations and states are indeed entities. They exist. But they have 
not always existed. They are not the products of nature but of history. 
Nations are ‘imagined communities’, to use the elegant phrase formu-
lated by Benedict Anderson, that is to say: creations of the mind.77
It is interesting to note that General de Gaulle and Mrs Thatcher 
spoke of the British, the French et cetera, each with their own lan-
guage, history and way of life, thus suggesting that these are uniform 
and homogenous groups. But they could also have spoken of Britain with 
her Scots, Welshmen, Englishmen and Irishmen or of France with her 
Bretons, Alsacians, Basques and others. These groups also have their 
own language, history and way of life. This, however, does not prevent 
them from forming together the British or the French nation and living 
together in one state, the United Kingdom and France respectively.
This combination of state and nation is what we call the nation-state 
and this nation-state is a typical European product which, for better or 
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for worse, has been exported all over the world. In some cases, in the ear-
ly states, like for example Britain, France and Spain, the state preceded 
the nation. In other states, those of the late comers, like Germany and 
Italy, the idea of a German and Italian nationhood preceded the process 
of forming a German and Italian state. In the first case historians speak 
of state-nations, in the second one of culture-nations. But, in whatev-
er order things took place, in both cases a great deal of this feeling of 
nationhood was artificially put into the citizens’ heads in the 19th cen-
tury in order to make them better and more obedient citizens. In both 
cases also the outcome was the same: one form of social organization, 
the national one, overshadowed all other forms. This process culminated 
in the two World Wars of the twentieth century. State formation, nation-
alism, interstate rivalry and war are part and parcel of European history.
Thus the realists are right when they emphasize the fundamental 
difference in history and development between Europe and the United 
States of America. But they are wrong when they suggest that nations 
are products of nature and therefore are bound to be with us forever. As 
the famous French writer Ernest Renan said more than a century ago: 
a nation is a product of the will.78 What makes a nation a nation, is the 
will to be a nation. This will was very strong in the 19th century, partly 
because of ideology but partly also because of the interest the citizens 
had in a strong state which provided them not only with security but also 
increasingly with social and economic advantages.
The nationalist ideology has lost much of its appeal after the two 
World Wars, and the interest of the citizen in having a strong state has 
also diminished. The function of the state changed fundamentally after 
1945, and two processes have been taking place in Europe since that time: 
decentralization and supranational integration. If these trends continue, 
the nation-states will also continue to lose many of their functions and 
there will be room for not just one, but for many social identities. To 
mention just one example, one could then be at the same time Alsacian, 
Frenchman and European.
Thus, unity does not necessarily imply uniformity, nor should it do so, 
because it is precisely the variations of national articulations and expres-
sions that create the vitality of European civilization. This was already 
stated by the famous Dutch historian Johan Huizinga a long time ago. In 
an address to American students in 1924, Huizinga said the following:
‘I do not know whether Americans can fully realize the necessity 
there is for Europe of preserving its division into many nations, 
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and the fervent desire of all and any of these to maintain their 
specific national existence. I do not mean this politically so much 
as culturally [...] It would be quite natural for you to say: why 
should not the European nations, after so many centuries of bit-
ter strife, in the long run be merged into one vast unit? [...] Still, 
political harmony and concord is not the one thing the world 
stands in need of. However indispensable to civilization peace 
and order may be, real civilization is not contained in them. They 
may even be a danger to it, should they be promoted by equal-
izing and levelling. What we envy you is your unity, not your 
uniformity. We Europeans feel too keenly that no nation, how-
ever prosperous or great, is fit to bear the burden of civilization 
alone. Each in his turn is called upon in this wonderful world, to 
speak his word, and find a solution which just his particular spirit 
enabled him to express. Civilization is safeguarded by diversity. 
Even the smallest facets in the many-sided whole may sometimes 
catch the light and reflect it’.79
These words of Huizinga’s sound rather romantic. But their basic assump-
tion is shared by most of us, viz. that Europe’s historical greatness and 
present vitality arise from the fact that there are so many nations, each 
with its own cultural tradition. But at the same time we also know that, 
with all their differences they are all truly European and form some sort 
of community, although not necessarily a Union. Thus the borderline 
between realists and utopianists is not really as clear cut as some would 
have us believe.
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France, Germany, and Europe
In 1999 a book appeared in Paris with the rather alarming title De la 
prochaine guerre avec l’Allemagne (‘On the future war with Germany’). It 
had not been written by some sensationalist science-fiction writer but by 
none other than Philippe Delmas, a former aid to Roland Dumas, who 
was twice minister of Foreign Affairs under the Mitterrand administra-
tion.
For historians who are familiar with the history of France between 
1870 and 1914, the title of this book must have rung a bell, because in 
that period many books with similar titles appeared in France, for exam-
ple, La prochaine guerre by General H. Bonnal (1906), La guerre de demain 
(1889) by Danrit, a pseudonym and acronym of the later famous Colonel 
Driant, who under his own name also published Vers un nouveau Sedan 
(1906), F. Delaisi’s La guerre qui vient (1911), A. Grouard’s La guerre éven-
tuelle (1913), M. Legendre’s La guerre prochaine et la mission de la France 
(1913), Ch. Malo’s La prochaine guerre (1912) and General Palet’s Les 
probabilités d’une guerre franco-allemande (1913), while similar works also 
appeared in Germany like Deutschland und der nächste Krieg by General 
F. von Bernhardi (1912) and Jena oder Sedan (1903) by F.A. Beyerlein. All 
these books reflected, of course, the strong and ever increasing tensions 
that existed between France and Germany after the defeat of France in 
the war of 1870 and the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 and 
the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, that resulted from this. With these 
developments of 1870–1871 a new question was born in Europe: the 
so-called German question (or in French ‘la question allemande’). This 
question came down to one simple problem: The German Reich was too 
big and too powerful a state to be integrated into the existing European 
state system. Two more Franco-German wars which eventually devel-
oped into two World Wars were the result of this ‘question’.
After 1945 the conditions changed completely. Germany was devas-
tated, partitioned and under the control of four alien powers. The same 
went for her capital, Berlin. France on the other hand was one of these 
four powers. France’s position however was also complicated. It was a 
member of the Great Four but only by permission of the Great Three; it 
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was defeated in 1940 but pushed forward as a fellow-victor in 1945. Soon 
it was getting involved in a desperate struggle to hold on to its colonial 
empire in Indochina which ended in a humiliating defeat and retreat and 
was followed by the even worse nightmare of the war in Algeria. Never 
ending financial, social and economic problems (inflation, strikes) as 
well as permanent political crisis (the average life of a French cabinet at 
that time was only five months) were characteristic of the France of the 
Fourth Republic.
All these problems notwithstanding, it was France that took the lead-
ership of Europe. That is perfectly understandable because France was 
the only nation that could take it. For obvious reasons, neither Germany 
nor Italy could do this. Britain could have done it, but did not want to. 
Thus France took the initiative towards European unity, because it was 
the only nation in a position to do so and because it had reasons of its 
own for doing it: it was in France’s own interest. To be sure, it would be 
unfair to deny all idealism in this move. Robert Schuman was no less 
sincere in his desire to remove the matters of conflict than Briand had 
been thirty years earlier. But there was another side to it as well. The 
European concept in France was based not only on hope, but also on fear. 
European integration was not only a reconciliation, but also an exorcism 
of Germany.
The first defence treaty that was concluded in Europe after 1945, the 
Treaty of Dunkirk, was aimed against Germany, not Russia. The Euro-
pean Community of Coal, Iron, and Steel was created in order to get 
a grip on Germany’s heavy industry. Under strong American pressure, 
and in order to escape the even greater danger of the creation of a new 
German army, France developed the plan for a European Defence Com-
munity. The final rejection of that plan by the French parliament in 1954 
illustrated France’s fear of Germany. It did not help, because in that same 
year Germany was rearmed and became a member of nato. After the 
defeat of the European Defence Community project, another course was 
selected for European cooperation, that of economic integration which 
was inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The idea was that eco-
nomic integration eventually would also lead to the political integration 
of Europe. This however was not the thinking of General de Gaulle.
The Fifth Republic, that was founded by General de Gaulle in 1958, 
produced an unmistakable increase in internal stability, in economic 
growth and in the continuity of foreign policy, and thus laid the basis 
for an increasing French influence in the 1960s. The unravelling of the 
drama of decolonization and the thaw in the Cold War opened up new 
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opportunities for French diplomacy. Thus the 1960s witnessed a strong 
impact of France on European politics. The foreign policy of General de 
Gaulle was the most stunning example of this. His diplomacy was aimed 
at nothing less than a fundamental revision not only of the European but 
of the entire world order.
The first thing de Gaulle did, on 17 September 1958, thus still as 
prime minister of the Fourth Republic and even before he had been 
elected president of the Fifth Republic, was to present a memorandum to 
the United States and the United Kingdom with the proposal to reform 
nato in such a way that it would be led by a directorship of the us, the 
uk and France. This suggestion was not accepted by ‘the Anglo-Saxons’. 
America had very different ideas as became clear when, somewhat later, 
the newly elected American president, John F. Kennedy presented his 
‘grand design’ for a new American leadership over the Western alliance. 
De Gaulle’s reaction was to make a bid for French autonomy and French 
leadership over Europe. He rejected Kennedy’s offer of a Multilater-
al Nuclear Force (mlf) and further developed France’s own ‘force de 
frappe’. At the same press conference where this was announced, he also 
vetoed Britain’s admission to the European Economic Community. For 
him Britain was simply a man of straw of America. De Gaulle wanted to 
reform the process of European unification by introducing the Fouchet 
Plan for a European Political Union, which would be based on coopera-
tion — not integration! — of European states. This was rejected by the 
other partners in the eec. In order to take revenge de Gaulle then, in 
1963, signed with chancellor Adenauer the French-German Friendship 
Treaty which is generally known as the Treaty of the Elysée.
The successors of de Gaulle faced different problems. The events 
of May 1968 had demonstrated France’s economic weakness, just at a 
time when the growing financial and economic power of Germany had 
become apparent. At the same time, through the gradual erosion of the 
past and the succession of generations, German diplomacy regained its 
freedom. The moral catharsis of Germany, brought about by the Willy 
Brandt administration, has been a strong catalyst in what was an anyway 
inevitable process. A new generation born after the War and thus uncon-
nected with the Nazi era, was to take over the German leadership.
In retrospect the above mentioned aspects of chancellor Willy 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik are unmistakable but at the time they were noticed 
only by a few observers, typically to be found in France. De Gaulle’s con-
fidant Christian Fouchet for example labelled the ‘Ostpolitik’ a ‘genuine 
Bismarckian policy’. And, as Henry Kissinger told us, president Pompi-
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dou (as well as he himself) was worried whether this policy might not be 
the first step to an uncertain and possibly dangerous future for Germany 
and Europe. Pompidou, in the classic traditions of French diplomacy, 
tried to outbid Germany in good relations with Russia, while at the same 
time re-enacting the Entente Cordiale by opening the Common Market 
to Britain as a counter weight against Germany. Giscard’s diplomacy was 
basically the same, only more so, because in the meantime Germany’s 
influence had grown. Thus, when chancellor Helmuth Schmidt was 
known to be planning a visit to Brezhnev, Giscard flew to Warsaw to see 
the Russian leader first.
Pompidou, a former banker, and Giscard, a brilliant economist, 
understood more of economics than General de Gaulle had done. Under 
them the main aim of France’s European policy was, in some way or 
another, to control Germany’s economic power. This implied an austere 
economic policy which, apart from the first two years of euphoria after 
the election of president Mitterrand, was also to be continued under the 
Left. The ‘franc fort’ became the symbol of this economic policy. The 
policy of the ‘franc fort’ implied however that France had to follow the 
German D-Mark and thus became dependent on the policy of the Ger-
man Bundesbank. To get a grip on that policy became the main aim 
of French European policy. President Mitterrand and chancellor Kohl 
developed a new ‘special relationship’, somewhat similar to the one that 
had existed between de Gaulle and Adenauer. They were both seriously 
concerned about the future of Europe and also saw parallel interests for 
their two countries. Germany wanted political and defence cooperation 
with France, France wanted economic and monetary cooperation with 
Germany. The Economic and Monetary Union and the European Politi-
cal Union were the results of this.
In the meantime however a completely unexpected and astonishing 
series of events had taken place: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unifica-
tion of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the end of the 
Cold War. Thus the Maastricht Treaty became effective in a completely 
different European and world order than the one for which it had been 
planned. French leaders who were confronted with German unification 
were of course very worried by it. But they quickly realized they had to 
accept the situation and put their hope on the saying that this time the 
German leaders did not want to create a German Europe but a European 
Germany.
As a consequence of all this, after 1989 the center of gravity of Europe 
has moved to the East and accordingly the capital of Germany has also 
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moved in that direction, from Bonn to Berlin. The enlargement of the 
European Union that followed has undoubtedly increased the political 
weight of Germany. Thus, in a way, ‘the German question’ has come back. 
But it has now taken on a very different form and we should be grateful 
for that. Books like the one by Delmas however, as well as many other 
publications, indicate that at least for France it will be a while before it 
will have become accustomed to this new situation.
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The American Century in Europe
In 1999, the Whitney Museum of American Art was showing a very suc-
cessful exhibition called The American Century. Indeed, there were two 
exhibitions, The American Century, Part I about the first half of the 20th 
century and Part ii dealing with the following fifty years. The presenta-
tion was divided up into decades, each of them having its own motto. 
The one for the 1950s was: ‘America takes command’. This may sound 
rather martial but the motto is indeed very appropriate as one could 
argue that as from then on the American leadership also included cul-
tural leadership.
The name of the exhibition, ‘The American Century’, was of course 
derived from the title of the famous article that Henry Luce, the editor/
publisher of journals like Life and Time, published in Life on 17 Febru-
ary 1941. Luce wanted the Americans to play a major role in the war for 
freedom and democracy that was in progress at that time and the build-
ing of the better world that would have to come after that. In his article 
Luce insisted that ‘our vision of America as a world power includes a 
passionate devotion to great American ideals’.80 The idea of America as a 
world power and, indeed, as the world power of the future, is, of course, 
much older than the concept of the 20th century as the American cen-
tury. Already in 1902 the British liberal journalist and advocate of world 
peace through arbitration W.T. Stead published a book with the title The 
Americanization of the World, or the Trend of the Twentieth Century. Accord-
ing to Stead the heyday of the British Empire was over and the United 
States was the Empire of the future. The enormous success of America 
was due to three things: education, production and democracy. Britain’s 
choice was between subjugation or cooperation. Stead even proposed 
the merger of the two countries. In the following decade, this idea that 
America was Britain’s successor and that the two countries should and 
could form a union because of their intimate familiarity, became popular 
among British writers.
Much earlier and long before the role of America as a world leader 
had actually become apparent, Alexis de Tocqueville had already proph-
esized that America would become a future master of the world, one of 
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the two superpowers, the other one being Russia. For Tocqueville Amer-
ica and Russia were also two opposite models of society. A few years 
before Tocqueville, the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel had said in his 
famous lectures on The Philosophy of History, given in Jena in 1830–1831: 
‘America [...] is the country of the future.’ But he also remarked that ‘its 
world-historical importance has yet to be revealed in the ages which lie 
ahead’.81 In the best of European traditions Hegel went on to declare that 
both physically and spiritually America was still impotent and that the 
Americans were like unwise children, far removed from higher thoughts 
and aims.
Hegel’s ideas were part of a tradition according to which civilization 
follows the course of the sun. From Asia, where it was born, it had come 
to Europe, where it had come to full blossom. For Hegel, Europe was 
the final destination of the journey of civilization. America might be a 
country with a future but it had offered nothing to the world yet and thus 
there was no place for it in his Philosophy of History. Others argued that 
civilization would follow the path of the sun even further, across the At-
lantic to America and that there the Empire of the future was to be found. 
The most famous formulation of this is to be found in the last quatrain of 
a poem by the philosopher — and bishop — George Berkeley, after whom 
a well-known university in California has been named. The poem was 
written in 1726 but published only in 1752. The last lines read as follows:
Westward the Course of Empire takes its Way;
The four first Acts already past,
A fifth shall close the Drama with the Day;
Time’s noblest Offspring is the last.
America would be the last chapter in the great book of empires and civi-
lizations, because westward from America there was only the Pacific and 
behind that lies the East, where long ago, it had all begun.
Economically and politically speaking, the American Empire began 
at the end of the 19th century. In 1898, with the Spanish-American war, 
America officially became an imperial power by taking over the remains 
of the Spanish Empire (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines). The us 
position of world power was confirmed by the First World War and the 
Peace of Paris. After the Great War the European powers had become 
debtors instead of creditors. Now, not Europe but America was ‘the 
world’s banker’. This new economic world order became clearly visible 
with the crash of Wall Street in 1929 which led the world into the great 
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depression of the 1930’s. From that time on, everybody knew that when 
America was ill the rest of the world would suffer too.
After 1945 the us became the world’s Number One superpower. The 
American economy alone produced more goods and services than all 
the rest of the world together. The dollar took over from sterling as the 
world’s reserve currency. The American fleet ruled the waves as once 
H.M.’s Navy had done and the president of the United States was the 
only statesman to dispose of the atomic bomb. As a matter of fact, Ameri-
ca used that weapon twice, in August 1945. As Tocqueville had predicted, 
Russia was the other superpower, but although a great military power, 
economically speaking, the Soviet Union was very vulnerable as became 
clear with the revolutions of 1989–1990. After that America remained as 
the world’s only superpower. Henry Luce’s prediction that the coming 
age would fulfill history and tensions and wars would become obsolete 
was faintly echoed by Francis Fukuyama when he coined the expression 
‘The End of History’.
While already after 1914–1918 nobody in Europe could remain blind 
to America’s economic and political power, its cultural impact was very 
limited. Luce argued that American culture had laid the foundations for 
the American century. All over the world people listened to jazz music 
and watched Hollywood films. This may be true, but for Europe’s intel-
lectual elite the United States remained a primitive country that had 
nothing to offer to the enlightened mind. The Americans were seen as 
naïve, uncivilized human beings, whose only interest was in making 
money. All over Europe and even in the former mother country, Eng-
land, writers and essayists were uttering similar sounds. C.S. Lewis for 
example remarked: ‘The so-called Renaissance produced three disasters: 
the invention of gunpowder, the invention of printing and the discovery 
of America.’82 And Harold Nicolson told a journalist who was leaving for 
America that ‘there is one thing you will miss in America — that is the 
adult mind.’83
The war did not bring about an end to these forms of cultural con-
tempt. Graham Greene for example said that he would rather spend his 
old age in the Gulag Archipel than in California.84 France soon took over 
the leadership of post-war anti-Americanism, of which Coca Cola and 
later McDonalds became the symbols. When Coca Cola in 1949 opened 
its first factory in France, there was a strong protest against the ‘Coca-
colonization’ of France. The catholic daily Témoignage Chrétien summa-
rized its rejection of both the Soviet Union and the us in the slogan: ‘We 
want neither Coca Cola nor vodka. Good wine is enough’.85
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The American intellectual elite was irritated by this refusal and tried 
to improve America’s image in the world of high culture by subsid-
ing journals and scholarly institutions. The history of this campaign is 
described by the historian Volker Berghahn in an article on ‘European 
Elitism, American Money and Popular Culture’. This article is one out 
of a collection of 13 contributions that are brought together in a recent 
book about The American Century in Europe. The book has three sections 
which deal with diplomatic, cultural and social responses to the Ameri-
can challenge respectively. The majority of the authors are Americans 
and among the Europeans, Italian authors take pride of place. This is 
easily explained by the fact that the book is the outcome of a joint project 
of the universities of Cornell and Turin. This is not to say that the book is 
unbalanced. There are two contributions that specifically deal with Brit-
ain and Germany. What one misses however is a chapter on what might 
well be the most interesting case, France.
The book appeared too early to deal with the European reactions to 
the American intervention in Iraq, but Walter LaFeber’s warning seems 
to be very much to the point. ‘If [...] the United States, defying the warn-
ings of Europeans and others, attacked states suspected of harboring ter-
rorists and/or developing weapons of mass destruction (Iraq would be 
the prime target), European and Islamic governments could well turn 
against the American action, unless the United States won quickly, con-
clusively, and established a well-regarded and effective government to 
replace the overthrown regime — a large order.’86 So far the effect of the 
war has not so much been a separation of Europe from America as an 
internal division of Europe. This is a new division that does not coin-
cide with the former East-West division. Maybe the American Century 
in Central and Eastern Europe has yet to begin.
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Eurocentrism
Africa is a European invention. When the Romans finally defeated 
Carthago, they turned the place into a province and called it Africa. 
Originally referring only to a small part of Tunisia and Algeria, it later 
became the name of the entire continent. The same happened to Asia, 
another province of the Roman Empire, in what is now called the Near 
East. The names of the two other continents demonstrate even more 
obviously their European origins: America was named after an Italian 
traveller — and not even Columbus! — and the term Australia comes 
from the fact that European voyagers who had some vague idea about 
the existence of this continent but knew nothing about it, called it ‘The 
Unknown Southland’, Terra australis incognita.
Thus these names, consciously or rather unconsciously as is the case 
with terms like the Near East, Non-Western Studies, Overseas History 
et cetera, are all witness to the Eurocentric bias in our world view. The 
same is true for history. History as we know it in its modern scientific 
form, is a European invention. It was developed in the West in the nine-
teenth century and it dealt almost exclusively with Western and indeed 
European history.
The historical interpretation which resulted from this was extremely 
Eurocentric. Weltgeschichte in fact came down to European history, for 
in the framework of general history non-European peoples played no 
role. In the nineteenth century the European approach to Asian history 
was increasingly dominated by feelings of European superiority and a 
conviction of Asian backwardness. Their supposed backwardness was a 
fairly recent phenomenon, since European historians and philosophers 
had traditionally shown a great respect for the ancient civilizations of 
Asia. Asia was considered as the continent where the cradle of civili-
zation had once stood. But true as it may be that the light of civiliza-
tion had originally come from the East, according to European thinkers 
since then there had been no development and thus no history. To quote 
Hegel: Asian history is ‘for the most part, really unhistorical, for it is only 
the repetition of the same majestic ruin’. And: ‘China and India lie, as it 
were, still outside the World’s History’.87
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Hegel had of course a great influence on Karl Marx and Marx also 
concluded that Asia has no history in the Western sense of the word. 
In an article of 1853 on ‘The Future Results of British Rule in India’ he 
stated: ‘Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. 
What we call its history, is but the history of the successive invaders 
who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and 
unchanging society’. And nearly ten years later on China: ‘The Oriental 
empires always show an unchanging social infrastructure coupled with 
unceasing change in the persons and tribes who manage to ascribe to 
themselves the political superstructure’.88
The opinions on Africa were even more categorical. Here there were 
no ideas about ‘the cradle of civilization’ or ‘the light that once came 
from the East’. Africa was seen as an ahistorical continent and the Afri-
can people as a people without civilization and thus without history. The 
most famous formulation of this judgment is to be found in the Jena 
Lectures given by Hegel in 1830–1831 and published as the Philosophy 
of History. Here he wrote: ‘At this point we leave Africa, not to mention 
it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or 
development to exhibit (...). What we properly understand by Africa is 
the Unhistorical Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of 
mere nature, which had to be presented here only as being on the thresh-
old of the World’s history’.89
Again, the writings of Karl Marx reflect the same line of thought. There 
is no doubt however that such opinions were by no means a monopoly of 
Marxist historians. Indeed they never had been. Adam Smith for exam-
ple wrote in The Wealth of Nations: ‘Africa (...) as well as several of the 
countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, are 
inhabited by barbarous nations’. To be true, he also remarked: ‘But those 
nations were by no means so weak and defenceless as the miserable and 
helpless Americans (...)’.90 These Americans of course were not the Euro-
pean colonists but the ‘Indians’. This line of thought was continued until 
very recently. A late echo of it can be found in the work of a Hungarian 
Marxist historian of Africa, Endre Sik, who wrote in 1966: ‘Prior to their 
encounter with Europeans the majority of African peoples still lived a 
primitive, barbaric life, many of them even on the lowest level of barba-
rism. (...) Therefore it is unrealistic to speak of their ‘history’ — in the 
scientific sense of the word — before the appearance of the European 
invaders.91 Again, this was by no means an exclusively Marxist way of 
thinking. Just one year before Sik’s book appeared, the Regius Professor 
of Modern History at Oxford — and by no means a Marxist — H.R. Tre-
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vor-Roper, compared the histories of Britain and Africa, describing the 
latter as being little more than ‘the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous 
tribes in picturesque but irrelevant quarters of the globe’.92
How things have changed since the 1960s! No sensible person would 
argue any more that African history does not exist, not even in Oxford. 
The development of African history has been spectacular. Perhaps it 
has been the most vivid, dynamic and innovative field of history since 
the emergence of the new social and economic history in the 1920s and 
1930s. One could argue that the Journal of African History has been the 
most innovative journal since the founding of the French journal of the 
Annales in 1929. Indeed the two developments are to a certain extent 
comparable. Social historians, such as those of the Annales and others, 
began to ask questions that had not been asked before and of which no 
mention has been made in traditional sources. New sources had to be 
discovered and new techniques developed to re-examine old sources in 
a new light. The same situation existed with African history. Sources are 
scarce, and the very scarcity of sources has given an enormous stimulus 
to the development of new techniques and methods. The past had to 
be investigated with other means. Anthropology has also played a major 
role in developing African history.
The great leap forward took pace at an astonishing speed. In the mid-
1950s not one of the major post-graduate institutions in the United States 
(Harvard, Princeton, Chicago, Berkeley, Columbia) offered courses in 
African history. By the late 1970s there were already 600 professional 
historians of Africa in the United States.93 Next to the Americans a major 
role was played by British historians. The Journal of African History — the 
first issue of which appeared in 1960 — was, as Terence Ranger has 
said, ‘the combined manifesto, charter, programme and shop-window 
for the field.94 Oliver and Fage’s Short History of Africa sold several hun-
dred thousand copies and is probably the single most influential book 
on African history. Soon however the Africans took over the leading role 
themselves. The unesco History of Africa is essentially an achievement of 
African historians.
The development of an autonomous (= non-Eurocentric) approach to 
Asian history had taken place earlier. The official British history writing 
about India was strongly Anglocentric. As Nehru once remarked about 
the British: ‘Real history for them begins with the advent of the Eng-
lishman to India; all that went before it is in some mystic kind of way 
a preparation for this divine consummation.’95 Already in the middle of 
the nineteenth century however, as a reaction to the rather condescend-
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ing approach of the colonial historians, Indian historians developed their 
own historiography, and in the late nineteenth century the rise of the 
nationalist movement gave a strong impetus to this so that by the 1920s 
and 1930s there existed a considerable group of professional historians. 
When independence came in 1947, Indian professional historiography 
was already in a strong position.
In Indonesia on the contrary, there were practically no professional 
Indonesian historians before independence. Here, however, the ques-
tion of Eurocentrism had already been approached in the 1930s by a 
Dutch colonial civil servant, J.C. van Leur, in his dissertation about early 
Asian trade which was published in 1934. He reacted against the exclu-
sively colonial approach, which constituted a distorted perspective and 
ignored vast areas of historical reality. Most historians, he wrote, see the 
Asiatic world through the eyes of the Dutch ruler: ‘from the deck of the 
ship, the ramparts of the fortress, the high gallery of the trading house’.96 
He successfully tried to remedy this view. Even more fundamentally, he 
also questioned the periodization of history and the place in it allotted 
to Asia. His ideas were rediscovered in the 1950s and have been very 
influential in the rethinking of Asian history in the early modern period.
In retrospect much of the debate about the possibilities and impos-
sibilities of, and the similarities and dissimilarities between western and 
non-western history, looks rather futile. Today everybody accepts that 
Africans and Asians have their own history, and that it is as rich and 
interesting as that of Europe. The question, however, is whether we can 
stop here and simply consider world history as the sum of a great num-
ber of autonomous regional, national or even continental histories. Most 
historians would agree that we should try to do more and study how, in 
one way or another, these various civilizations have become intercon-
nected, how the world situation of today has come into being. Therefore 
the real challenge is now to offer a non-Eurocentric form of world his-
tory. This is a difficult task but a necessary one because, as the Dutch 
historian Johan Huizinga already wrote in the 1930s: ‘our civilization is 
the first to have for its past, the past of the world, our history is the first 
to be world history’.97
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A Peace Loving Nation
We Dutch people like to think of ourselves as a peace-loving nation. 
We do not like the clash of arms, parades and uniforms, even though 
the memory of admirals Tromp and De Ruyter is still strong enough to 
make our hearts beat faster whenever the Navy is allowed to purchase a 
few farm-fresh and very expensive super-frigates. We have a great time 
watching the British journalists on Newsnight who, leaning over a sand-
box with generals and admirals retd., analyze the military operations in 
Iraq. But the French military pomp and glory of Quatorze Juillet does not 
appeal to us, and the French force de frappe is greeted as a joke. And Ger-
mans in uniform are not our cup of tea.
So we have an aversion to the turmoil of war and like to sing our 
praises as a peace-loving nation. Militarism is foreign to our nature. Sol-
diers are not held in high regard here, although the officers and especially 
the generals are paid well. Almost everybody saw conscription as a very 
unpleasant obligation. The slogan ‘Mourir pour la patrie’ does not sound 
appealing to us. Warlike behavior is not appreciated. Which is quite 
exceptional. Even the Belgians have considered courage and militancy 
as historical qualities of the Belgian people for centuries. They refer to 
none other than Julius Caesar, who wrote that of all the peoples of Gaul 
the Belgians were the most courageous (‘horum omnium fortissimi sunt 
Belgae’). Not only eighteenth century Belgian authors liked to refer to 
Caesar, the Belgian king Albert also quoted these words in his proclama-
tion to the army on August 5th, 1914, one day after the German invasion. 
Those Belgians mentioned by Caesar also happen to include the Dutch, 
but I don’t think anyone ever felt the need to remind us of that fact.
There is a real tradition here. The Dutch mentality has been more 
pacifistic than militaristic for a long time, and our foreign policy has 
been focused on maintaining neutrality and encouraging an interna-
tional legal system, in which the law, rather than force will prevail on 
earth. Cornelis van Vollenhoven, the great legal scholar from Leiden, 
was of the opinion that our country should serve as an example for the 
dangerous outside world. He spoke of a Lafayette-role, and even a Joan 
of Arc-role, both pretty militant figures by the way. The Peace Confer-
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ences of 1899 and 1907, which resulted in the establishment of the 
International Court of Arbitration, were held in The Hague, the seat of 
government of the neutral Netherlands. In his well-known Projet pour 
rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe of 1713 the French Abbé de St. Pierre 
had already proposed to establish a permanent Court of Arbitration in 
our country, not in The Hague, but in Utrecht, a city he knew because 
of the peace conference that was held there that year. Still, love of peace 
is not the only order of the day in Holland. In the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century we waged one of the biggest colonial wars in history, 
the Atjeh war, in which half a million people died. And that wasn’t the 
only one. We had already had the Java War, the Lombok Expedition, and 
many others. All of this led to much excitement and a roll of drums. 
Well-known and popular songs from those days contained catchy slo-
gans such as:
‘With powder and lead
we shoot the Balinese dead’
and
‘On a rope, on a rope,
Toekoe Oemar and his wife’
In 1894 L.W.C. van den Berg wrote in De Gids that the people of Atjeh 
should be eradicated: ‘no longer at their assimilation, but at their elimi-
nation must our policy be aimed’. And we also sympathized deeply with 
the struggle of the Boers in Transvaal. The Dutch poetess Catharina van 
Rees wrote the national anthem of the republic of Transvaal which says, 
among other things:
‘Do you know that nation so heroic
and yet oppressed for so long?
It has sacrifïced property and blood
For freedom and justice.’
This heroism actually also rubbed off on us, for after all, the Boers were 
our ‘cousins’. After World War ii, we waged a big war of decolonization 
that lasted several years and led to the deaths of thousands of people on 
both sides. We fought most of our wars, however, in Europe. Everyone 
remembers World War ii, when we fought against Germany and Japan. 
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And of course we all know the episode of the Belgian revolt, during 
which we conducted among other expeditions, the Ten Days Campaign, 
and admiral Van Speyck who destroyed himself with his ship after utter-
ing the immortal words: ‘I’d sooner blow her up’.
However, the largest number of wars stem from the days when the 
Netherlands was a powerful nation, and the years before that when our 
people fought for independence. First there was the Eighty Years’ War 
with Spain. Then we became an independent nation, and our goal was to 
remain independent and gather wealth. We conducted many wars with 
these objectives in mind, including four with the English that lasted a 
total of fourteen years. Still, that was nothing compared to the wars with 
France. In all we were at war with France for twenty-eight years, or even 
thirty-three if you count the War of the Austrian Succession. And then 
there is the French declaration of war in 1793, followed by the French 
invasion in 1795, and eighteen years of French occupation and annexa-
tion. After that there was the French intervention during our war with 
the Belgians in 1830. Has there ever been a time when we were not at 
war with France?
There were many more adversaries. For example the Portuguese, 
whom we fought in Asia, Africa and America, and generally not without 
success. In 1645 we supported the Swedes and fought the Danes and ten 
years later we did the exact opposite. In both cases the objective was the 
same: to keep the Øresund, which was of vital importance to our Baltic 
trade, open. In 1672, the Year of Disaster, we were simultaneously at 
war with France, England and two German sovereigns, the bishops of 
Munster and Cologne. We were at war with more than half of the fifteen 
countries that until recently made up the European Union, including all 
the big ones (France, Germany and England) but also Spain, Portugal, 
Sweden, Denmark and Belgium. Furthermore, we should not forget that 
Austria was part of Germany during World War ii and Italy was its ally. 
So we were at war with those countries, too. As for Finland and Ireland: 
in the past they used to resort under Sweden and England respectively 
and therefore do not figure in these calculations. Of the fifteen countries 
that until recently made up the European Union, there are only two we 
have not been at war with. The first is Luxemburg, but this country was 
united with ours in a personal union for a long time. The other country 
is Greece. At least, I don’t remember any war with Greece. But that is the 
only exception.
None of this applies anymore now. We may spend a lot of money on 
our armed forces, but we were very happy when conscription was abol-
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ished. A regular army was going to defend our honor from now on. Pro-
fessionals, that’s what we wanted. It seemed like a good solution, because 
professionals make their own decision to fight and if necessary be killed. 
But it became clear very quickly that this was not exactly what we had 
had in mind either. If actual shots are going to be fired, the members 
of our Lower House will trample each other in order to be the first to 
demand that our boys be called back. Being killed in action is pour les 
autres, especially the Americans.
The aversion to being shot is a rapidly and strongly spreading phe-
nomenon that governments are increasingly obliged to take into con-
sideration. In bygone days governments were willing to sacrifice large 
numbers of human lives to achieve the desired goals. Tradition has it that 
Frederick the Great shouted at his soldiers: ‘Hunde, wollt ihr ewig leben?’ 
[Dogs, do you want to live forever?] The millions of soldiers who died in 
World War I are the most horrifying example of this willingness. And the 
soldiers on their part were willing to make the sacrifice, for in spite of 
the occasional strike and mutiny, their silent acceptance of — in our eyes 
senseless — suffering and death, is what strikes us most. The willingness 
to fight and be killed has diminished considerably, not only in the Neth-
erlands, but all over the Western world, and governments, even those of 
totalitarian states such as the Soviet Union during the Afghan war, have 
to take this into account. Saddam Hussein thought the Americans would 
not dare fight a war in the Gulf. He was mistaken. Twice. But that does 
not alter the fact that, since the Vietnam war, the arrival of an airplane 
filled with body bags has been every American president’s nightmare.
The question of where this change in the mentality of leaders and 
troops came from has been subject to much speculation. Some have 
named the decrease in family size as a factor. I don’t see that. Families 
weren’t that large in the past, plus I don’t believe that the parents of a 
large family would carelessly send their sons off to die thinking: ‘on a 
fruit-filled tree, one or two plums are not missed’. The question, espe-
cially with regard to World War I with its endless and senseless slaughter, 
should be why this willingness existed before. As yet, nobody has come 
up with a satisfying answer. Perhaps it has to do with class relations and 
the acceptance of authority back then. These have since changed con-
siderably. The emancipation of the individual has progressed and it is no 
longer matter-of-course to accept and obey orders. And so the world is 
starting to resemble the Netherlands more and more. What a pleasant 
thought!
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European Ideas about Education, Science and Art
In September 2010 pope Benedict xvi payed an official visit to the Unit-
ed Kingdom. Apart from some protests about the sexual misbehavior of 
catholic clerics, the popal visit received little attention. On 19 September, 
the fourth and last day of his visit, the pope celebrated the beatification 
of John Henry Newman. That event got even less attention. In fact one 
wonders whether the British people had any notion at all not only about 
what beatification actually is but also who ever this Newman might have 
been. Still he is not only of interest to the Roman Catholic Church as one 
of her most famous converts but also as the author of one of the most 
influential books about education, viz. The Idea of a University. As not 
everybody may be familiar with the life and work of this Oxford don who 
was later to become a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, I will first 
say a few words about the author of this remarkable book.
John Henry Newman was born in London in 1801. His father, a 
banker, was of Dutch extraction while his mother came from a Hugue-
not family. Newman entered Oxford as a student when he was only 15 
years old and stayed for a considerable time. In 1822 he became a fellow 
and in 1826 was appointed tutor at Oriel College. In 1828 he became 
vicar of St. Mary’s Church. With John Keble and others he founded the 
so-called Oxford Movement, which opposed liberalism in religion. He 
became disenchanted with the Church of England, resigned his post as 
vicar, became a Roman Catholic and left Oxford to go to Rome. In 1847 
he was ordained a priest. Seven years later he was asked to become Rec-
tor of the newly established Catholic University in Dublin. It was there 
that he gave the lectures that were to form the basis for his extremely 
influential book: The Idea of a University.
Newman’s book is a most curious work, as is apparent from its rather 
long and complicated title, which reads as follows: The Idea of a Univer-
sity Defined and Illustrated, i. In Nine Discourses delivered to the Catholics 
of Dublin; ii. In Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members 
of the Catholic University.98 It is by no means a coherent book. Indeed it 
is not really a book at all. It consists of a compilation of nine lectures 
given at the Catholic University of Dublin and a selection of other lec-
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tures and papers given on various occasions. It has often been criticized 
as being ‘radically flawed by inconsistency and self-contradiction’.99 This 
is true in so far as it is not always easy to follow his line of argument. 
Moreover, the assumption that theology is a science, and indeed the 
most important of all, may not be easy for the modern reader to accept. 
All the same, the main argument is clear and powerfully presented: a 
university is primarily ‘a place of teaching universal knowledge’. Its aim 
is ‘the diffusion and extension of knowledge’. Its purpose is ‘to produce 
more intelligent [...] members of society’ by fostering ‘cultivation of 
mind’, and ‘formation [...] of the intellect’.100 Newman presents a high 
ideal of what a university should be: ‘the high protecting power of all 
knowledge and science, of fact and principle, of inquiry and discovery, 
of experiment and speculation’.101 He also elaborates his ideal of liberal 
education: which is the ‘real cultivation of mind’.102 As a result, ‘A habit 
of mind is formed which lasts through life, of which the attributes are, 
freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, and wisdom [...]’.103
There is of course much more to be said about this monumental 
work, and I shall return to it later on. However, one thing is clear. By 
discussing the ‘idea’ of a university, Newman was able to address some 
general issues concerning science and education. I hope to do the same 
and so present some general reflections and observations on education, 
science and art.
education
The Oxford English Dictionary gives various meanings for the word ‘Edu-
cation’, including puzzling definitions such as, for example, ‘the rearing 
of silkworms’. But the two most familiar ones are ‘the process of ‘bringing 
up’ (young persons)’ and ‘the systematic instruction, schooling or train-
ing given to the young in preparation for the work of life’ [...]. These two 
elements are present at every stage of education but not always in the 
same proportions. Primary education, to begin with that, is a matter of 
basic instruction. The main aim is to teach the child certain elementary 
skills, of which the most important are reading, writing and arithme-
tic as well as obtaining some basic knowledge about the world, that is 
to say some geography and history. The general education of children 
is, of course, principally a duty for the parents. Just as one has to feed 
and protect a child one has the duty to impart knowledge and skills as 
well as instill moral values. Nowadays, however, in virtually all societies, 
the state also assumes responsibility for the provision of schooling for 
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all its subjects, regardless of the financial or social background of the 
parents. Indeed, whether they like it or not, parents are obliged by the 
state to send their children to school and they are punished if they fail 
to comply.
Secondary education did not become of interest to the state until 
much later. The usefulness and purpose of primary education was obvi-
ous, but this was not so apparent for secondary education. Indeed, some 
denied that secondary education had any purpose at all.104 The famous 
English historian Sir Lewis Namier once remarked: ‘Elementary educa-
tion keeps children off the streets; university education provides a place 
for people like me. As for secondary education, I can think of no reason 
for it at all’. I cannot agree with Sir Lewis, because I believe that second-
ary education is the most important of all the types of schooling. While 
elementary education is necessary to be able to operate in society, and 
university education is indispensable for the training of scientists and 
qualified professionals, the ‘liberal education’ Newman spoke of is essen-
tially acquired at secondary schools. This is certainly true for the rather 
elite form of secondary education (exemplified by the grammar schools 
and gymnasia) that was the norm in Europe until the 1960s.
When in 1878, Mark Twain travelled to Germany, and visited Heidel-
berg among other places, he wrote that the German student ‘has spent 
nine years in the gymnasium, under a system which allowed him no free-
dom, but vigorously compelled him to work like a slave. Consequently, 
he has left the gymnasium with an education which is so extensive and 
complete, that the most a university can do for it is to perfect some of its 
profounder specialities.’105 The German gymnasium was the model for 
the Dutch gymnasium.
The backbone of this type of secondary education was the study of 
the humanities, that is to say of Greek and Latin, but also of modern lan-
guages, history, mathematics as well as, in most cases, religion. This type 
of education was based on an ideological consensus that was character-
ized by two elements: firstly, the idea that there is a continuous thread 
linking modern civilization with the past and, secondly, that European 
civilization is virtually synonymous with civilization in general. Accord-
ing to this way of thinking, there is a direct line running back through 
time, from the present to the Renaissance and from the Renaissance to 
Rome and Greece, and so on going right back to the ancient civiliza-
tions of Egypt and the Near East. Civilization originated in the Mediter-
ranean world; not just European or Western civilization but civilization 
tout court.
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The most pertinent, most passionate and, possibly, also the most arro-
gant formulation of this belief — for a belief is what it was — is to be 
found in Newman’s Idea of a University, from which I will quote the fol-
lowing lines: ‘I am not denying of course the civilization of the Chinese, 
for instance, though it be not our civilization; but it is a huge, station-
ary, unattractive, morose civilization. Nor do I deny a civilization to the 
Hindoos, nor to the ancient Mexicans, nor to the Saracens, nor (in a 
certain sense) to the Turks; but each of these races has its own civiliza-
tion, as separate from one another as from ours (...)’. That was the great 
difference with Western civilization, which, according to Newman, ‘has 
a claim to be considered as the representative Society and Civilization 
of the human race, as its perfect result and limit, in fact’. Newman con-
cluded: ‘I call then this commonwealth pre-eminently and emphatically 
Human Society, and its intellect the Human Mind, and its decisions the 
sense of mankind, and its disciplined and cultivated state Civilization in 
the abstract, and the territory on which it lies the orbis terrarum, or the 
World’.106
Newman formulated these ideas extremely forcefully but they were 
then held by virtually the whole Western intellectual world. Later on 
however, the situation Newman described changed dramatically and this 
produced, what is known as, the Crisis in the Humanities. In a book of the 
same title published in 1964, the prominent English historian J.H. Plumb 
wrote: ‘A hundred, fifty, even twenty years ago, a tradition of culture, 
based on the Classics, on Scripture, on History and Literature, bound 
the governing classes together and projected the image of a gentleman. 
[...] These subjects — History, Classics, Literature, and Divinity — were, 
with Mathematics, the core of the educational system (...). Alas, the ris-
ing tide of scientific and industrial societies, combined with the batter-
ing of two World Wars, has shattered the confidence of humanists in 
their capacity to lead or to instruct’.107
Thus, the two foundations of traditional humanistic education have 
been shaken. Firstly, the sense of an unbroken line connecting us with 
the past has disappeared. If history is popular at all today, this is not, as 
it used to be, to study books that highlight how we relate to our ‘forefa-
thers’ but rather to read how very different, how strange the people in 
the past were. The success of books such as Montaillou by Emmanuel Le 
Roy Ladurie or Simon Schama’s The Embarrassment of Riches illustrates 
just this. The past has become a collection of curiosities and the historian 
has turned into an anthropologist.
Secondly, the belief in the superiority of Western civilization has 
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diminished, if not vanished entirely (although it has probably disap-
peared more from public discourse than from private convictions). The 
reason for this is not so much the rise or the increased appreciation of 
other civilizations. Few of us envy life under the Taliban, the Iranian Aya-
tollahs or in hectic, overcrowded Japan. This change in attitude is more 
related to the steady decline of European influence worldwide.
If this analysis is correct it leads us to two questions. Firstly, is this 
development to be regretted? Secondly, can something be done to rem-
edy it? My answer to both questions is: ‘Yes’. As to the first question, the 
reason for regret is not so much ideological as practical. In order to be 
brief, I will borrow E.D. Hirsch’s succinct words on the subject. Hirsch 
has argued that ‘an absolute requirement of high literacy in a nation is 
that its citizens must share a broad range of diverse background knowl-
edge’ and he concluded ‘that broad humanistic studies at every stage of 
education and particularly in early education are highly utilitarian as 
well as intrinsically valuable’.108 I agree wholeheartedly with this view.
As to the second question: ‘What can be done to remedy the prob-
lem?’ the answer is not so simple. A return to the old situation is not an 
option. Modern concepts of civilization will have to be more ecumenical 
and more multicultural than they used to be. What is necessary, then, 
is the development of a new ideological consensus about what is worth 
knowing and, subsequently, to teach that to students either at secondary 
school, as was the European tradition, or at college, as is the tradition in 
America.109
This brings me to the third level of education, the one I know best 
from personal experience and that is university education. Although 
there are many important differences between the various national tra-
ditions in university education, it is fair to say that the most fundamen-
tal distinction is seen when comparing the European and the American 
university. There can be no doubt that the American model has been the 
most successful. It combines higher education for the many with having 
the best research universities in the world. It has been so successful that 
it is now imitated virtually all over the world. The reason why the Euro-
pean system failed is that it did not adjust to the two main developments 
in modern society: social emancipation and the economic need for an 
ever better-educated population. These two developments have created 
the need for mass university education.
As I have argued for a long time, and at various occasions, I see the 
transformation of the European university as a structural change, that 
should be welcomed not regretted.110 It is necessary to accept the con-
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sequences that this will bring a greater diversification of the academic 
landscape. Inevitably with the increase in the number of degrees and 
the merging of university and vocational higher education institutes, 
the degree itself will become less important than the place where it was 
awarded. The distinction between research and teaching universities, 
widely accepted in America, will inevitably come to Europe too.
science
This brings me to the second topic of my lecture, science. Nowadays, 
it seems quite natural that universities are places where teaching and 
research go hand in hand. This, however, is a fairly recent phenomenon. 
The history of the universities reveals that in the beginning the universi-
ties were first and foremost institutions for professional training. Willem 
Otterspeer’s magisterial history of the University of Leiden, demon-
strates that this venerable place of learning was not a centre for research 
but for education.111 When, in the eighteenth century, science became 
increasingly important this was more a matter for learned societies and 
academies than for the universities. The idea that the university could 
play a role in this and that teaching and research should go together only 
emerged later, in the nineteenth century. The man who first introduced 
this idea of the university was the German scholar, statesman and diplo-
mat Wilhelm von Humboldt.
In Humboldt’s view, the university was a place where scholars and 
students could dedicate themselves to research. University lecturers 
should not merely be passive ‘scholars’ but must take an active part in 
research. However, according to Charles Mc Clelland, Humboldt’s idea 
of Wissenschaft was radically different from, later, positivist, concepts. 
Humboldt’s view was that ‘Wissenschaft and further discoveries emanat-
ing from it were the instrument, not the goal, of the scholar. The full 
development of the personality and of a supple, wide-ranging habit of 
clear, original thinking was the goal’. In other words, Wissenschaft should 
contribute to Bildung.112 In this respect, there was not that much differ-
ence between Humboldt’s and Newman’s ideas of ‘liberal education’. The 
main difference was that in England university research was not encour-
aged until about the 1860s. Almost half a century after Humboldt’s 
reforms were introduced in Prussia, Newman was still arguing that the 
object of a university ‘is the diffusion and extension of knowledge rather 
than the advancement’ of it. And he concluded: ‘If its object was scien-
tific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a university should 
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have students [...]‘.113 One of Newman’s younger contemporaries, Benja-
min Jowett, the famous Master of Balliol when that College still was ‘the 
nursery of statesmen’, exclaimed: ‘Research! A mere excuse for idleness; 
it has never achieved, and will never achieve any results of the slight-
est value!’114 And even a century later another Oxford don spoke with 
great contempt about ‘that state of resentful coma dignified by the name 
of Rezearch’.115 The way he spelled ‘rezearch’ and pronounced it with a 
strong German-American twang, indicates the contempt for American 
education that was still so powerful in the 1950s.
Such protests were, of course, all in vain. Research was here to stay. 
Today, the university justifies its own existence not only, and not even 
primarily, as a place of higher education but first and foremost as a cen-
tre of scientific research. The academic pecking order is clear evidence 
of this: the highest accolade does not go to the best teacher but to the 
most successful researcher. For the researcher, there are Nobel Prizes 
and similar awards; for the teacher there is a bunch of flowers, a bottle of 
cheap wine and the dubious accolade of ‘Teacher of the Year’.
The strategy to promote the university as the best place for the 
advancement of science has been very successful. This is hardly surpris-
ing as in every walk of life, we all benefit, in some way, from achieve-
ments in science and technology. Science has become the backbone of 
society, the prerequisite for progress and economic growth. There is an 
unbroken chain connecting knowledge to science to research to technol-
ogy to industry to production to economic growth and finally to wealth 
and wellbeing. Today, this forms the main justification for research. 
However, this utilitarian reasoning is not the only, and may not even be 
the most important, justification for the acquisition of knowledge. The 
strongest, and oldest, argument in favor of the pursuit of knowledge is 
that it is an intrinsical good. Even in Ancient times, Cicero declared that 
we are all of us drawn to the pursuit of Knowledge and the search after 
truth.116 Cicero was most probably inspired in this by the famous words 
from Aristotle’s Metaphysics: ‘All men naturally desire knowledge’.117 Aris-
totle also wrote: ‘Clearly then it is for no extrinsic advantage that we seek 
this Knowledge [...] since it alone exists for itself’.118 This tradition was 
still very much alive in the nineteenth century. Newman, for example, 
not only quoted Cicero but also argued himself that, ‘Knowledge is, not 
merely a means to something beyond it, or the preliminary of certain 
arts into which it naturally resolves, but an end sufficient to rest in and 
to pursue for its own sake’.119
Newman was a pious and religious man but other thinkers also had 
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similar ideas. His contemporary, the French scholar Ernest Renan was 
a student who lost his faith, left the seminary, became an agnostic and 
caused a scandal by writing the Life of Jesus in which he wrote ‘My reli-
gion is the progress of reason, that is to say of science’.120 Elsewhere, in 
his famous book L’Avenir de la Science, he said: ‘there is in this world 
something that is more valuable than material pleasures, or wealth, or 
even health, and that is the dedication to science’.121
By the time Renan declared his faith in the religion of science and 
Newman pleaded for knowledge for its own sake, the other argument 
in favor of science, the utilitarian one, had also built up a respectable 
tradition. Even if the utilitarian tradition cannot boast a link to Aristo-
tle or Cicero, it was represented by a wellknown philosopher from the 
sixteenth century, Francis Bacon. Macaulay wrote a wonderful essay 
on Bacon, in which he has an imaginary follower of Bacon summarize 
what ‘the new philosophy’, i.e. science, has done for mankind: ‘It has 
lengthened life; it has mitigated pain; it has extinguished diseases; it has 
increased the fertility of the soil; (...) it has spanned great rivers and estu-
aries with bridges of form unknown to our fathers; (...) it has lighted up 
the night with the splendor of the day; it has extended the range of the 
human vision; it has multiplied the power of the human muscles; it has 
accelerated motion; it has annihilated distance (...)’.122 And so Macaulay 
went on for another two pages.
Currently, this is the main argument for the promotion of science. 
Since the Second World War, the practical application of science has 
underlined the importance of advancing pure science. However, defend-
ing the interests of pure science while, at the same time, securing funds 
from the state has turned out to be a delicate balancing act and a rather 
humiliating task at that. As that remarkable observer of human nature 
Sir Humphrey Appleby, one of the main characters from the series Yes 
Minister, remarked on an occasion when his boss visited Oxford: ‘No one 
really understands the true nature of fawning servility until he has seen 
an academic who has glimpsed the prospect of money’.123 A few years 
in academia suffice to learn how true this observation is. Nevertheless, 
there are also some remarkable examples of intellectual honesty. In 1969, 
when particle physics was at its zenith — it had given the American poli-
ticians first the atomic and then the hydrogen bomb — Robert Wilson, 
director of a famous particle-physics lab, was asked by Congress what his 
laboratory could contribute to America’s defense. There was, of course, 
an enormous amount of money at stake, but Wilson replied: ‘This new 
knowledge has all to do with honor and country, but it has nothing to 
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do directly with defending our country, except to help make it worth 
defending’.124
Because the state has become the main financier of science it is able 
to influence what kind of research will be promoted and what will fall 
by the way-side. This is called ‘research policy’. By putting pressure on 
research councils, the government can, either directly or indirectly, 
influence research priorities in the natural and the life-sciences and, also 
increasingly, in the humanities and social sciences.
While this is generally considered acceptable for the sciences, and 
nowadays also for the humanities, it has, hitherto, not been considered 
acceptable for the arts. This is quite remarkable as the state now not only 
takes care of education and science, but has also become the principal 
financier of the arts, at least in Europe. In the late nineteenth century, 
when scientists realized that in order to gain public support they could 
not defend science for the sake of science alone, the art world did exactly 
the opposite. It proclaimed its new ideal of art for the sake of art alone 
(‘l’art pour l’art’). This idea has been so successfully disseminated that 
if an occasional progressive politician tries to support socialist art, or 
promote cultural activities for young people or for immigrants, this is 
generally considered to demonstrate a lack of taste. Where does this dif-
ference in attitude come from? What does this tell us about the differ-
ence between science and art?
art
Although in actual practice artists and scholars usually move in separate 
spheres, it would be difficult to deny that, even if their worlds are differ-
ent, there is a sense in which they are identical. They both spring from 
the human mind. The creativity of the artist can easily be equated to the 
inspiration of the scientist. Artists today mostly work alone, although 
this was different in the days of Rembrandt and Rubens. Scientists usual-
ly work in groups. But in science as in art it is the drive of the individual 
that matters. The concept of genius is equally applicable to music as it is 
to mathematics. The name of Einstein is a symbol of scientific genius as 
much as the name Van Gogh is of artistic genius.
When in 1998, the Royal Netherlands Academy celebrated its one 
hundred ninetieth birthday, it chose Science and Art as its theme. Part of 
the jubilee symposium consisted of a series of dialogs between an artist 
and scholar.125 As a historian I had an easy task as speaker because his-
tory is clearly a hybrid discipline: it is a mixture of science and art. But 
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more generally I think it is fair to say that science and art are usually 
defined more by their differences than by their similarities. The most 
striking difference is that science is characterized by the notion of pro-
gress, while art is not.126
Research is a cumulative process: knowledge is advanced by build-
ing on the achievements of the past. Copernicus and Newton are still 
famous but their theories are outdated. A mediocre high school physics 
teacher of today possesses far more knowledge about the laws of nature 
than Newton did. In the world of art, this is very different. At least, one 
rarely hears people say how fortunate we are today to have Karel Appel, 
Stockhausen and Le Clézio so that we do not have to suffer anymore the 
primitive attempts of Rembrandt, Mozart and Shakespeare. But, differ-
ent as they are, there is in my mind no doubt that science and art are 
also very similar in so far as they are the two most sublime expressions of 
the human mind. There is also no doubt that, as Cicero said, as soon as 
human beings have satisfied their most basic needs, they start to search 
for knowledge. And, as prehistoric cave paintings demonstrate, humans 
will then also look for beauty. The search for truth, through knowledge, 
is not unlike the search for beauty, through art. As Carl Kaysen, former 
director of the Institute for Advanced Study of Princeton, once said, ‘the 
ultimate standards in the intellectual world are aesthetic’127 and one of 
his successors, Philip Griffiths, a mathematician, remarked: ‘Fundamen-
tal thinking has much in common with art, with play, with dreams; it is 
fragile and unformed’.128
In the paper I presented at the Academy symposium I quoted, in this 
context, two famous lines from John Keats’ ‘Ode on a Grecian urn’:
‘Beauty is truth, truth beauty — that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.
I was criticized on this point by one of my colleagues who said that if, 
indeed, this is all one needs to know, we might as well close down all the 
universities right now!
He obviously interpreted Keats a little too literally, which shows how 
dangerous it is to rely on poetry in order to illustrate an argument. Nev-
ertheless, I am willing to take that risk once again and quote another 
poem, with a similar tenor, this time by Emily Dickinson:
‘I died for Beauty — but was scarce
Adjusted in the Tomb
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When one who died for Truth, was lain
In an adjoining room —
He questioned softly, ‘Why I failed’?
‘For Beauty,’ I replied —
‘And I — for Truth — Themselves are One —
We Brethren, are’, He said.’
It is time to come to a conclusion. What I have tried to argue can be sum-
marized in four simple statements: 1) It is important, indeed imperative, 
to come to some agreement about the role of humanist studies in sec-
ondary and tertiary education. 2) The European universities are going 
through a stage of structural change, which will result in a new academic 
landscape with greater diversity than before. 3) It is wrong, particular-
ly for the humanities, but also for the sciences to defend and illustrate 
the importance of science and scholarship in utilitarian terms only. 4) 
Although there are fundamental differences, science and art also have a 
great deal in common. And finally of course we will have to reconsider 
Newman’s idea that Western civilization is the only true “civilization of 
the human race, (...) its perfect result and limit”. Such a reconsideration 
will have important consequences for the way we look at other civiliza-
tions today.
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History: Science or Art?
Is history a science or an art? There are several ways of looking at this 
well known and frequently debated question. One way would be to look 
at the categorization of disciplines as made by the Academia Europaea. 
This organization has given a great deal of thought to the matter, result-
ing in the rather practical solution of essentially distinguishing four 
broad categories: Humanities, Social Sciences, Natural Sciences and 
Life Sciences. It is noticeable that, apart from the Humanities, all other 
scholars use the term ‘science’ to describe their work. But not all of them 
will be considered as scientists proper because in the English language, 
the word science or sciences in its simple form, thus without any adjec-
tive, refers exclusively to the natural sciences.
To a certain extent the same is true in France. Of course, the con-
cept of the sciences humaines or the sciences de l’homme is well estab-
lished — although they are not altogether too clearly distinguished from 
the sciences sociales — but here again ‘les sciences’ in its simple form is the 
term used for the natural sciences. Thus, the Institut de France includes 
five academies but only one of them simply calls itself Académie des Sci-
ences, and that, of course, is the one for the natural sciences.
In German — and Dutch — the situation is different. The term Wis-
senschaft does not exclusively refer to the natural sciences. There is no 
Wissenschaft as such. There is Naturwissenschaft and there is Geisteswis-
senschaft or Kulturwissenschaft. They are different, but both are Wissen-
schaft. This may be because the term Wissenschaft comes from Wissen 
(knowledge) and although the humanities may not be scientific, obvi-
ously it cannot be denied that they are based on knowledge.
The German notion of the Kultur- or Geisteswissenschaft has much to 
do with the development of history as a scientific discipline in the course 
of the 19th century. This was a new development, because originally, in 
its traditional or classical form, history was considered as a form of lit-
erature. After all, apart from, somewhat surprisingly, astronomy, it is the 
only discipline to have its own muse: Kleio. Classical historians were and 
still are considered as part of classical literature: Herodot, Livy, Tacit and 
even Caesar are — or should we say were? — read at school, just as were 
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Euripides, Virgil and Horace. This also was the case with historians like 
Machiavelli, Schiller and Voltaire, who were at the same time famous 
writers. This tradition continued well into the 19th century: Macaulay, 
Carlyle, Michelet were all typically literary historians.
Then there came a reaction to this situation with the plea for the intro-
duction of scientific methods in history. The first stage in this process of 
‘scientification’ brought the introduction of the so-called philological and 
text-critical method. The principal task of the historian was supposed to 
be the truthful reconstruction and interpretation of historical texts and 
documents. The aim of his work was verstehen: to understand the past. 
The word verstehen already indicates that this was a typically German 
movement, which indeed it was. But the German example was followed 
all over Europe. We owe a great deal to the German historical school of 
the 19th century. We owe it some important notions that are still part 
and parcel of historical thinking: the notion of development over time, 
that is the diachronic concept of history, as well as the synchronic con-
cept of history, i.e. the notion that every period has its own character and 
that there is a unity that connects all the phenomena during a certain 
period. Furthermore, we owe to it the notion that goes with this, namely 
that every period should be judged according to the standards of its own 
time or, in the famous words of the German historian Ranke, that every 
period is unmittelbar zu Gott. All this can be summarized as what the 
Germans call Historismus (Historicism).
Historicism strongly underlined the uniqueness of historical events. 
This led to the great debate at the end of the 19th century that was in 
particular animated by the German neo-Kantian philosophers Rickert 
and Windelband, who claimed that there were, in fact, two models of sci-
ence, the model of the natural sciences which they labelled ‘nomothetic’ 
because it is interested in regularities and thus in laws, and another total-
ly different concept of science, which they labelled ‘idiographic’, because 
it is not interested in laws but in the particular and the unique. Its aim 
is to give an accurate description rather than to discover laws and rules.
This was the first strategy used by historians in order to have their 
discipline accepted as a science: to promote their activities as a science 
sui generis, in its own right. It was not wholly unsuccessful but ultimately 
it was vulnerable because it was in contradiction with the very powerful 
notion of the unity of science. After all it is not easy to accept that there 
exist two practices that are very different but have the same name of sci-
ence. But it was not only ‘idiographic’ theory that was criticized, for his-
torical practice was also attacked. The criticism was that this approach 
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to history was too narrow, too much focused on great men and political 
events. History should also study the anonymous people who had always 
represented the vast majority of the population. Thus social history came 
about and methods were developed to study the unknown people of the 
past, first in Europe, the peasants and the laboring classes, later on also 
in the rest of the world, the so-called ‘people without history’. This led to 
the second strategy of historians in trying to become accepted as a sci-
ence, the one of the conversion to the social sciences.
This school of thinking with which the name of the French Annales 
group is intimately connected, was dominant during the greatest part of 
the 20th century. It had a strong impact on history not only in France 
but also elsewhere. It played an important role in the renewal of histori-
cal studies, by introducing new themes, new approaches, new methods 
and new techniques. It continues to be important but in recent years a 
new school has become fashionable which may be labelled the narrative 
school. Essential for their way of thinking is the claim that history not 
only is not a social science but that it is not a science at all and that the 
purpose of doing history lies in something else, viz. in the enjoyment of 
‘the pleasures of the past’. The background of this development is mani-
fold. It concerns postmodernism and the so called ‘linguistic turn’, but 
also of course it is connected with the general decline in appreciation of 
the social sciences. To be a social scientist may have seemed attractive in 
the 1960s, but it did not sound so very sexy in the 1980s!
Who is right? The narrativists or the scientists? To the non-philo-
sophical mind it is clear that the answer lies somewhere in the middle. 
If history is a science it is a rather special sort of science, but if it is to be 
considered as a form of literature, it is also a very special form of litera-
ture. History is different from the siences in so far as it is very difficult 
to speak of scientific progress. Science in its proper sense is character-
ized by the accumulation of knowledge, and thus by progress. Very few 
school-teachers of today will have the mind of Newton or Darwin but 
most of them have a better insight into nature than these geniuses had. 
This is not the case in history. History is not based on the accumulation 
of knowledge. We know now more about the French Revolution than 
Michelet did. We can also agree that some interpretations of the Revolu-
tion have proved to be untenable, that they have been ‘falsified’, to put it 
in Popperian terms. But we cannot say that we now know the truth about 
the French Revolution while our ancestors did not. In this respect his-
tory is more like the arts where the idea of progress is also either absent 
or ambiguous. Who for example would say that, now that we can enjoy 
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Appel, Albee and Andriessen, we can happily get rid of the works of 
Rembrandt, Shakespeare and Mozart? In this respect history may also be 
somewhat similar to philosophy, insofar as that discipline too is hardly 
considered as a story of continuous progress, from the clumsy reasonings 
of Plato and Aristotle to the high levels of sophistication of Heidegger’s 
‘Nichtendes Nichts’ and Sartre’s ‘être en soi’.
On the other hand history is not simply literature either. This can also 
be pretty easily demonstrated. A novelist may write: ‘It was a rainy day 
in Carlovia, the splendid capital of Ruritania, when Queen Diana woke 
up on the morning of November 11, 1945. The Queen felt miserable, she 
hated rain and was always depressed by it’. It is prose that may not lead 
straightaway to the Noble or the Booker Prize, but, apart from aesthetic 
concerns, no objection can be made to it. A historian however could only 
write this if he had evidence for all his statements: Was it indeed raining 
that day? Was the Queen depressed? Was this because of the weather? 
How does he know that? This he will have to explain by giving references 
and mentioning his sources. In other words, like the novelist he writes a 
story, but in his case he needs sources to justify his story.
Historians have often been worried by the ambiguous character of 
their trade. But they should not be. Whatever their discipline may be, it 
is appreciated both by the public at large and by their peers from other 
disciplines. In a way, their work is more respected than that of their col-
leagues in the social sciences. They can write for large audiences, while 
at the same time and for the same work also be praised by their fellow 
historians. Historians may receive the Nobel Prize for Literature but they 
have also received it for Economics. In short, they live in the best of two 
worlds and they had better enjoy it. For more than anybody else they 
ought to know that things may change.
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Two Fin de Siècles
Was the end of the 20th century comparable with the end of the 19th 
century, the so-called fin de siècle? To what extent were the cultural char-
acterizations of that decade — for fin de siècle is first and foremost a cul-
tural concept — applicable to those days? The answer to this question is 
not easy to give because there are similarities as well as dissimilarities. 
The central preoccupation of the fin de siècle was the feeling of deca-
dence, the idea that European civilization was past its prime and on to 
the end. Living in the 1990s it was only logical that we were remembered 
of the 1890s and asked ourselves whether our period resembled those 
years, whether the cultural characterizations of that decade were also 
relevant to our time.
In order to be able to answer this question we should consider the 
similarities and dissimilarities between the two periods. When doing so, 
a serious complication arises. We know about the end of the 19th cen-
tury, and we can even know it in two ways. We can look at it through the 
eyes of contemporaries, who devised the term fin de siècle; but also, more 
closely, through the magnifying glass of present day historians with their 
hindsight. In other words, we may reconstruct that which the contem-
poraries saw as typical of their time as well as that which we now con-
sider as characteristic. These need not necessarily coincide. However, 
we cannot do the same thing for our own time. We do not know what the 
historic judgement of our time will be. Moreover, we hardly know our 
contemporaries’ judgement of the 1990s. Rather unwisely then, I shall 
try and discuss our own time anyway, but considerably more briefly than 
the previous fin de siècle.
Before doing so, something has to be said about the notion fin de siècle 
itself. What exactly does fin de siècle mean? Literally nothing more than: 
the end of the century. But, as everyone knows, the term refers to the 
end of one specific century, that of the 19th century. Yet, since the begin-
ning of the Christian era 18 other ends of centuries preceded that one, 
and one even included the end of a millennium. For that is what we were 
doing in the 1990s: we were not just witnessing the end of a century, we 
were living to see the end of a millennium. So we were in the same posi-
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tion as people were in the decade preceding the year 1000. According to 
the romantic historians of the 19th century, people had a vivid sense of a 
finality of time around the year 1000. That year would bring not only the 
end of a century and a millennium, but the end of the world, because the 
thousand years’ realm from the book of Revelations would perish then, 
a thousand years after Christ’s birth. Modern historians are no longer 
quite so sure about this subject, therefore I will leave it at that. It does 
not matter to us so much for, when our thoughts go back to the fin de siè-
cle we do not think of the 1990s, but of the 1890s. There is only one real 
fin de siècle, and that is the end of the 19th century.
How come there is only one fin de siècle? Well, it is not because his-
torians decided afterwards that these were such exceptional years. Con-
temporaries did so and that was a pretension which they recognized 
themselves. John Grand-Carteret wrote in his book xixe siècle that he 
and his contemporaries had pompously named fin de siècle that period 
which, in the eighteenth century, had simply been called ‘la fin du siè-
cle’.129 That was in 1893 and ever since that moment the term fin de siècle 
crops up regularly. The term itself, however, is somewhat older and was 
probably used for the first time in the comedy of the same name by Jou-
venot and Micard in 1880.
In the meantime, we need to establish which years exactly comprise 
the fin de siècle. Of course, in the first instance one thinks of the decade 
1890–1900, but often the notion is used in a wider sense. Some people 
define the fin de siècle as beginning in 1880 or 1877 and others again 
consider it as continuing until 1905 or 1914. But let us stick to the literal 
fin de siècle, that is to say the 1890s. Fin de siècle is, however, not only 
(and not even primarily) a chronological notion. It is primarily used as a 
cultural-historical concept, created by the contemporaries themselves to 
express that aspect which they considered to be the most characteristic 
of their time, namely that it was a final time, a waning, or to use another 
metaphor, the Dämmerung, a twilight of civilization. To them, fin de siècle 
was also and especially a certain attitude, a pose. Anything strange and 
mysterious was called fin de siècle. Holbrook Jackson illustrates this in 
his Eighteen-nineties: a wedding party in a gas-works, followed by a hon-
eymoon in a balloon, that is fin de siècle. A police-officer who, after the 
execution of a murderer he has caught, uses a piece of his skin to manu-
facture a cigar-case, that is fin de siècle.130 Eugen Weber tells in his book 
France. Fin de siècle of a man taken to court because he lives on his wife’s 
income obtained from prostitution, who alleges as his defence: ‘But I am 
just a fin de siècle husband’.131
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So there are many notions connected with the fin de siècle: that of 
‘unity of contrasts’, as Grand-Carteret wrote,132 and of ambivalence or 
Halbheit, to give it a Viennese ring, of perversity, complexity, eccentricity, 
nihilism, abnormality, egotism, refinement, artificiality and, paradoxi-
cally enough, also of renovation and modernity. But one notion domi-
nates all others, namely that of decadence. Now, decadence itself is also a 
complicated notion with many connotations, from completion to decay, 
and with different backgrounds — I will come back to that later — but let 
us confine ourselves for the time being to this observation of decadence.
So we may agree on the fact that the fin de siècle is a cultural-historical 
notion rather than a chronological one, that it may be dated around 1900 
and that it was dominated by a sense of down-grade and decline. The 
question arising then is whether the fin de siècle was a common Euro-
pean phenomenon. I mean this in a national sense and not in a social 
sense — naturally it was a phenomenon confined to the elite; neither 
farmers in their hovels nor workers in their factories will have cared 
much about the decline of civilization or the way in which the clock 
ticked away the hours of the century: they had other, real problems. What 
I mean is this: was the fin de siècle exclusively a French phenomenon, or 
was it to be found in all European countries? The answer is simple: the 
latter is the case, but in each country there were rather great differences.
The Spaniards had a real fin de siècle. To them, in 1898, with the war 
lost against the United States and the loss of Cuba and the Philippines, 
the remnants of the Spanish supremacy were brought to an end. This 
caused a considerable political and psychological shock. The ‘generation 
of 1898’, as they were called in literature, that is to say the generation 
born in the 1870s, was marked by it. This Spanish experience however, 
was an exceptional one and did not have much to do with the fin de siècle 
as a European cultural phenomenon.
One might call a figure such as the Bavarian King Ludwig ii a typi-
cal fin de siècle person, but the Wilhelminian Germany is certainly not 
to be associated with fin de siècle, rather with bragging and a belief in 
progress. In Italy the Risorgimento was followed by a period of scepti-
cism and uncertainty, but that stretched beyond the barriers of the fin 
de siècle and culminated in the post-war years and the rise of Mussolini. 
In the Netherlands, an author like Couperus is associated with the fin de 
siècle, but he was obviously a solitary individual. Dutch literature had 
finished with the fin de siècle during the movement of the ‘Writers of the 
Eighties’ with its extreme individualism and aestheticism. The 1890s on 
the other hand were characterized by a search for harmony and balance. 
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The Americans also knew their fin de siècle, but that had a totally differ-
ent tone. Do not they speak of the ‘gay nineties’, when ‘gay’ then simply 
meant merry?
In England however, we see a real fin de siècle. It has been beautifully 
evoked by Holbrook Jackson in the previously mentioned The Eighteen-
nineties. We all know its most famous representatives: Aubrey Beardsley 
in the arts, and in literature Oscar Wilde, Max Beerbohm and a whole 
series of minor litérateurs. However, this English fin de siècle very strong-
ly resembles a phenomenon imported from France; which is how the 
English saw it themselves, as we will see.
There is only one other country which is associated with the fin de 
siècle to the same degree as France, or rather one city: Vienna. Recently, 
the Vienna of the fin de siècle has become a source of great public inter-
est, this is the Vienna of Freud, Klimt, Hofmannsthal, Schnitzler and so 
many other great ones, but also of Lueger, Schönerer and Herzl; in other 
words, of anti-semitism, populism and zionism. Books like Wittgenstein’s 
Vienna,133 Carl Schorske’s Fin de siècle Vienna134 and especially the great 
exhibition in Paris Vienne, L’apocalypse joyeuse135 focused on the charm 
and importance of Vienna during this period in a spectacular way, even 
to such a degree that we are tempted to consider Vienna as much as 
Paris as the centre of the European fin de siècle. Yet this parallel does 
not hold good completely. There are various differences between Vienna 
and Paris. One of them is, in my opinion, essential. In Vienna we actu-
ally see a society and civilization that perished, that disappeared. After 
1914–1918 the Hapsburg Empire ceased to exist and Vienna never fig-
ured again as a cultural centre. Berlin, also capital of a defeated — but 
not vanished — country, took over Vienna’s cultural role. Vienna became 
the symbol of Die Welt von gestern (The World of Yesterday), to quote the 
title of Stefan Zweig’s famous book.
France is another matter. The French fin de siècle was followed by the 
belle époque. In the French spiritual, political and moral climate after 
1890 sentiments of decadence and downfall changed to sentiments of 
vitalism, elan, patriotism, virility, energy, expansion, self-confidence, 
chauvinism, nationalism, etc. France became herself again, as the title of 
a well-known book by Dimnet summarized it.136 Indeed, France appeared 
in 1914–18 to be anything but a society in disintegration. The country 
stood the greatest test of her history during the First World War before 
becoming once more the centre of world politics at the Peace Confer-
ence of Paris in 1918–1919, but that was for the last time, as we know 
now. However, as a cultural centre, it is still blooming, with her most 
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important rival no longer being Vienna or Berlin, but New York. That 
is the reason why the French fin de siècle, historically speaking, is a dif-
ferent story from the Austrian one. The Austrian one is a prelude, an 
introduction to the downfall in 1914–1918. The French fin de siècle is an 
interlude, to be followed by an era of regeneration.
For this reason it is hard to speak about the fin de siècle as a general 
European phenomenon. Countries differ too much. On the other hand 
it is also true that the feeling of decadence, so characteristic of the fin 
de siècle, is a common European phenomenon which can be found in 
all countries. During this period, Russian literature had its trend of the 
Decadents and downfall-philosophers, such as Vladimir Solovjev, who 
predicted in his Story of the Antichrist of 1899 an Asiatic sovereignty over 
Europe and the rise of the realm of the antichrist. The Italians knew 
Gabriele d’Annunzio as their most monumental figure of the decadent 
movement, the ‘Victor Hugo of decadence’, as Mario Praz names him 
in the Romantic Agony.137 In Germany, we meet Julius Langbehn — at 
that time incredibly successful but now completely forgotten — who, 
in 1890 in his remarkable bestseller Rembrandt als Erzieher (Rembrandt 
as an Educator), scourged the decay of German spiritual life — to him 
Rembrandt, just like Shakespeare, was a Low German.138 And there was 
Gustav Meyrink who chose Amsterdam as a symbol of European decay 
and who accordingly gave the city its just deserts in his novel Das grüne 
Gesicht (The Green Face): it was destroyed by a hurricane.139
However, much better-known is another German, Max Nordau, who 
in his Entartung (Degeneration) of 1893 pointed out France as the country 
par excellence of moral and psychological decay, a country perishing by 
alcohol, tobacco, opium and hashish, by impurities and mental defects.140 
Nordau’s work made a deep impression — in France as well — and when 
an English translation was published in 1895, it became a bestseller in 
that country. It was the year of the trial of Oscar Wilde, one of the leaders 
of the aesthetic movement, and in every respect a symbol of decadence. 
Nordau’s book suited the English very well, for they did not love their 
decadents much. This work confirmed for them their conviction that 
their decadent movement was imported from the continent and, in par-
ticular, from that perverse country of bird-, snail- and frog-eaters, France, 
for which no room existed in England, and which should therefore be 
opposed. This feeling was formulated inimitably by John Davidson in 
his novel Earl Lavender by a lady proclaiming in a heavy Cockney-accent: 
‘It’s fang-de-seeaycle that does it, my dear, and education and reading 
French’.141 French import, that’s what it was.
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These views of the Germans and English, on the French decadence, 
agree surprisingly well with what the French themselves thought of it. 
They too were quite preoccupied with the French decay. At this point 
however, we encounter the problem mentioned above, the problem of 
what exactly decadence means. The French feeling of decadence was 
widespread and deeply felt, but it had different connotations from those 
of depravity, homosexuality and amorality.
Above all it was a realization of political and social decadence. It did 
not arise from the fin de siècle’s underlying metaphor of growth, maturity 
and old age, of the temporariness and transitoriness of life. A specifically 
political experience was at its root, namely that of the defeat by Germany 
in 1870, and a specifically social experience, that of demographic stagna-
tion. In the eyes of the French, France was pre-eminently a country of 
decadence, but in view of its specific character this could not possibly be 
an article of export. It was a typically French, and not a general European 
phenomenon. Better still, the French decadence was only the reverse of 
the German and English (or Anglo-Saxon) superiority, subjects on which 
a great number of books were published in these same 1890s.
Typical of the real fin de siècle feeling of decadence is the famous dia-
logue from Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray: ‘Fin de siècle, mur-
mured Lord Henry. Fin du Globe, answered his hostess. I wish it were fin 
du globe, said Dorian sigh. Life is a great disappointment.’142
Here is the dandyish ‘épater le bourgeois’ — feeling of decadence in 
full flower. ‘Sordid’ and ‘morbid’, realistic à la Zola and romantic à la 
Verlaine, these were, according to Holbrook Jackson the characteristics 
of the English decadent literature.143 Of course, we do hear these noises 
in France as well, but this is not the issue with the French philosophers 
of decadence in the first instance. In France the issue was not ‘la fin du 
globe’, nor ‘la fin du monde’ but the end of a particular world, ‘la fin du 
monde latin’. That notion was very strong during these years, but it can 
also be found before the fin de siècle. ‘We are witnessing the end of the 
world’, Flaubert wrote in 1870 and: ‘our race is finished’.144 Taine and 
Renan proclaimed the same in famous writings like Les Origines de la 
France contemporaine (The Origins of Contemporary France)145 and La 
Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France (The Intellectual and Moral 
Reform of France),146 but they also showed the way to recovery: science 
and patriotism. That was where the future layed. These two should put 
an end to decadence. In short, the Prussian model should be imitated.
That is indeed what happened. In the 1870s and 1880s barriers were 
put up in order to put an end to decay. The army and schools were 
A Cape of Asia.indd  |  Sander Pinkse Boekproductie  |  10-10-11  /  11:44  |  Pag. 139
140 a cape of asia
the instruments by which the Republicans wanted to create unity and 
propagate knowledge. When barriers broke down in the 1890s under 
the influence of the rising irrationalism and anti-patriotism, the idea of 
decadence returned.147 This idea was taken over by authors and aesthetes 
in other countries from their French colleagues and was made into a 
general concept. However, while doing so its content was changed. The 
typically French idea of decadence with its specific political and social 
backgrounds changed to a general feeling of downfall, which was cou-
pled with the idea of a century coming to an end, and obtained a much 
vaguer, more romantic Weltschmerz- and maladie-du-siècle-like content. 
The mental decay in certain texts assumed almost physical dimensions. 
This has been formulated in an unforgettable way in the chanson on Le 
jeune homme triste, which Maurice Donnay sang in the Chat-Noir:
‘Il etait laid et maigrelet,
Ayant sucé le maigre lait
D’une nourrice pessimiste’.148
Thus, we are confronted by a paradoxical conclusion. France, as we saw, 
is the country par excellence of the fin de siècle. Decadence, we also saw, is 
pre-eminently the characteristic of the fin de siècle. But the French idea 
of decadence, we finally noticed, is in fact not real fin de siècle, but a thing 
from years gone by and of different purport and background.
a turning point in history?
Up to now we have discussed the vision of contemporaries. The question 
we have to consider now is whether that vision was correct. Is it true 
that the 1890s were a period of decadence? Was the fin de siècle a ‘fin du 
globe’, a ‘fin du monde’ or at least a ‘fin du monde latin’? Coming straight 
to the point, I believe the answer is no, but a qualified no, for here again 
France seems to occupy a special position.
The decade between 1890 and 1900 in French history certainly was a 
period of crisis. This culminated in 1898 in the dual drama of the Drey-
fus-affair, and the Fashoda-incident, that great French humiliation in 
international politics. Rehabilitation, however, was soon to follow. After 
the Dreyfus-affair a powerful united front was effected in order to defend 
the Republic. In international politics the reconciliation with England 
followed in 1904, whereafter the position of France on the international 
scene improved considerably. The years after that (the decade before the 
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First World War) were not a time of decay but, on the contrary, of reviv-
al and restoration. The infrastructural weaknesses however, remained. 
France remained a country with a stagnant and aging population, an old-
fashioned economy and a strong introversion. This would only change 
during the next fin de siècle, that of the twentieth century. The political 
and social crisis, however, which was the main issue to the contempo-
raries, was over. France was herself again. With some good reason, the 
1890s in French history can be seen as a period of decay and crisis, but 
only if one realizes that this was temporary.
This kind of epoch and its characterization has only a very limited 
significance. Let us remember that this period was also the time of 
socialism, anarchism, feminism and imperialism and so on. There was 
also optimism. As K.W. Swart reported in The Sense of Decadence in Nine-
teenth-century France many pubs during these years were named Café du 
Progrès.149 Periods of time cannot be typified univocally, but we cannot do 
without such generalizations and there is little harm in them, so long as 
we realize their relativity and limit ourselves to one single country. For 
Europe as a whole, such generalizations are much more questionable. In 
a world of national states it is obvious that what applied to one country 
does not necessarily apply to another. On the contrary, that which was 
flourishing-time in one often meant decline in another. The Dutch Gold-
en Age did not coincide with the Spanish one, but came closely after it. 
The decline of the one was the condition for the blooming of the other. 
The periods of flourishing in European cultural history are generally not 
only coupled to a period of time, but also to one country: Italy during 
the Renaissance, England under Elisabeth, Holland during the Golden 
Age, France during the Enlightenment, Germany under the Republic of 
Weimar, etc. Although, of course, these concepts are disputable, they 
have been accepted rather generally. For Europe as a whole however, 
this poses problems and therefore we should be grateful to the historians 
who have tried to establish the meaning of these years in a general Euro-
pean perspective.
Various authors have ventured to do this, but I confine myself to only 
two here, who have formulated very explicit theses on the subject. The 
Dutch historian Jan Romein described this period in his The Watershed 
of Two Eras. Europe in 1900, as a transition period. To him 1900 was a 
turning point in European history. Fundamental changes occurred in 
many fields: art, psychology, philosophy, etc.150 The Englishman Geoffrey 
Barraclough defended, in his well-known Introduction to Contemporary 
History, an even stronger opinion: the 1890s, according to him, formed 
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a transition to a new phase in history. As the end of the fifteenth cen-
tury was the watershed between the Middle Ages and the Modern Era, 
likewise the end of the nineteenth century was the transition to a new 
historic period, the ‘Contemporary Era’. The latter has a character of its 
own, different from the modern period. With Barraclough it is not, as 
with Romein, a new way of thinking he is interested in, but infrastruc-
tural changes like the Industrial Revolution, which overcame nature, 
and modern imperialism, which conquered and united the world.151
Naturally, such theses are open to criticism, but there is some sense 
in pointing out, as Romein did, that during these years the fundamentals 
of a number of presuppositions concerning European thinking, such as 
the belief in reason, science and progress, came up for discussion, and 
to assume with Barraclough that together with the changes in Asia and 
America, the first signs appeared of a fundamentally new world order, in 
which there would no longer be a self-evident dominance of the Euro-
pean economy, politics and culture. If one would like to call that fin de 
siècle or ‘End of the European era’ or whatever, then I do not object, but 
it was not a period of decadence.
The fact that we are inclined, to a certain degree, to see it that way, is 
of course caused by the First World War. The First World War definitely 
put an end to the belief in progress and European supremacy over the 
world. It is conceivable that we see the fin de siècle now for the great-
er part sub specie of this war. But, however radical the events, Europe’s 
role and the role of European culture had not yet come to an end. That 
brings us to the last part of my argument, the twentieth century fin de 
siècle. Here we have to answer the same questions as we did before: were 
there then voices which produced similar noises as could be heard in the 
1890s? Is there a reason for this?
the 1990s
Clearly it is not easy to say anything about the last fin de siècle. The 1990s 
have only just finished and who can comprehend their spirit? Yet one 
thing seems clear to me. If fin de siècle is always connected with deca-
dence — and, as we have seen, in a cultural-historical sense it is — then 
there seems to be no question of a fin de siècle feeling at this time. We all 
strongly realize since that annus mirabilis, 1989, that the world is in full 
motion and that we are experiencing an era of great changes, but what 
we see, fills us predominantly with optimism. The end of a malevolent 
system, decline of an incompetent bureaucracy, recaptured freedom in 
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Eastern and Central Europe, successful collective actions against a dicta-
tor, none of these are matters which would make us feel dejected.
Undoubtedly, a hangover will follow the intoxication and we will see 
that economic and social stress will come to a crisis after the dictator-
ships have been dissolved and that nationalistic sentiments will take 
their course. Already they take a heavy toll. Undoubtedly, the joy over 
the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy will be silenced when 
the ecological catastrophe, which is inevitably the result of a worldwide 
expansion of the western life-style, will become visible to its full extent. 
We will then come to our senses and realize that it is unwise to lay the 
future of the world exclusively into the hands of the ladies and gentle-
men of the options exchange. At that time the question as to how society 
should be arranged will be asked anew and new differences of opinion 
and new ideologies will present themselves. Even though we are most 
certainly experiencing times of great historical importance and probably 
the end of an era, I do not foresee a definitive end of ideologies or even 
an End of history.
Undoubtedly also, it is too easy to speak of the triumph of western 
culture and western values but the idea of an end of western civiliza-
tion is remarkably absent in any case. How remarkable this is becomes 
evident when we consider, from this point of view, the period between 
the two fin de siècle’s. When doing so we witness a curious development. 
Summarized, the story amounts to the following. The first fin de siècle, 
i.e. 1890–1900, was characterized by feelings of decadence, the follow-
ing decade was darkened by the threat of the great war. The first post-war 
decade, i.e. the 1920s, was dominated by horror and remorse over what 
the Europeans had done to themselves, the second post-war decade, the 
1930s, by the crisis and the rise of the dictatorships. Ortega y Gasset, 
Huizinga, Spengler and others prophecized the end of our civilization. 
The Second World War did indeed seem to bring the end. As a conse-
quence of the terrors of this war, the demolition of the European posi-
tions of authority in Asia and Africa set in. The Era of Europe, as Romein 
said was over.152 Toynbee continued Spengler’s work in the 1950s: the life 
cycle of western civilization had been completed. Romein announced 
the Age of Asia.153 The 1960s finally manifested great doubts on western 
values and standards. Our culture seemed to have had its time. Our val-
ues were rotten. At least that was what some people thought.
The facts were different. Europe recovered in a miraculous way after 
1945. Its economic and political role is not over by far. European, or rath-
er western civilization even shows an amazing vitality. It has been criti-
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cized strongly, and many have declared it to be dead and buried, but this 
seems to be somewhat premature. Western civilization, like God and the 
novel, has been declared dead over and over again. Yet they all appear to 
be very much alive.
If I am a good judge of the spirit of the age, there is even a renewed 
appreciation of western culture to be discerned and a stronger self-confi-
dence. Is there a reason for this? Personally, I think so, but that has noth-
ing to do with science or historic insight. It is indeed a matter of faith. To 
put it differently, it is anybody’s guess. The only thing we can learn from 
historic insight is that nothing is so hard to see through as the spirit of 
one’s own time. So let us stop trying, and come to our conclusion.
conclusion
That conclusion can be simple. The question at issue was whether our 
time resembles the former fin de siècle. The answer is a clear no, in any 
case, and not just in a subjective sense. The feelings of decadence, so 
characteristic for the fin de siècle, do not, at the moment, play a dominat-
ing role in our cultural consciousness. We have neither the feeling that 
our civilization has reached a unique degree of flourishing, never to be 
surpassed by anything, nor do we have that other feeling that it is past 
its prime and on to the end. Western civilization is neither ripe nor rot-
ten. It resembles the western life-style. People tend not only to become 
older, but to remain fit and full of vitality up to their old age. It is a rather 
disturbing, but familiar sight, at least in America, to see people, of 80 
years of age, who are not only still alive, but also cheerfully occupied 
chopping wood, riding horseback, swimming and running in city parks. 
It is strange, but one gets used to it. The same applies to western civili-
zation. She has grown older and become a bit damaged. Traces of a few 
face-lifts are visible on her face, but she is still active and full of vitality. 
It is tempting to elaborate on this metaphor, but it is not wise to do so, 
for one might end up thinking not of western civilization but of Ronald 
and Nancy Reagan!
To the question of whether art and science are affected by the fin de 
siècle, as they were once before, we can give a simple answer. The answer 
is no. Science continues and has been continuing, for centuries already, 
and whether it is the year 1900 or 2000, is of no consequence to its prac-
titioners. Artists do not care which decade it is. For more than a century 
they have declared a new trend every decade: impressionism, expression-
ism, fauvism, dadaism, surrealism, constructivism, non-figuratism, min-
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imalism, maximalism, neo-realism, post-modernism, deconstructivism, 
etc. Undoubtedly they will go on like this. The fin de siècle has presented 
itself here already. However, in literature and essayism — in short, in 
those organs which determine the cultural climate — we do not for the 
time being find the idea of a fin de siècle. Worries concern the economy 
and politics, the recession and the revival of nationalism, but not the 
decay of European or western civilization. Many things may change as 
yet, but for the time being the differences in mentality between the end 
of the twentieth century and the previous one seem to surpass the num-
ber of their similarities.
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Johan Huizinga and the Spirit of the 
Nineteen Thirties
The historian Johan Huizinga lived from 1872 to 1945 and whilst he came 
from a line of Baptist ministers, his father, by contrast, was a professor 
at the medical faculty of the university of Groningen. As rector of the 
university, member of the municipal council and president-curator of the 
municipal ‘gymnasium’, he belonged to the local elite of Groningen, albeit 
not to the top. The style of living in the Huizinga household was sober and 
even slightly blinkered. Johan attended the municipal gymnasium and 
after his graduation, in 1891, he read Dutch at the university of Gronin-
gen. In his student days he became fascinated by art and literature, but 
nonetheless did not neglect his studies. He took his bachelor’s exams and 
gained a cum laude iudicium in 1893, after which he specialized in linguis-
tics. He graduated on June 5, 1895. After a year of further study in Leipzig, 
he returned to Groningen and on May 28, 1897, he obtained his doctorate 
with a thesis on De Vidûshaka in het Indisch tooneel (The ‘Vidûshaka’ in 
Indian theatre), under the tutelage of the sanskritist J.S. Speyer. He still 
was a young man who had not yet reached the age of twenty-five.
Huizinga could thus with some justification be regarded as a linguist 
and with some imagination as a sanskritist, but certainly not as a histo-
rian. As for the study of history, he had limited himself to attending P.J. 
Blok’s lectures on Dutch history in Groningen. Blok was also instrumen-
tal in Huizinga obtaining his first job in 1897: that of history teacher at 
a secondary school in Haarlem. His bachelor’s degree in Dutch qualified 
him to teach history at this level. In 1902, the young history teacher mar-
ried a girl from a very distinguished family, Lady Mary Vincentia Schor-
er, the daughter of the mayor of Middelburg.
Huizinga remained a secondary school teacher, although this was not 
completely to his liking. He wanted something to do besides teaching, 
and in 1903 he became an unsalaried lecturer in History and Literature 
of British India at the University of Amsterdam. In 1905, at the age of 
thirty-three, Huizinga was appointed professor of General and Dutch 
History in Groningen. A little less than ten years after his appointment 
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in Groningen, Huizinga was appointed professor of General History in 
Leiden. This was towards the end of 1914, shortly after the death of his 
wife. He quickly gained renown in the academic arena. His book Herfst-
tij der Middeleeuwen (The Waning of the Middle Ages) appeared in 1919. 
This book made his name as a historian. In 1924, the book was published 
in English and German, gaining him international repute. These events 
were quickly followed by invitations from abroad and guest lectures. 
Huizinga’s most successful book, In de schaduwen van morgen (In the 
shadows of tomorrow), appeared in 1935. This book was translated into 
eight languages very soon after its publication, and was reprinted many 
times. From being an internationally famous cultural historian, Huiz-
inga now became a world famous cultural critic. Huizinga’s last major 
work, Homo ludens, published in 1938, provided the third element of his 
current reputation, that of cultural philosopher.
At first glance, the story of Huizinga’s life seems to paint a picture of a 
predestined and effortless road to the top. And this is indeed the way the 
story is often told. Those who take a closer look at this life, however, will 
find that there was another side to it, and that with hindsight, Huizinga’s 
career was not the straightforward success story it appears to be.
huizinga’s private life
Huizinga talked only rarely about his private life. The odd paragraph in 
the autobiographical essay Mijn weg tot de historie (My road to history) 
provides a glimpse into his private life.154 Huizinga’s Correspondence, 
published a few years ago, greatly adds to our knowledge of the subject.155 
His dearly beloved wife died at a very young age in 1914 and left him 
with five very young children. He remained a widower for almost a quar-
ter of a century, not remarrying until 1937, when he married Auguste 
Schölvinck, who was thirty-seven years his junior. They had one child.
Huizinga’s father was a complicated character and a tormented spirit. 
He had originally wanted to study theology, but gave up this idea because 
he lost his faith. He lived a wild life in his student days. He contracted 
syphilis, and at the end needed morphine to make his suffering bear-
able. Another son, Herman, became convinced that he also suffered 
from syphilis and, at seventeen, committed suicide because of this, just a 
few months before the death of their father. Obviously, these events will 
have made a significant impression on the dreamy and sensitive boy that 
Johan Huizinga was.
As has been said, Huizinga’s first marriage was an extremely happy 
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one, but it lasted only a very short time. In those days it was not unusual 
for men to become widowers at an early age, but it was rather unusual 
to remain one for so long, especially in a case such as Huizinga’s. At the 
time of his first wife’s death his children were eleven, nine, eight, six 
and two years old respectively. From 1914 until 1937, over twenty-three 
years, he lived alone with his growing children and the many members 
of domestic staff common in his circles in those days. His grief was not 
limited to the death of his first wife. His oldest son Dirk, who had always 
suffered from poor health, died at the age of fifteen, in 1920. Huizinga’s 
relationship with his children was rather complicated, to put it mildly. 
The distance at which he kept them was unusual even for his time.
The years of his widowhood almost completely coincided with the 
years of his professorship at Leiden University and his growing interna-
tional reputation. Did the tragedies of his private life influence his work 
and his academic productivity? Surprisingly, the answer to this question 
appears to be: not at all. He wrote two of his most important works in the 
first five years after his first wife’s death: Mensch en menigte in Amerika 
[Men and masses in America] and The Waning of the Middle Ages; these 
being published in 1918 and 1919 respectively. Moreover, Erasmus fol-
lowed in 1924, Tien studies [Ten studies] in 1926, the second book on 
America and the biography of Jan Veth in 1927, and Cultuurhistorische 
verkenningen [Cultural-historical explorations] in 1929. Apart from Homo 
ludens, all his major works appeared in the years between 1918 and 1930 
(In the Shadows of Tomorrow is a different story). In the course of that 
period his children left the house one by one. His youngest child, who 
was two at the time of his first wife’s death, turned seventeen in 1930.
That twelve-year period between 1918 and 1930 proved to be the 
most creative period in his life. This is also true in a purely quantita-
tive sense as can be seen from his Verzamelde werken [Collected works]. 
In total these comprise 4,296 pages. Of these, 1,702 pages were written 
in the twelve-year period mentioned above. The twelve years prior to 
that period, 1905–1917, resulted in 871 pages, and the twelve years after, 
1930–1942, rendered 1,068 pages. One could say that Huizinga was a late 
starter. His first well-known book appeared when he was forty-six. After 
that his productivity, quantitatively speaking, always remained at a high 
level no matter what events occurred in his life. Qualitatively speaking 
the standard of his work declined somewhat. He had reached the qualita-
tive peak of his creativity in the first ten years of his widowhood.
Whereas Huizinga’s private and family life was certainly not carefree, 
as we have seen, his career took a smooth and successful course. Howev-
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er, we must also adjust our view somewhat with regard to his career. We 
now know Huizinga as the world-famous historian whose work is read 
all over the world. This has not always been the case. One of his most 
famous books, Homo ludens, was translated rather long after its original 
publication and became famous even later. Erasmus, on the other hand, 
was written at the request of an American publisher, and therefore first 
appeared in English. This was in 1924. It was not very successful; in 1931, 
the publisher had over half of the two thousand copies originally printed 
destroyed because of a lack of interest.
More remains to be said about Huizinga’s most famous work The Wan-
ing of the Middle Ages, which was published in Dutch in 1919. The English 
and German translations appeared five years later in 1924, which can be 
regarded as a long time for such a famous book. Much more remarkable 
is the fact that the French edition did not appear until 1932. And thereby 
also hangs a tale.
huizinga and the french
Huizinga’s friend, W.J.M. van Eysinga, professor of International Law at 
Leiden University, met the French diplomat and historian Gabriel Hano-
taux at the Assembly of the League of Nations. This curious and mercu-
rial man had become Minister for Foreign Affairs at a very early age, but 
as such had not been very successful and subsequently returned to his 
former profession, that of historian. He edited a large number of major 
and successful series, was a member of the Académie Française, and may 
therefore be regarded as an influential person. Van Eysinga tried with 
success to interest Hanotaux in the idea of a translation of Huizinga’s 
work. Hanotaux subsequently approached the publisher Champion. 
This intervention would turn out to be the start of a long and sometimes 
slightly humiliating via dolorosa for Huizinga.
The Correspondence paints a clear picture of this. It shows how 
Hanotaux, from the very beginning to the end, time and again, imposes 
increasingly peculiar requirements on his Dutch colleague. ‘You have to 
translate it into French yourself’, is his first demand. Huizinga does it. 
‘You have to make it two hundred pages shorter’, is his second. And Huiz-
inga does it. Not only that, but he even writes to Hanotaux: ‘The book is 
no doubt the better for it’.156 And so on and so forth. The book has to be 
shorter still, the French is not good enough, the publisher has no money 
and Hanotaux has no time. Finally Champion asks Huizinga to make sure 
that a potential French translation will also be sold in the Netherlands. 
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When Huizinga points out that this is impossible, Champion demands 
that Huizinga pay half the printing costs. This is more than even Huiz-
inga can take. ‘To buy the honour of seeing my work published in French’ 
is below his dignity.157 The translation was never published, and in 1927, 
after six years of agony, Hanotaux finally returns the manuscript.
Five years later a French edition is published after all, but in a differ-
ent translation and by a different publisher. Huizinga again approach-
es Hanotaux asking him to write a foreword to this edition. The latter 
complies, but writes in an accompanying note that he really had not 
had enough time to do it because he was due to leave for Morocco. He 
apologizes for it being a chaotic text and suggests that it may need to be 
improved when the proofs come in. Or perhaps it may not. It is left to 
Huizinga to decide what to do with the text. The book did indeed appear 
with the foreword as written by Hanotaux: a curious, rhetorical and cha-
otic text that can only have put off its potential readers. The book was 
not a success, and in 1936 the disappointed publisher Payot writes that 
he had only sold twenty-nine copies of The Waning of the Middle Ages in 
the previous year, and therefore wants to offer the book at half price. 
In order to stimulate sales, he will put a paper band around the book 
with the text: ‘This book teaches us that in times of great trouble, we 
should not despair of human nature. Gabriel Hanotaux de l’Académie 
Française.’158 This way, Huizinga — or rather his publisher — may have 
profited from Hanotaux’s fame and rhetoric, at least to some extent.
It is a strange history, and yet a poignant one. Just imagine Huizinga 
the widower, writing in his study and translating The Waning of the Mid-
dle Ages into his schoolboy French, and taking his ‘homework’ to be dis-
cussed sentence by sentence with the austere Walloon minister Cler who 
rewrites every sentence, strikes out every metaphor. Then imagine that 
the author has to cut his work to half the size of the original, and one 
cannot but be surprised about the peculiar route that this work, now so 
famous, has had to travel.
After the French edition of The Waning of the Middle Ages, French 
interest in Huizinga still remained rather meagre. The strange thing 
about this is that the Annales-school arose in France in 1929, named after 
the journal Annales d’Histoire Économique et Sociale, which came to be 
the most influential school of history after the war. The founding fathers, 
Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, preferred to work on the same periods 
that Huizinga was specialized in — the late Middle Ages and the early-
modern period — and were also very interested in the type of history in 
which Huizinga pioneered: the history of mentality. In an article about 
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history and psychology, Febvre praised The Waning of the Middle Ages and 
called it ‘fort suggestif’.159 This article later came to be famous because, 
as was often the case with Febvre, it was in the nature of a scholarly pro-
gramme. The article’s argument ends in a series of suggestions for new 
historical themes: a history of love, death, piety, cruelty, joy and fear. 
This list is reminiscent of Huizinga’s list of wishes, which includes a his-
tory of vanity, pride, the seven cardinal sins, the garden, the market, the 
horse, the inn, etc.160
The interests of Huizinga and of the historians of the Annales display 
remarkable similarities. However, there was hardly any contact between 
them, and certainly no cooperation ever evolved. In the index of names 
to Huizinga’s Collected works the names of Bloch and Febvre take a mod-
est place. Febvre is mentioned three times in passing and his name does 
not appear at all in Huizinga’s overview of De geschiedschrijving in het 
hedendaagsche Frankrijk (Historiography in present-day France), which 
appeared in 1931. Marc Bloch only appears as the author of reviews in 
the Revue Historique. The name of the journal Annales is not mentioned 
anywhere and the only thing Huizinga ever wrote about the work of 
both founding fathers of the Annales was a rather critical review of Marc 
Bloch’s Les Rois thaumaturges.
Thus Huizinga’s interest in the Annales was limited and by the same 
token little interest was shown in his work by them. For instance, the 
French translation of The Waning of the Middle Ages has never been 
reviewed in the Annales. Marc Bloch did review the German edition of 
the book in the Bulletin de la Faculté des Lettres de Strasbourg. It appears 
from the Correspondence that Febvre asked Huizinga for an article for 
the Annales twice within a brief period at the end of 1933. Apparently the 
first letter received a hesitant reply from Huizinga. Febvre did not give 
up immediately but wrote in his next letter that the whole of The Wan-
ing of the Middle Ages would have been appropriate for publication in the 
Annales: ‘Tous les chapitres de votre Déclin du Moyen-Age auraient pu 
y paraître les uns après les autres’ (‘All chapters of your Waning of the 
Middle Ages could have appeared here one after the other’). Huizinga 
next submitted two topics for publication, which were apparently not to 
Febvre’s liking. Huizinga then told him he did not have anything else to 
submit and had in the meantime become occupied with other subjects.161
Nothing came of Huizinga’s cooperation with the Annales. This is 
because the editors did not contact him until after The Waning of the 
Middle Ages had been published in French. By then Huizinga had largely 
shifted his attention from cultural history to cultural criticism. The fact 
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that an entire group of historians had devoted themselves to an area that 
he once had explored all by himself seems to have escaped his atten-
tion completely. The journal Annales appeared for the first time in 1929. 
The Waning of the Middle Ages was published in 1919. The French edition 
appeared in 1932, as we have seen. One wonders how things would have 
turned out had Champion published the book in 1922 or 1923.
from cultural historian to cultural critic
As has been mentioned, Huizinga’s productivity abated somewhat after 
his fifty-fifth year, yet it still remained considerable. The nature of his 
work changed however. In the thirties, from having been a cultural 
historian he became first and foremost a cultural critic, rather than a 
scholar he now was an intellectual. The extent to which that transition 
was either the result of a conscious choice or of circumstances is diffi-
cult to ascertain. In his major work about modern Dutch historiography 
the Belgian historian Jo Tollebeek wrote that circumstances after 1933 
‘forced [...] Huizinga to a fundamental cultural criticism’.162 That is put-
ting it a bit strongly. It was most probably a combination of factors that 
brought Huizinga to undertake his activities as a cultural critic. The situ-
ation in the world was of course important, but his personal develop-
ment also played a role.
It seems that by the end of the 1920s, his main creative wave had run 
its course and his doubts about the importance of purely scholarly work 
grew. These doubts had always been present in him. Huizinga had always 
been more of a generalist than a specialist. He preferred to write for a 
cultural journal such as De Gids rather than for a specialist historical jour-
nal such as the Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis. Nevertheless, he had been 
extremely successful as a historian. He was undoubtedly held in high 
regard as a scholar in the Netherlands, as well as becoming a member 
and eventually the president of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences. And as a historian he was also known and acknowledged 
abroad. Would it not have been appealing to follow up on these academic 
successes by playing a role outside of the academic and university world, 
and to make known to a wider public the opinions and insights in mod-
ern civilization he had developed? In other words, was not the time right 
to take up a more important position in the intellectual and cultural life 
of his times? It seems not too implausible that such ideas and emotions 
must have gone through his mind. Maybe his domestic circumstances 
also played a role. The first phase of life after his first wife’s death, which 
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had been colored by his family and work, ended around 1930. Whatever 
brought Huizinga to his new activities, it is certain that he played his 
new role of cultural critic with great enthusiasm, and that he felt com-
fortable in this role. It added a new element to his fulfilling existence. It 
is to this part of his work and particularly to In the Shadows of Tomorrow, 
his main work in this area, that we must now turn.
In October 1933, Huizinga gave a lecture on ‘The future of the Euro-
pean spirit’ to the Committee of Arts and Literature of the League of 
Nations.163 This presentation, which was followed by a discussion with 
prominent European intellectuals such as Julien Benda, Aldous Huxley, 
Paul Valéry and others, can be regarded as Huizinga’s first step on the 
road of contemporary cultural criticism. In fact, the two main themes 
of In the Shadows of Tomorrow can already be found in the last paragraph 
of this lecture. In the first sentence of this paragraph we find a warning: 
‘Europe today finds itself exposed to more than one force threatening 
to send it back to barbarism’.164 And the last sentence contains a recom-
mendation: ‘It is, after all, only the moral practice of communities and 
individuals that can cure our poor world, so rich and yet so infirm’.165 The 
entire work, Shadows, published later is no more than an elaboration of 
these two themes.
In 1934, he further elaborates on this in an open letter to Julien 
Benda.166 Nationalism, superstition in technology, the need for ascesis, 
familiar themes, are all discussed here. In that same year Nederland’s 
geestesmerk (The cultural identity of Holland) appears, which is a true 
ode to the Netherlands and a prayer of thanks for the divine blessing that 
rests on the history of this country. The book includes a paragraph on the 
‘Crisis of culture’,167 in which Huizinga announced that he would further 
elaborate later, in a larger work, on what he had only briefly touched 
upon here. Here too, we find themes such as technocracy and over-
organization, heroism and ‘puerilism’, the weakening of the morale and 
the decline of morals, the ‘error of universal suffrage’, political irrational-
ism, and such like. Then he was invited to deliver a speech at a dinner at 
‘De Grote Club’ in Amsterdam in 1934 on the topic: ‘Is our civilization 
in danger?’168 And finally on February 8, 1935, Huizinga gave a speech 
in Brussels about the ‘Crisis of civilization’. This speech was to become 
the reason for him to write his most successful work: In the Shadows of 
Tomorrow.
This book is no doubt Huizinga’s main cultural critical work. The title 
provides an indication of its content. It is about the future of culture, the 
prospects for which are not good. The subtitle Een diagnose van het gees-
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telijk lijden van onzen tijd (A diagnosis of the mental suffering of our time) 
makes this even clearer. The book is about suffering, and the author obvi-
ously sees himself as a doctor who wants to diagnose the disease.
This is the main theme of the book, which is elaborated in twenty-
one brief, sometimes very brief, chapters. In each of these chapters is 
described one of the ailments of contemporary civilization. This is preced-
ed by some general paragraphs in which the cultural crisis is determined, 
compared with the past and placed in the framework of an analysis of the 
cultural concept itself. Some themes may now be familiar: the weaken-
ing of judgement (illustrated by cinema and advertising), the decline of 
the critical mind (apparent from the theories on race and Freud’s ide-
as), the abuse of science (expressed in birth control and bacteriological 
warfare — a surprising combination at first glance), the betrayal of the 
knowledge ideal (by placing the will higher than knowledge), the cult 
of life (which results in an overestimation of earthly happiness and a 
lack of interest in the hereafter), the decline of moral standards both in 
the international community (as expressed in the theory of the amoral 
state), and in private life (impurity, glorification of vice, the romanti-
cized view of crime), the cult of heroism (called the ‘superficial vogue 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy’)169, ‘puerilism’ (meaning the glorification of 
records, sports, games and of youth), lack of style and other wrongs in 
modern art.
Finally, Huizinga discusses the chances of recovery. Social, political 
and economic reform will not suffice. They will solve some problems but 
if the same spirit remains in control, civilization will not be restored: ‘A 
new spirit is needed’, ‘an internal cleansing’, ‘the mental habitus of peo-
ple needs to be changed’.170 This is the way he puts it in the last chapter 
entitled “Catharsis”. To achieve that catharsis, a new ascesis is needed, a 
‘surrender (...) to what may be considered the highest’, not to the state 
or people or class or individual happiness, but to ‘He who said: “I am the 
way, the truth and the life”.’171
This is the way it should be, but will it really turn out this way? Huiz-
inga does not express his opinion on this. After all, the book was only 
presented as a ‘diagnosis’, and one should not look for a prognosis or a 
therapy. Nevertheless, there is something of a prognosis to be found in 
the text (the patient is sick, but not yet doomed) together with a remedy 
(ascesis and reconsideration are prescribed).
The main idea of Shadows then is that civilization is in decline and that 
this can be reversed only by a spiritual, internal regeneration through 
the recovery of an absolute moral embedded in metaphysics. This idea 
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can also be found in many other writings, both long and short, such as 
‘Humanisme ou humanités?’, ‘Geistige Zusammenarbeit der Völker’, 
‘Conditions for a recovery of civilization’, which Huizinga published in 
the years that followed.172 They also constitute the core of his second 
large work about the cultural crisis of his time, Geschonden wereld (Dam-
aged world), which was written under difficult circumstances during the 
war, and which was published in 1945, shortly after that war and shortly 
after the end of his own life.173
I can be brief about this last work, not because it is without signifi-
cance, but because insofar as it adds new elements to Huizinga’s earlier 
work, particularly in the shape of fairly extensive semantic and historical 
views of the concepts of civilization and culture, it is of little relevance 
with regard to our topic. While, insofar as it does relate to our topic, the 
book offers the same diagnosis (the crisis is a cultural crisis), the same 
prognosis (the future is uncertain, but we have to keep hoping) and the 
same therapy (remedy has to come from an ethical reconsideration and 
individual catharsis) as Shadows.
In Shadows, Huizinga also paid attention to international political 
morals. This topic was very important to him and was also to take up 
a considerable place in his Damaged world. Huizinga resisted the view 
of the amoral state, as did Hugo Grotius and his friend and colleague 
from Leiden the lawyer Cornelis van Vollenhoven before him, and made 
a plea for an international moral standard. He opposed especially the 
philosophy of the German lawyer Carl Schmitt, who had argued that the 
issue between states was not about right or wrong, but about friend or 
foe. With this he touched on one of the most important German histori-
cal traditions, that of the ‘Primat der Aussenpolitik’. His remarks in this 
context about the work of Gerhard Ritter led to a correspondence with 
‘this exceptional and calmly thinking historian’ which somewhat tem-
pered the debate.174 The German government was less composed in its 
reaction as becomes clear from the fact that after Shadows, Huizinga’s 
name started to appear on the official German Listen des schädlichen und 
unerwünschten Schrifttums (Lists of damaging and undesirable books).175
In the Shadows of Tomorrow was a successful book, and it made Huiz-
inga world-famous. A great deal has been written about it, then and later, 
and many have studied the source and meaning of the views voiced in it. 
Were they merely an expression of the emotions of an old and downcast 
man, or was there more to it? Dutch critics such as the essayist Jacques 
de Kadt, the historian Jan Romein, a former student of Huizinga, and 
others regarded it as a cry for help coming from a member of the petty 
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bourgeoisie and emphasized the class-relatedness of his ideas. Others 
still, the German national-socialists for instance, regarded his ideas as 
typically Dutch. This is all true, but first and foremost it is a book that is 
characteristic of the period in which it originated. Therefore we should 
not only focus our attention on the spirit of Huizinga himself, but also on 
that of his time, the nineteen thirties.
huizinga and the spirit of the nineteen thirties
Huizinga’s book about the mental suffering of his time was one of many. 
There was a great deal of true suffering in the thirties, particularly in the 
forms of poverty and unemployment. It was a period of general angst. 
The fact that so many books about crisis and decline appeared in that 
particular period was not surprising. The First World War had ended a 
period of optimism and long-term international stability. The Russian 
Revolution of 1917 had resulted in the first modern dictatorship. Mus-
solini established the first fascist dictatorship in the twenties, followed 
in the thirties by the economic crisis and the rise of Hitler. It would have 
been astonishing had historians and intellectuals refrained from study-
ing these phenomena and had priests and ministers refrained from ask-
ing people to pray and keep hope.
A large number of important works on this theme of crisis appeared, 
with the best known being Oswald Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abend-
landes.176 Albert Schweitzer published the first part of his Kulturphiloso-
phie in 1923, which started with the simple yet catching observation: ‘We 
live under the sign of the decline of civilization’.177 As early as 1919, Paul 
Valéry published his La Crise de l’esprit in which he wrote: ‘Nous autres, 
civilisations, nous savons maintenant que nous sommes mortelles’ (We, 
civilizations, now know that we are mortal).178 In his book about the 
‘new Middle Ages’, the Russian emigrant Berdjajev gave his view on the 
difference between Western elements of European culture — meaning 
focused on the earthly and finite — and Eastern elements — focused on 
the revelation and the infinite. He felt the future lay in the Eastern ele-
ment, because it held the remedy against the mechanistic and atheistic 
spirit of the West.179 The German count and philosopher Keyserling pub-
lished Das Spektrum Europas in 1928. In it he stressed the diversity with-
in the European cultural spectrum as well as the unity of Europe. That 
unity was to be found in the European spirit. The task of Europe was to 
preserve ‘the holy fire of the spirit’.180 Keyserling founded his ‘Schule der 
Weisheit’ (School of wisdom) in Darmstadt for this very purpose.
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The thirties showed a true explosion of crisis studies. Arnold Toynbee 
published the first three parts of his major Spenglerian Study of history 
in 1934.181 The American sociologist of Russian descent, Pitirim Sorokin, 
concluded in 1937, according to him “on the basis of a vast body of evi-
dence”, that Western society was in an extraordinary crisis.182 Toynbee 
and Sorokin however were not to become famous until after the Second 
World War.
The authors in the area of cultural criticism who did become known 
in the thirties were others, the most famous probably being Ortega y 
Gasset and Julien Benda, but there were more. Ernst Jünger gave his view 
on modern man in Der Arbeiter, published in 1932.183 In the same year, 
Henri Bergson published Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion and 
Jacques Maritain published Humanisme intégral in 1936.184 Henri Mas-
sis, a definite right-wing ideologist, wrote his Défense de l’Occident,185 in 
which he compared the West with the East and defended the West.
Poets and novelists such as Yeats and Eliot also expressed complaints 
about the decline of civilization and views on what caused it, as well as 
about the opportunities for restoration by way of introducing authori-
tarian and/or aristocratic systems. The thirties can rightly be called the 
golden age of intellectual commitment. Some of these authors commit-
ted themselves to the communist ideology and the Soviet Union, oth-
ers to fascism or national socialism. However, there were others still 
who could not find satisfaction in these movements and who sought 
new solutions. That is why a restless search for new ways and methods 
became apparent in these years, this having been characterized by the 
phrase ‘L’esprit des années trente’.186
For some, the crisis of the thirties was primarily a socio-economic cri-
sis, a crisis of capitalism. They looked for new forms of socio-economic 
structuring and organization. Others felt it constituted a crisis of democ-
racy. They looked for new forms of leadership and political organization. 
Still others — with one view not excluding another, of course — focused 
mainly on the international crisis, the crisis of the European system of 
states, which was a result of nationalism gone haywire. They looked for 
new forms of international organization, such as the League of Nations 
and the Pan-Europe movement.
However, there was also a group of people who regarded the crisis 
a cultural crisis in essence. And Huizinga belonged to this group. He 
had little interest in socio-economic aspects. Politics was another area 
in which he was not particularly interested, although he did have ideas 
about it. He felt democracy was only acceptable with ‘the addition of an 
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element of aristocracy’,187 and regarded the system of proportional rep-
resentation ‘the silliest mistake (...) a doctrinal theory of state has ever 
made’.188 He paid a great deal of attention to the dangers of nationalism 
and international rivalry. He deemed an international moral and supra-
state organization necessary. All these themes are dealt with in his work, 
yet to him the main issue was the crisis of culture.
Huizinga’s cultural criticism belongs to the aristocratic school. With 
it — and in the nature of his analyses — his views sometimes came close 
to those of some fascist and reactionary cultural critics. His witticisms 
about the irrational character of the democracy, his concern about ‘the 
extinction of the supply of indigenous people’ in Western Europe189, his 
complaint about ‘the depraved half-civilised’ human being who does not 
know the wholesome restrictions of respect for tradition190, his aversion 
to modern art and compulsory education, his concerns about mechani-
zation, urbanization, the decay of the landscape, the ugliness of the sub-
urbs, and so many other things, remind us of reactionary authors such 
as Yeats, Eliot, Bernanos, Massis and others. It would not be difficult to 
compile an anthology of statements and judgements expressed by Huiz-
inga that can also be found in the writings of the many reactionary and 
fascist authors who were active during the period between the two wars. 
On the other hand, it would also not be difficult to compile a similar 
anthology of statements made by Huizinga in which the social and politi-
cal opinions of these authors are contested. The latter is less surprising 
than the former, but it is more important, because, given the influence of 
their era on all these authors, their mutual differences are the issue here. 
There are a number of differences, and they are significant.
In the first place, Huizinga often implicitly compares the present 
with a past, idealized or not, and this has to be so because otherwise one 
would not be able to discern either changes or decline. However, he does 
not want to return to that past, at least he realizes that this is impossible. 
Huizinga is too much of a historian to believe in such a return. Civiliza-
tion has developed, and will develop further. We should not go back, he 
argues, but must move forward. We have to get through this crisis, even 
if we do not know where this will lead us. We have to keep creating cul-
ture, he says. This shows that Huizinga was not a reactionary. The second 
difference with at least some of the reactionary thinkers of that time 
stems from Huizinga’s faith. He shows his Christianity in his work and 
he places his faith in the restoration of Christian values. The third differ-
ence is that Huizinga has never wanted to commit himself, politically or 
in any other way. In this respect he resembles Julien Benda, who pointed 
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out in his La trahison des clercs that commitment was the main sin of 
the modern intellectual. He also kept a certain distance with regard to 
the ‘Committee of vigilance of anti-national socialist intellectuals’, even 
though he certainly sympathized with their ideas.
The fourth and final difference stems from the true sobriety and bour-
geois mentality that marked his character and his world. There was a 
clear aristocratic element in his aversion to modern culture. In his con-
cern about the phenomena of his time and the rise of the half-civilized 
human being, Huizinga was no doubt honest. However, he had too much 
common sense to believe in ‘the new man’ of the fascists and the commu-
nists, and he was too much of an Erasmian not to detest fanaticism and 
radicalism, too much of a historian not to be convinced of the relativity 
of things, and too much of a Christian not to be aware of the limited 
capacity of man to take control of his own fate. And, as a native of Gron-
ingen, he after all was a very down-to-earth type of man. One should not 
expect too much zeal for the creation of the new man from someone who 
used to call it a day at ten o’clock every night, saying: “I don’t know about 
you, but I am going to bed”.191
conclusion
We live in a world that is radically different from that of Huizinga, and 
we know it. The period between 1914 and 1945 was indeed, as was expe-
rienced and described by many, a time of crisis or at least transition. 
The position of Europe in the world, which in the previous century had 
been so dominant that it sometimes seemed as if the rest of the world 
did not matter, was changing. The colonial era drew to an end. America 
informally took over leadership of the world after 1914–1918, and did so 
formally after 1940–1945. Correspondingly, there was a change in soci-
ety that is often rightly called the ‘Americanization’ of society.
The crisis caused by these social and global changes is now over and 
done with. The masses have not adjusted to fit the elite, but rather the 
elite have adopted the taste of the masses. That is why a typical thirties 
theme such as that of elite-versus-masses is no longer topical: the dis-
tinction no longer exists. It has often been said in reaction to the success 
of books such as Huizinga’s Shadows and Ortega’s Rebellion of the Masses 
that penitential sermons always have been popular. But that too is no 
longer the case. The prevailing mood is no longer one of pessimism, but 
one of optimism.
The remarkable thing is that already immediately after 1945 this 
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development was clearly to be seen. One would expect that the Second 
World War and the holocaust, the atom bomb and the Cold War would 
only have reinforced the mood of crisis. But they did not, at least not 
with regard to the future of European civilization. In the second half of 
the forties quite a number of books appeared on ‘the-crisis-of-Europe-
and-its-civilization’, but in them, besides the many concerns expressed, a 
certain optimism could be detected: democracy had won, western civili-
zation had proved it was alive, once again our culture had a future. And 
in later years these feelings became even stronger. Today, we are satisfied 
with our wealth, generally speaking, with our society and even with our 
culture. As in the years before 1900, we have experienced a fin de siècle, 
but this time without many feelings of crisis. We know, either from what 
we read, or more likely, from what we see of other continents on televi-
sion, that things can be different, and we are not envious: neither of the 
disciplined way of life in wealthy Japan nor of the poverty of Africa or 
equally of the veiled and alcohol-free life under the ayatollah regime. We 
may be living in a world that is ‘possessed’, to quote the famous opening 
words of In the Shadows of Tomorrow, but we are certainly not doing too 
badly.
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